Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-72860 (GCVE-0-2026-72860)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-20 21:35 – Updated: 2026-08-21 11:21

Title

9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable

Summary

The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

6.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CWE-184 - Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root

References

6 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293	issue-tracking
https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/sr…	technical-description
https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/sr…	technical-description
https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370	issue-tracking
https://github.com/decolua/9router	product
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-serv…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
decolua	9router	Affected: 0 , ≤ 0.5.55 (custom)	guessed

Date Public

2026-08-14 00:00

Credits

HK4zCzi

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://registry.npmjs.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "9router",
          "packageURL": "pkg:npm/9router",
          "product": "9router",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js",
            "src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/decolua/9router",
          "vendor": "decolua",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.5.55",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "HK4zCzi"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-08-14T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL(\"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 8.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
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            "version": "3.1"
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        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
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            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
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            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs",
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              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T11:21:00.284Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Issue #3293",
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293"
        },
        {
          "name": "assertPublicUrl and the unreachable IPv4-mapped branch in isBlockedIpv6",
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js"
        },
        {
          "name": "validate route applying the guard and reflecting 200 bytes",
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js"
        },
        {
          "name": "Proposed fix judging mapped addresses by address rather than spelling (not merged)",
          "tags": [
            "issue-tracking"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "product"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: 9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable"
        }
      ],
      "title": "9router Server-Side Request Forgery via /api/provider-nodes/validate Because the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Denylist Check Is Unreachable",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-72860",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-20T21:35:14.677Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-10T15:16:31.372Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T11:21:00.284Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-72860",
      "date": "2026-08-22",
      "epss": "0.00218",
      "percentile": "0.12539"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-72860\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"published\":\"2026-08-20T22:18:05.787\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-20T22:18:05.787\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\\\\d+\\\\.\\\\d+\\\\.\\\\d+\\\\.\\\\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL(\\\"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\\\").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"decolua\",\"product\":\"9router\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"collectionURL\":\"https://registry.npmjs.org\",\"packageName\":\"9router\",\"programFiles\":[\"src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js\",\"src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js\"],\"repo\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router\",\"packageURL\":\"pkg:npm/9router\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"0\",\"lessThanOrEqual\":\"0.5.55\",\"versionType\":\"custom\",\"status\":\"affected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":6.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"NONE\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}],\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N\",\"baseScore\":8.5,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"CHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"NONE\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.1,\"impactScore\":4.7}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-184\"},{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-918\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"}]}}"
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-72860

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-20 22:18 - Updated: 2026-08-20 22:18

Severity

8.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://github.com/decolua/9router
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370
	disclosure@vulncheck.com	https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://registry.npmjs.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "9router",
          "packageURL": "pkg:npm/9router",
          "product": "9router",
          "programFiles": [
            "src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js",
            "src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js"
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/decolua/9router",
          "vendor": "decolua",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "0.5.55",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "custom"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL(\"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-72860",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-20T22:18:05.787",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.5,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 4.7,
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "NONE",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 6.3,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-20T22:18:05.787",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370"
    },
    {
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-184"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-918"
        }
      ],
      "source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CQGH-7H49-Q3MR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-21 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-21 00:31

Details

The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\d+.\d+.\d+.\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL("http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T22:18:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The POST /api/provider-nodes/validate route in 9router takes a caller-supplied baseUrl and issues server-side HTTP requests to it, guarding the destination with assertPublicUrl from src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js. That guard compares hostname strings only: it resolves no DNS, does not revalidate after a redirect, and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 branch is unreachable. The branch matches ^::ffff:(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)$, but the WHATWG URL parser canonicalizes such literals to hextets before the guard runs, so new URL(\"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/\").hostname yields [::ffff:7f00:1] and the pattern is tested against a string it is never handed. Every IPv4-mapped address therefore passes, and http://[::ffff:7f00:1] and http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe] reach loopback and link-local metadata addresses; a hostname whose A record points at an internal address passes as well because no resolution occurs. In the custom-embedding branch the upstream response body is truncated to 200 bytes and returned to the caller whenever the upstream status is neither 2xx nor 401 nor 403, which discloses the beginning of internal responses, and the other validation types remain usable for blind internal port scanning through status and timing differences. The caller-supplied apiKey is forwarded to the internal destination as an Authorization Bearer header. A dashboard session is required by default, and none is required when requireLogin is disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-cqgh-7h49-q3mr",
  "modified": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-21T00:31:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72860"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/issues/3293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/pull/3370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/app/api/provider-nodes/validate/route.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/decolua/9router/blob/master/src/shared/utils/ssrfGuard.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-server-side-request-forgery-via-api-provider-nodes-validate-because-the-ipv4-mapped-ipv6-denylist-check-is-unreachable"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-72860 (GCVE-0-2026-72860)

FKIE_CVE-2026-72860

GHSA-CQGH-7H49-Q3MR

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature