GHSA-P3M8-78J2-G5P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 15:40 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:40NLTK's pathsec.py security module defaults to ENFORCE=False (line 24), which means all 8 security validation functions only emit RuntimeWarning instead of raising exceptions when violations are detected.
The pathsec module was introduced as the fix for CVE-2024-39705 (arbitrary code execution via pickle) and CVE-2026-0846 (path traversal). However, with ENFORCE=False as the default:
- pathsec.open('/etc/passwd') succeeds (reads the file, emits warning)
- pathsec.validate_network_url('http://169.254.169.254/...') succeeds (warning only)
- pickle.loads() via nltk.data.load() proceeds despite unsafe source (warning only)
Every security gate follows the same pattern:
ENFORCE = os.environ.get('NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE', '').lower() in ('1', 'true', 'yes')
def validate_something(path):
if is_violation(path):
if ENFORCE:
raise SecurityError('...') # Only raised when env var is set
else:
warnings.warn('...', RuntimeWarning) # Default: warning only
# Execution continues regardless
This means the security remediations for CVE-2024-39705 and CVE-2026-0846 are effectively disabled by default. Any user who installed NLTK 3.9.x expecting the security fixes to be active is still vulnerable unless they manually set NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE=1.
PoC:
import nltk.pathsec
import warnings
# Show that ENFORCE is False by default
print(f'ENFORCE = {nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE}') # False
# Attempt to read /etc/passwd through pathsec -- should be blocked
with warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as w:
warnings.simplefilter('always')
result = nltk.pathsec.open('/etc/passwd', 'r')
print(f'File opened: {result.name}') # /etc/passwd
print(f'Warning emitted: {w[0].message}') # RuntimeWarning (not an exception)
# Attack succeeds -- file is readable
The correct default is fail-secure: ENFORCE should be True unless explicitly disabled. The current default makes the security module opt-in rather than opt-out, defeating its purpose.
Suggested fix: Change default to ENFORCE=True. Users who need backwards compatibility can set NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE=0 to explicitly disable.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62388"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T15:40:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NLTK\u0027s pathsec.py security module defaults to ENFORCE=False (line 24), which means all 8 security validation functions only emit RuntimeWarning instead of raising exceptions when violations are detected.\n\nThe pathsec module was introduced as the fix for CVE-2024-39705 (arbitrary code execution via pickle) and CVE-2026-0846 (path traversal). However, with ENFORCE=False as the default:\n\n1. pathsec.open(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027) succeeds (reads the file, emits warning)\n2. pathsec.validate_network_url(\u0027http://169.254.169.254/...\u0027) succeeds (warning only)\n3. pickle.loads() via nltk.data.load() proceeds despite unsafe source (warning only)\n\nEvery security gate follows the same pattern:\n```python\nENFORCE = os.environ.get(\u0027NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE\u0027, \u0027\u0027).lower() in (\u00271\u0027, \u0027true\u0027, \u0027yes\u0027)\n\ndef validate_something(path):\n if is_violation(path):\n if ENFORCE:\n raise SecurityError(\u0027...\u0027) # Only raised when env var is set\n else:\n warnings.warn(\u0027...\u0027, RuntimeWarning) # Default: warning only\n # Execution continues regardless\n```\n\nThis means the security remediations for CVE-2024-39705 and CVE-2026-0846 are effectively disabled by default. Any user who installed NLTK 3.9.x expecting the security fixes to be active is still vulnerable unless they manually set NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE=1.\n\nPoC:\n```python\nimport nltk.pathsec\nimport warnings\n\n# Show that ENFORCE is False by default\nprint(f\u0027ENFORCE = {nltk.pathsec.ENFORCE}\u0027) # False\n\n# Attempt to read /etc/passwd through pathsec -- should be blocked\nwith warnings.catch_warnings(record=True) as w:\n warnings.simplefilter(\u0027always\u0027)\n result = nltk.pathsec.open(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027r\u0027)\n print(f\u0027File opened: {result.name}\u0027) # /etc/passwd\n print(f\u0027Warning emitted: {w[0].message}\u0027) # RuntimeWarning (not an exception)\n # Attack succeeds -- file is readable\n```\n\nThe correct default is fail-secure: ENFORCE should be True unless explicitly disabled. The current default makes the security module opt-in rather than opt-out, defeating its purpose.\n\nSuggested fix: Change default to ENFORCE=True. Users who need backwards compatibility can set NLTK_PATHSEC_ENFORCE=0 to explicitly disable.",
"id": "GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3",
"modified": "2026-09-02T15:40:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T15:40:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-p3m8-78j2-g5p3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62388"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3593"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/155e40343cff0bf50d233e274a12e04d1428b1d9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3722.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-insecure-default-configuration-pathsec"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Default ENFORCE=False Disables All pathsec Security Controls"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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