GHSA-M4W9-GCH5-C2G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 18:54 – Updated: 2026-02-06 21:43
VLAI?
Summary
client-certificate-auth Vulnerable to Open Redirect via Host Header Injection in HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect
Details
Summary
Versions 0.2.1 and 0.3.0 of client-certificate-auth contain an open redirect vulnerability. The middleware unconditionally redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS using the unvalidated Host header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary domains.
Vulnerable Code
// lib/clientCertificateAuth.js (versions 0.2.1, 0.3.0)
if (!req.secure && req.header('x-forwarded-proto') != 'https') {
return res.redirect('https://' + req.header('host') + req.url);
}
Attack Scenario
- Attacker crafts a link:
http://vulnerable-app.example.com/login - When victim clicks, attacker intercepts and injects header:
Host: attacker.com - Server responds:
302 Found → https://attacker.com/login - Victim is redirected to attacker-controlled site
Impact
- Phishing: Attackers can use trusted domain links to redirect victims to credential-harvesting pages
- OAuth/SSO Token Theft: In authentication flows, authorization codes or tokens may leak via redirect
- Referer Leakage: Sensitive URL parameters may be exposed to attacker domains via the Referer header
- Cache Poisoning: In deployments with shared caches, malicious redirects may be cached and served to other users
Exploitability
Exploitation requires that HTTP traffic reaches the Node.js application without TLS termination setting x-forwarded-proto: https. This condition is uncommon in production deployments behind modern reverse proxies or load balancers, which limits real-world exploitability.
Fix
The vulnerable redirect behavior has been completely removed in version 1.0.0.
npm install client-certificate-auth@^1.0.0
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible:
- Block HTTP traffic at the network/load balancer level
- Ensure your reverse proxy always sets
x-forwarded-proto: https - Add middleware before
clientCertificateAuthto validate theHostheader against an allowlist
References
Severity ?
6.1 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "client-certificate-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T18:54:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T19:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nVersions 0.2.1 and 0.3.0 of `client-certificate-auth` contain an open redirect vulnerability. The middleware unconditionally redirects HTTP requests to HTTPS using the unvalidated `Host` header, allowing an attacker to redirect users to arbitrary domains.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n```javascript\n// lib/clientCertificateAuth.js (versions 0.2.1, 0.3.0)\nif (!req.secure \u0026\u0026 req.header(\u0027x-forwarded-proto\u0027) != \u0027https\u0027) {\n return res.redirect(\u0027https://\u0027 + req.header(\u0027host\u0027) + req.url);\n}\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker crafts a link: `http://vulnerable-app.example.com/login`\n2. When victim clicks, attacker intercepts and injects header: `Host: attacker.com`\n3. Server responds: `302 Found \u2192 https://attacker.com/login`\n4. Victim is redirected to attacker-controlled site\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Phishing**: Attackers can use trusted domain links to redirect victims to credential-harvesting pages\n- **OAuth/SSO Token Theft**: In authentication flows, authorization codes or tokens may leak via redirect\n- **Referer Leakage**: Sensitive URL parameters may be exposed to attacker domains via the Referer header\n- **Cache Poisoning**: In deployments with shared caches, malicious redirects may be cached and served to other users\n\n### Exploitability\n\nExploitation requires that HTTP traffic reaches the Node.js application without TLS termination setting `x-forwarded-proto: https`. This condition is uncommon in production deployments behind modern reverse proxies or load balancers, which limits real-world exploitability.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe vulnerable redirect behavior has been completely removed in version 1.0.0.\n\n```bash\nnpm install client-certificate-auth@^1.0.0\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n1. Block HTTP traffic at the network/load balancer level\n2. Ensure your reverse proxy always sets `x-forwarded-proto: https`\n3. Add middleware before `clientCertificateAuth` to validate the `Host` header against an allowlist\n\n### References\n\n- [CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html)\n- [OWASP: Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html)\n- [Fix Commit](https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/commit/8fc995e953db483495be46862965e50fe9e1cc52)",
"id": "GHSA-m4w9-gch5-c2g4",
"modified": "2026-02-06T21:43:18Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T18:54:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-m4w9-gch5-c2g4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/commit/8fc995e953db483495be46862965e50fe9e1cc52"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tgies/client-certificate-auth/releases/tag/v1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "client-certificate-auth Vulnerable to Open Redirect via Host Header Injection in HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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