BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-C28G-VH7M-FM7V)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-25 08:57 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Owner-enforced commands could accept wildcard channel senders as command owners
Details

Impact

OpenClaw deployments before 2026.4.21 could treat a non-owner sender as authorized for owner-enforced slash commands when all of the following were true:

  • a channel plugin declared commands.enforceOwnerForCommands: true;
  • the channel accepted wildcard inbound senders with allowFrom: ["*"];
  • no explicit commands.ownerAllowFrom was configured.

In that state, src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts reused the channel inbound wildcard as part of the command-owner decision. A sender who was not the owner could therefore pass the owner-command gate for commands such as /send, /config, or /debug on the affected channel.

The issue is limited to the command-owner authorization axis. It does not by itself grant owner-only tool access, host/sandbox access, or gateway administrator scope.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw on npm
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.4.20
  • Patched version: 2026.4.21

The latest public release, 2026.4.21, contains the fix.

Patches

The fix requires a concrete owner identity or internal operator-admin scope when a plugin enforces owner-only commands. Wildcard channel allowFrom no longer implies wildcard command ownership.

Fix commits:

  • 2aa93d44a1b2c7058c371f261fda2b5d4de4a882 on main
  • 995febb7b1e811ff6a1df5b18c22de94103f4c9f in the 2026.4.21 release line

Workarounds

Upgrade to openclaw@2026.4.21 or later. Before upgrading, avoid wildcard/open-DM sender policy on owner-enforced channels, or configure commands.ownerAllowFrom to the intended owner identities.

Credits

OpenClaw thanks @zsxsoft for reporting.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.21"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.6",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.9.6"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nOpenClaw deployments before `2026.4.21` could treat a non-owner sender as authorized for owner-enforced slash commands when all of the following were true:\n\n- a channel plugin declared `commands.enforceOwnerForCommands: true`;\n- the channel accepted wildcard inbound senders with `allowFrom: [\"*\"]`;\n- no explicit `commands.ownerAllowFrom` was configured.\n\nIn that state, `src/auto-reply/command-auth.ts` reused the channel inbound wildcard as part of the command-owner decision. A sender who was not the owner could therefore pass the owner-command gate for commands such as `/send`, `/config`, or `/debug` on the affected channel.\n\nThe issue is limited to the command-owner authorization axis. It does not by itself grant owner-only tool access, host/sandbox access, or gateway administrator scope.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.4.20`\n- Patched version: `2026.4.21`\n\nThe latest public release, `2026.4.21`, contains the fix.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe fix requires a concrete owner identity or internal operator-admin scope when a plugin enforces owner-only commands. Wildcard channel `allowFrom` no longer implies wildcard command ownership.\n\nFix commits:\n\n- `2aa93d44a1b2c7058c371f261fda2b5d4de4a882` on `main`\n- `995febb7b1e811ff6a1df5b18c22de94103f4c9f` in the `2026.4.21` release line\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.4.21` or later. Before upgrading, avoid wildcard/open-DM sender policy on owner-enforced channels, or configure `commands.ownerAllowFrom` to the intended owner identities.\n\n## Credits\n\nOpenClaw thanks @zsxsoft for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-44991",
  "modified": "2026-09-25T08:57:16Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-c28g-vh7m-fm7v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44991"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2aa93d44a1b2c7058c371f261fda2b5d4de4a882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/995febb7b1e811ff6a1df5b18c22de94103f4c9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-in-owner-enforced-commands-via-wildcard-channel-senders"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Owner-enforced commands could accept wildcard channel senders as command owners",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-c28g-vh7m-fm7v",
    "CVE-2026-44991"
  ]
}



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