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GHSA-CH57-39Q2-4CRM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 21:06 – Updated: 2026-06-03 21:06
VLAI
Summary
malla: Stored XSS via Meshtastic node names in multiple frontend pages
Details

Node names (long_name, short_name) received via MQTT are stored in SQLite without sanitization and rendered into the DOM without escaping. Any participant on a public Meshtastic MQTT broker can set a malicious node name that executes JavaScript in the browser of every Malla dashboard visitor.

Affected files:

  • src/malla/templates/traceroute_graph.html (line ~832)
  • src/malla/templates/map.html (lines ~945, 1078)
  • src/malla/templates/packet_detail.html (lines ~1402, 1452)
  • src/malla/static/js/relay_node_analysis.js (line ~124)

Steps to reproduce

  1. Publish a Meshtastic NODEINFO_APP packet to any public MQTT broker with long_name set to a HTML entity i.e <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
  2. Wait for malla-capture to store it
  3. Open the dashboard

Impact

Allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser, such as:

  • Phishing overlays
  • Force redirect to malicious websites
  • Injection of arbitrary third-party scripts (no CSP restrictions)
  • Browser resource abuse
  • Persistent dashboard denial of service
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "malla"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43980"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-03T21:06:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Node names (long_name, short_name) received via MQTT are stored in SQLite without sanitization and rendered into the DOM without escaping.\nAny participant on a public Meshtastic MQTT broker can set a malicious node name that executes JavaScript in the browser of every Malla dashboard visitor.\n\nAffected files:\n\n - src/malla/templates/traceroute_graph.html (line ~832)\n - src/malla/templates/map.html (lines ~945, 1078)\n - src/malla/templates/packet_detail.html (lines ~1402, 1452)\n - src/malla/static/js/relay_node_analysis.js (line ~124)\n\nSteps to reproduce\n\n 1. Publish a Meshtastic NODEINFO_APP packet to any public MQTT broker with long_name set to a HTML entity i.e `\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e`\n 2. Wait for malla-capture to store it\n 3. Open the dashboard\n\nImpact\n\nAllows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser, such as: \n\n - Phishing overlays\n - Force redirect to malicious websites\n - Injection of arbitrary third-party scripts (no CSP restrictions)\n - Browser resource abuse \n - Persistent dashboard denial of service",
  "id": "GHSA-ch57-39q2-4crm",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T21:06:27Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T21:06:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zenitraM/malla/security/advisories/GHSA-ch57-39q2-4crm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zenitraM/malla/commit/4086e2b5f61615a813b70b25bc76095083552135"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zenitraM/malla"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "malla: Stored XSS via Meshtastic node names in multiple frontend pages"
}



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