CVE-2026-65198 (GCVE-0-2026-65198)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-13 14:18 – Updated: 2026-10-13 14:18
VLAI
Title
Huawei Default SNMPv3 USM key
Summary
Huawei's openUBMC ships a default SNMPv3 USM key that uses one value for both authentication and privacy. An attacker who holds the key (recoverable from the open-source build) can authenticate SNMPv3 to, and decrypt SNMPv3 traffic from, any unit that still carries the shipped key. The build customization `manifest/build/customization/default_password.lua` sets `AuthenticationKey == EncryptionKey == 7df2f29369e3ac3245b2c9d46b67a0ecd055197e41808a34ef325db2f6422581` for the iBMC product build, and the community seed `account/manufacture/default_password.lua` sets both to `7a2f5b86f20233ec7b7bef49643fbf34d86d0cbf6f1f8f5c52d4f30d4536938b`. These are shipped constants, not per-unit values, and they are not rotated by the Administrator password reset, so they survive account provisioning. This is especially dangerous considering that SNMP access is mapped to full device administration privileges, including system reset and firmware upgrades.
Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
SSVC
Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CNA · runZero (v2.0.3)
CWE
  • CWE-321 - Use of hard-coded cryptographic key
Assigner
runZero CNA under the icscert root
CNA scorecard C 71/100 over 30 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Huawei openUBMC Affected: 0 , ≤ 26.06 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-10-13 14:00
Credits
HD Moore of runZero Tod Beardsley of runZero
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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