cve-2024-47742
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2024-10-21 12:14
Modified
2024-12-19 09:27
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware_loader: Block path traversal Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex numbers or such. However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file names contain string components that are passed through from a device or semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces that require root privileges) are: - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware filename from "ModelName", a string that was previously parsed out of some descriptor ("Vital Product Data") in lpfc_fill_vpd() - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, "nffw.partno"), which I think parses some descriptor that was read from the device. (But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks like "netronome/nic_%s", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting with "netronome/nic_". The previous case was different because there, the "%s" is *at the start* of the format string.) - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided firmware name. (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into, so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.) Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing ".." path components. For what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
Version: abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e
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   Linux Linux Version: 3.7
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      datePublished: "2024-10-21T12:14:10.499Z",
      dateReserved: "2024-09-30T16:00:12.959Z",
      dateUpdated: "2024-12-19T09:27:12.659Z",
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The previous case was different because there,\\n   the \\\"%s\\\" is *at the start* of the format string.)\\n - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the\\n   ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as\\n   GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is\\n   enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided\\n   firmware name.\\n   (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a\\n   network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into,\\n   so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.)\\n\\nFix it by rejecting any firmware names containing \\\"..\\\" path components.\\n\\nFor what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device\\ndrivers that use the firmware loader dangerously.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: firmware_loader: Block path traversal La mayoría de los nombres de firmware son cadenas codificadas o se construyen a partir de cadenas de formato bastante restringidas donde las partes dinámicas son solo algunos números hexadecimales o algo así. Sin embargo, hay un par de rutas de código en el kernel donde los nombres de archivo de firmware contienen componentes de cadena que se pasan desde un dispositivo o un espacio de usuario semiprivilegiado; los que pude encontrar (sin contar las interfaces que requieren privilegios de root) son: - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() parece construir el nombre de archivo de firmware a partir de \\\"ModelName\\\", una cadena que se analizó previamente a partir de algún descriptor (\\\"Vital Product Data\\\") en lpfc_fill_vpd() - nfp_net_fw_find() parece construir un nombre de archivo de firmware a partir de un nombre de modelo que proviene de nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, \\\"nffw.partno\\\"), que creo que analiza algún descriptor que se leyó desde el dispositivo. (Pero este caso probablemente no sea explotable porque la cadena de formato se parece a \\\"netronome/nic_%s\\\", y no debería haber ninguna *carpeta* que comience con \\\"netronome/nic_\\\". El caso anterior era diferente porque allí, el \\\"%s\\\" está *al comienzo* de la cadena de formato). - module_flash_fw_schedule() es accesible desde el comando netlink ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT, que está marcado como GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (lo que significa que CAP_NET_ADMIN dentro de un espacio de nombres de usuario es suficiente para pasar la verificación de privilegios), y toma un nombre de firmware provisto por el espacio de usuario. (Pero creo que para llegar a este caso, necesita tener CAP_NET_ADMIN sobre un espacio de nombres de red en el que se asigna un tipo especial de dispositivo Ethernet, por lo que creo que esta no es una ruta de ataque viable en la práctica). Arréglelo rechazando cualquier nombre de firmware que contenga componentes de ruta \\\"..\\\" Por si sirve de algo, he buscado y no he encontrado ningún controlador de dispositivo USB que utilice el cargador de firmware de forma peligrosa.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\",\"baseScore\":7.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":5.9}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-22\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"3.7\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"5.10.227\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"3B73A13A-D7BE-4035-BEF2-2821D9D5CB6D\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"5.11\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"5.15.168\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"4D51C05D-455B-4D8D-89E7-A58E140B864C\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"5.16\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.1.113\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"D01BD22E-ACD1-4618-9D01-6116570BE1EE\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.2\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.6.54\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"D448821D-C085-4CAF-88FA-2DDE7BE21976\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.7\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.10.13\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"CE94BB8D-B0AB-4563-9ED7-A12122B56EBE\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.11\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.11.2\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"AB755D26-97F4-43B6-8604-CD076811E181\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f1cd94d3f1092728fb775a0fe26c5f1ac2ebeb\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d2411f4edcb649eaf232160db459bb4770b5251\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4e13fdfcab34811c3143a0a03c05fec4e870ec\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7420c1bf7fc784e587b87329cc6dfa3dca537aa4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b1ca33ebd05b3acef5b976c04e5e791af93ce1b\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a77fc4acfd49fc6076e565445b2bc5fdc3244da4\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c30558e6c5c9ad6c86459d9acce1520ceeab9ea6\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1768e5535d3ded59f888637016e6f821f4e069f\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\"},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0e5311aa8022107d63c54e2f03684ec097d1394\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}",
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\"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"9b1ca33ebd05b3acef5b976c04e5e791af93ce1b\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"c30558e6c5c9ad6c86459d9acce1520ceeab9ea6\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"a77fc4acfd49fc6076e565445b2bc5fdc3244da4\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"3d2411f4edcb649eaf232160db459bb4770b5251\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"7420c1bf7fc784e587b87329cc6dfa3dca537aa4\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"28f1cd94d3f1092728fb775a0fe26c5f1ac2ebeb\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"6c4e13fdfcab34811c3143a0a03c05fec4e870ec\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}, {\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e\", \"lessThan\": \"f0e5311aa8022107d63c54e2f03684ec097d1394\", \"versionType\": \"git\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"unaffected\"}, {\"repo\": \"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git\", \"vendor\": \"Linux\", \"product\": \"Linux\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"3.7\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"0\", \"lessThan\": \"3.7\", \"versionType\": \"semver\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"4.19.323\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"4.19.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"5.4.285\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"5.4.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"5.10.227\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"5.10.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"5.15.168\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"5.15.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.1.113\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.1.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.6.54\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.6.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.10.13\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.10.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.11.2\", \"versionType\": \"semver\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"6.11.*\"}, {\"status\": \"unaffected\", \"version\": \"6.12\", \"versionType\": \"original_commit_for_fix\", \"lessThanOrEqual\": \"*\"}], \"programFiles\": [\"drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c\"], \"defaultStatus\": \"affected\"}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1768e5535d3ded59f888637016e6f821f4e069f\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b1ca33ebd05b3acef5b976c04e5e791af93ce1b\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c30558e6c5c9ad6c86459d9acce1520ceeab9ea6\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a77fc4acfd49fc6076e565445b2bc5fdc3244da4\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d2411f4edcb649eaf232160db459bb4770b5251\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7420c1bf7fc784e587b87329cc6dfa3dca537aa4\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f1cd94d3f1092728fb775a0fe26c5f1ac2ebeb\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4e13fdfcab34811c3143a0a03c05fec4e870ec\"}, {\"url\": \"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0e5311aa8022107d63c54e2f03684ec097d1394\"}], \"x_generator\": {\"engine\": \"bippy-5f407fcff5a0\"}, \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\nfirmware_loader: Block path traversal\\n\\nMost firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly\\nconstrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex\\nnumbers or such.\\n\\nHowever, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file\\nnames contain string components that are passed through from a device or\\nsemi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces\\nthat require root privileges) are:\\n\\n - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware\\n   filename from \\\"ModelName\\\", a string that was previously parsed out of\\n   some descriptor (\\\"Vital Product Data\\\") in lpfc_fill_vpd()\\n - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model\\n   name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, \\\"nffw.partno\\\"), which I\\n   think parses some descriptor that was read from the device.\\n   (But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks\\n   like \\\"netronome/nic_%s\\\", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting\\n   with \\\"netronome/nic_\\\". The previous case was different because there,\\n   the \\\"%s\\\" is *at the start* of the format string.)\\n - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the\\n   ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as\\n   GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is\\n   enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided\\n   firmware name.\\n   (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a\\n   network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into,\\n   so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.)\\n\\nFix it by rejecting any firmware names containing \\\"..\\\" path components.\\n\\nFor what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device\\ndrivers that use the firmware loader dangerously.\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"shortName\": \"Linux\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-12-19T09:27:12.659Z\"}}}",
         cveMetadata: "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2024-47742\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-12-19T09:27:12.659Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2024-09-30T16:00:12.959Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\", \"datePublished\": \"2024-10-21T12:14:10.499Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"Linux\"}",
         dataType: "CVE_RECORD",
         dataVersion: "5.1",
      },
   },
}


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