CVE-2026-81730 (GCVE-0-2026-81730)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-27 20:07 – Updated: 2026-08-27 20:07
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via EmailCollector Attachment Filename
Summary
Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a4… | patch |
| https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr | product |
| https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/… | technical-description |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
Date Public
2026-07-07 00:00
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"version": "9.0.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
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"version": "24.0.0",
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"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187"
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"dateReserved": "2026-08-27T11:15:29.421Z",
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"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-81730\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"published\":\"2026-08-27T20:18:55.480\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-08-27T20:18:55.480\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Received\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message\u0027s MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . \u0027.\u0027 . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.\u0027/\u0027.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment\u0027s own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module\u0027s ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr\u0027s SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects\u0027 documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.\"}],\"affected\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"affectedData\":[{\"vendor\":\"Dolibarr\",\"product\":\"dolibarr\",\"defaultStatus\":\"unaffected\",\"versions\":[{\"version\":\"9.0.0\",\"lessThan\":\"24.0.0\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"affected\"},{\"version\":\"24.0.0\",\"versionType\":\"semver\",\"status\":\"unaffected\"}]}]}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV40\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"4.0\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X\",\"baseScore\":8.8,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"attackRequirements\":\"NONE\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"vulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"vulnIntegrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"vulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"subConfidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subIntegrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"subAvailabilityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"exploitMaturity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"confidentialityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"integrityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"availabilityRequirement\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackVector\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackComplexity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedAttackRequirements\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedPrivilegesRequired\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedUserInteraction\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Safety\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Automatable\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"Recovery\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"valueDensity\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"vulnerabilityResponseEffort\":\"NOT_DEFINED\",\"providerUrgency\":\"NOT_DEFINED\"}}],\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L\",\"baseScore\":8.2,\"baseSeverity\":\"HIGH\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"HIGH\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"LOW\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":4.2}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-22\"}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a44defb5e438689c75679617f6edc4c038abc\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"},{\"url\":\"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0.0-through-23.0.4-path-traversal-via-emailcollector-attachment-filename\",\"source\":\"disclosure@vulncheck.com\"}]}}"
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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