Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-54353 (GCVE-0-2026-54353)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-26 20:44 – Updated: 2026-06-29 13:17

Title

Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation

Summary

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-29 13:17 UTC

CWE

CWE-367 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Budibase	budibase	Affected: < 3.39.9	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-54353

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-26 21:16 - Updated: 2026-06-30 20:05

Severity

8.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
7.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf	Exploit, Vendor Advisory
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf	Exploit, Vendor Advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	budibase	budibase	*

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
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      "affectedData": [
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          "product": "budibase",
          "vendor": "Budibase",
          "versions": [
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    }
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  "lastModified": "2026-06-30T20:05:11.687",
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GHSA-GFQ7-5X4G-3XHF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-22 23:39 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:57

Summary

@budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation

Details

Summary

Authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding.

The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection.

This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints.

Details

The issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice:

During blacklist validation Again during the real socket connection

The first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP.

This creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue.

Affected flow in:

packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts

async function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise<void> {
  const parsed = parseUrl(url)

  if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) {
    throw new Error("URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.")
  }
}

for (let redirects = 0; redirects <= MAX_REDIRECTS; redirects++) {
  await throwIfUnsafe(nextUrl)

  const response = await fetchFn(nextUrl, nextRequest)

  // ...
}

fetchFn uses plain node-fetch with no custom http.Agent / https.Agent, so the underlying socket performs its own independent dns.lookup after validation completes.

The same pattern also exists in:

packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts

await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl)

const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest)

The blacklist implementation resolves hostnames but only returns a boolean:

packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts

async function lookup(address: string): Promise<string[]> {
  address = parseAddress(address)

  const addresses = await performLookup(address, { all: true })

  return addresses.map(addr => addr.address)
}

export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> {
  // ...

  if (!net.isIP(address)) {
    try {
      ips = await lookup(address)
    } catch (e) {
      /* ... */
    }
  } else {
    ips = [address]
  }

  return ips.some(ip => blackList!.check(ip, getIpVersion(ip)))
}

The resolved IPs are discarded, so callers cannot pin the later socket connection to the validated addresses.

An attacker controlling authoritative DNS for a hostname can therefore return:

a public IP during validation a private/internal IP during the actual connection

Anything routing through these helpers inherits the issue, including:

outgoing webhook Slack Discord Make Zapier n8n AI extract object-store fetches

Several of these steps return upstream response content directly into automation output, which makes the SSRF non-blind.

PoC

Tested locally against a self-hosted build from master. No Budibase-operated infrastructure was touched.

Run Budibase locally.

Start a harmless local HTTP listener:

python3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 127.0.0.1

Use a rebinding hostname such as:

7f000001.cb007264.rbndr.us

which rotates between:

127.0.0.1 203.0.113.100

Steps to reproduce:

Log into Budibase with automation permissions. Create an automation using the Outgoing Webhook step. Set the URL to: http://:8080/ Trigger the automation.

Observed result:

The blacklist validation resolves the hostname to the public IP and allows the request. node-fetch performs a second DNS lookup during socket creation. The second lookup resolves to 127.0.0.1. The TCP connection lands on the local service. The local server response body appears directly in the automation output. Impact

This produces a non-blind read-SSRF primitive against anything reachable from the Budibase host process, including:

loopback services (127.0.0.1) RFC1918 ranges internal Kubernetes/VPC services cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)

On cloud deployments without IMDSv2 enforcement, this may expose temporary IAM credentials via:

/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

On multi-tenant hosted deployments, this may also create potential cross-tenant access paths through shared internal infrastructure.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@budibase/backend-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.39.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54353"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-367",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T23:39:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T21:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Summary\n\nAuthenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase\u0027s SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding.\n\nThe outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection.\n\nThis results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nDetails\n\nThe issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice:\n\nDuring blacklist validation\nAgain during the real socket connection\n\nThe first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP.\n\nThis creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue.\n\nAffected flow in:\n\npackages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts\n```\nasync function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n  const parsed = parseUrl(url)\n\n  if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) {\n    throw new Error(\"URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.\")\n  }\n}\n\nfor (let redirects = 0; redirects \u003c= MAX_REDIRECTS; redirects++) {\n  await throwIfUnsafe(nextUrl)\n\n  const response = await fetchFn(nextUrl, nextRequest)\n\n  // ...\n}\n```\nfetchFn uses plain node-fetch with no custom http.Agent / https.Agent, so the underlying socket performs its own independent dns.lookup after validation completes.\n\nThe same pattern also exists in:\n\npackages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts\n```\nawait throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl)\n\nconst response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest)\n```\nThe blacklist implementation resolves hostnames but only returns a boolean:\n\npackages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts\n```\nasync function lookup(address: string): Promise\u003cstring[]\u003e {\n  address = parseAddress(address)\n\n  const addresses = await performLookup(address, { all: true })\n\n  return addresses.map(addr =\u003e addr.address)\n}\n\nexport async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e {\n  // ...\n\n  if (!net.isIP(address)) {\n    try {\n      ips = await lookup(address)\n    } catch (e) {\n      /* ... */\n    }\n  } else {\n    ips = [address]\n  }\n\n  return ips.some(ip =\u003e blackList!.check(ip, getIpVersion(ip)))\n}\n```\nThe resolved IPs are discarded, so callers cannot pin the later socket connection to the validated addresses.\n\nAn attacker controlling authoritative DNS for a hostname can therefore return:\n\na public IP during validation\na private/internal IP during the actual connection\n\nAnything routing through these helpers inherits the issue, including:\n\noutgoing webhook\nSlack\nDiscord\nMake\nZapier\nn8n\nAI extract\nobject-store fetches\n\nSeveral of these steps return upstream response content directly into automation output, which makes the SSRF non-blind.\n\nPoC\n\nTested locally against a self-hosted build from master.\nNo Budibase-operated infrastructure was touched.\n\nRun Budibase locally.\n\nStart a harmless local HTTP listener:\n\npython3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 127.0.0.1\n\nUse a rebinding hostname such as:\n\n7f000001.cb007264.rbndr.us\n\nwhich rotates between:\n\n127.0.0.1\n203.0.113.100\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\nLog into Budibase with automation permissions.\nCreate an automation using the Outgoing Webhook step.\nSet the URL to:\nhttp://\u003crebinding-host\u003e:8080/\nTrigger the automation.\n\nObserved result:\n\nThe blacklist validation resolves the hostname to the public IP and allows the request.\nnode-fetch performs a second DNS lookup during socket creation.\nThe second lookup resolves to 127.0.0.1.\nThe TCP connection lands on the local service.\nThe local server response body appears directly in the automation output.\nImpact\n\nThis produces a non-blind read-SSRF primitive against anything reachable from the Budibase host process, including:\n\nloopback services (127.0.0.1)\nRFC1918 ranges\ninternal Kubernetes/VPC services\ncloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)\n\nOn cloud deployments without IMDSv2 enforcement, this may expose temporary IAM credentials via:\n\n/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u003crole\u003e\n\nOn multi-tenant hosted deployments, this may also create potential cross-tenant access paths through shared internal infrastructure.",
  "id": "GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf",
  "modified": "2026-08-12T18:57:24Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T23:39:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54353"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation"
}

Sightings

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Action not permitted

CVE-2026-54353 (GCVE-0-2026-54353)

FKIE_CVE-2026-54353

GHSA-GFQ7-5X4G-3XHF

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