GHSA-R253-R9JW-QG44

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 17:25 – Updated: 2026-06-18 17:25
VLAI
Summary
Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated RCE via Chromium launch-argument injection in browser_config.extra_args
Details

Summary

The Docker API server accepted a request-supplied browser_config.extra_args, which flowed into Chromium's launch arguments. An attacker could inject Chromium switches that replace a child-process launch command (--utility-cmd-prefix, --renderer-cmd-prefix, --gpu-launcher, --browser-subprocess-path) together with --no-zygote, causing Chromium to fork/exec an attacker-controlled command as the container's runtime user. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default, so a single request yields arbitrary command execution.

The earlier extra_args SSRF patch (0.8.9) used a denylist scoped to proxy/DNS flags; a denylist of launch switches is inherently incomplete, and these command-execution switches were not covered.

Affected paths

/crawl, /crawl/stream, /crawl/job accepting a request browser_config.extra_args.

Impact

Unauthenticated remote code execution as the container runtime user; full read/write of application data, mounted secrets, environment, and tokens, and out-of-band exfiltration independent of the HTTP response.

Fix

0.9.0 establishes a trust boundary for request-supplied configuration: extra_args (along with other power fields such as proxy, user_data_dir, cdp_url, init_scripts) is a forbidden field for untrusted request bodies. Any request that sets extra_args is rejected with HTTP 400 rather than scrubbed against an always-incomplete denylist. In-process SDK callers (trusted) are unaffected.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).
  • Enable authentication (CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN) and restrict who can reach the API.
  • Run the container with a restrictive seccomp profile and no ability to exec helper binaries.

Credits

Y4tacker - reported the --no-zygote + --utility-cmd-prefix command-injection chain with a confirmed in-container PoC and an allowlist/reject recommendation. UDU_RisePho (hoanggxyuuki) - independently reported the request-supplied Chromium launch-flag RCE class (--renderer-cmd-prefix), confirmed still reproducing on 0.8.9.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "crawl4ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T17:25:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Docker API server accepted a request-supplied `browser_config.extra_args`, which flowed into Chromium\u0027s launch arguments. An attacker could inject Chromium switches that replace a child-process launch command (`--utility-cmd-prefix`, `--renderer-cmd-prefix`, `--gpu-launcher`, `--browser-subprocess-path`) together with `--no-zygote`, causing Chromium to fork/exec an attacker-controlled command as the container\u0027s runtime user. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default, so a single request yields arbitrary command execution.\n\nThe earlier `extra_args` SSRF patch (0.8.9) used a denylist scoped to proxy/DNS flags; a denylist of launch switches is inherently incomplete, and these command-execution switches were not covered.\n\n### Affected paths\n\n`/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/crawl/job` accepting a request `browser_config.extra_args`.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote code execution as the container runtime user; full read/write of application data, mounted secrets, environment, and tokens, and out-of-band exfiltration independent of the HTTP response.\n\n### Fix\n\n0.9.0 establishes a trust boundary for request-supplied configuration: `extra_args` (along with other power fields such as `proxy`, `user_data_dir`, `cdp_url`, `init_scripts`) is a forbidden field for untrusted request bodies. Any request that sets `extra_args` is rejected with HTTP 400 rather than scrubbed against an always-incomplete denylist. In-process SDK callers (trusted) are unaffected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to the patched version (0.9.0).\n- Enable authentication (`CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN`) and restrict who can reach the API.\n- Run the container with a restrictive seccomp profile and no ability to exec helper binaries.\n\n### Credits\n\nY4tacker - reported the `--no-zygote` + `--utility-cmd-prefix` command-injection chain with a confirmed in-container PoC and an allowlist/reject recommendation.\nUDU_RisePho (hoanggxyuuki) - independently reported the request-supplied Chromium launch-flag RCE class (`--renderer-cmd-prefix`), confirmed still reproducing on 0.8.9.",
  "id": "GHSA-r253-r9jw-qg44",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T17:25:34Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T17:25:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-r253-r9jw-qg44"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Crawl4AI: Unauthenticated RCE via Chromium launch-argument injection in browser_config.extra_args"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…