CVE-2026-55953 (GCVE-0-2026-55953)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-27 15:21 – Updated: 2026-07-27 18:34
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
TLS 1.2 and DTLS client accepts unoffered anonymous cipher suite, bypassing server authentication
Summary
The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected.
An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.4, OTP 28.5.0.4 and OTP 27.3.4.15, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.7.4, 11.6.0.4 and 11.2.12.11.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-757 - Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
Assigner
References
7 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-55953.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-55953 | related |
| https://www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html#o… | x_version-scheme |
| https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/064e23641461… | patch |
| https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/0a82596d425a… | patch |
| https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/e6ff938116b2… | patch |
Impacted products
Credits
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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