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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-409

Allowed

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.

223 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-R7GV-HXJ8-94C4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 03:31 – Updated: 2026-08-24 03:31
VLAI
Details

exceljs-hardened before 5.0.0 decompresses all entries from supplied xlsx archives into memory without limits on entry size, total size, or compression ratio. Attackers can upload highly compressed workbooks that expand to gigabytes in memory, exhausting available resources and causing denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-78206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T01:16:57Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "exceljs-hardened before 5.0.0 decompresses all entries from supplied xlsx archives into memory without limits on entry size, total size, or compression ratio. Attackers can upload highly compressed workbooks that expand to gigabytes in memory, exhausting available resources and causing denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-r7gv-hxj8-94c4",
  "modified": "2026-08-24T03:31:05Z",
  "published": "2026-08-24T03:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mateocallec/exceljs-hardened/security/advisories/GHSA-7cvf-3r55-r39q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/exceljs/exceljs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/exceljs/exceljs/blob/v4.4.0/lib/xlsx/xlsx.js#L257-L281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/exceljs-through-uncontrolled-resource-consumption-via-unbounded-xlsx-decompression"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R89F-H4HF-P5H7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 21:30 – Updated: 2026-08-19 21:30
VLAI
Details

Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Threat Response.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-75476"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T21:17:37Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Threat Response.",
  "id": "GHSA-r89f-h4hf-p5h7",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T21:30:38Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T21:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75476"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-021"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-RGWJ-5XJ2-C3M3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-31 22:36 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:28
VLAI
Summary
MySQL2: Unbounded zlib inflate in compressed MySQL protocol handler allows decompression-bomb DoS
Details

Vulnerability Details

File: lib/compressed_protocol.js Line: 43 (zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... }) inside handleCompressedPacket)

Root Cause

When a connection is created with compress: true (and the server advertises CLIENT_COMPRESS), every incoming packet is unwrapped by handleCompressedPacket() in lib/compressed_protocol.js, which calls:

zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... });

No options object (in particular, no maxOutputLength) is passed. Node's zlib convenience methods default maxOutputLength to buffer.kMaxLength, which on this platform is Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER — i.e. effectively unbounded until the process runs out of memory. The 3-byte "length of payload before compression" field in the compressed-packet header is read (packet.readInt24()) but is only used to branch on !== 0; it is never used to cap or validate the actual inflate output size, and the real decompressed size is determined purely by the attacker-supplied deflate stream.

Because DEFLATE can reach compression ratios over 1000:1 for crafted repetitive input, an attacker who controls (or MITMs, on a non-TLS connection) the MySQL server endpoint can send a single small compressed packet that expands to gigabytes in the client's memory — a classic decompression-bomb / "zip bomb" applied to MySQL's client-compression protocol.

Attack Scenario

  1. Application connects with mysql2/mysql2/promise using compress: true (a documented option for reducing bandwidth, commonly used for cloud/WAN DB connections).
  2. The connection target is attacker-controlled or attacker-compromised, or an attacker MITMs a non-TLS connection.
  3. Right after authentication succeeds, the malicious endpoint sends one crafted compressed packet whose deflate stream is small on the wire (hundreds of KB) but decompresses to several GB.
  4. zlib.inflate() starts allocating memory for the full decompressed output with no ceiling.
  5. The Node.js process's RSS grows uncontrolled until OOM-kill or crash — no query needs to be issued by the client; the malicious packet alone is enough.

Impact

Denial of Service of the client application (process crash / OOM) — not the database itself. No authentication bypass or data exposure. Requires compress: true plus a malicious/compromised server or MITM position.

Vulnerable Code

function handleCompressedPacket(packet) {
  const connection = this;
  const deflatedLength = packet.readInt24();
  const body = packet.readBuffer();

  if (deflatedLength !== 0) {
    connection.inflateQueue.push((task) => {
      zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => {
        if (err) {
          connection._handleNetworkError(err);
          return;
        }
        connection._bumpCompressedSequenceId(packet.numPackets);
        connection._inflatedPacketsParser.execute(data);
        task.done();
      });
    });
  } else {
    ...
  }
}

Recommended Fix

const MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // e.g. 1 GiB, ideally configurable

zlib.inflate(body, { maxOutputLength: MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE }, (err, data) => {
  if (err) {
    connection._handleNetworkError(err);
    return;
  }
  ...
});

maxOutputLength makes zlib.inflate abort with ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE as soon as the decompressed size would exceed the cap, routing into the exact same (already-existing) errconnection._handleNetworkError(err) path, so no new error-handling logic is required.

Verification

Dynamically confirmed on v3.23.0 (HEAD) using a minimal rogue "MySQL server" built on node-mysql2's own server-mode helpers (mysql.createServer, Packets.Handshake, connection.writeOk()). The rogue server completes a real handshake advertising CLIENT_COMPRESS, then writes one raw compressed frame (509,604 bytes on the wire — a zlib deflate of 500 MB of zero bytes, ratio 1028.8:1) directly to the socket. A normal mysql.createConnection({ ..., compress: true }) victim client — which never issues any query — had its RSS grow from 74.3 MB to 1115.0 MB after receiving that single packet, before erroring out with PROTOCOL_UNEXPECTED_PACKET once the client tried to parse the inflated zero-filled buffer as MySQL packets. The memory allocation happens unconditionally before any content validation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.23.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mysql2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.23.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-31T22:36:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability Details\n\n**File**: `lib/compressed_protocol.js`\n**Line**: 43 (`zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) =\u003e { ... })` inside `handleCompressedPacket`)\n\n### Root Cause\nWhen a connection is created with `compress: true` (and the server advertises `CLIENT_COMPRESS`), every incoming packet is unwrapped by `handleCompressedPacket()` in `lib/compressed_protocol.js`, which calls:\n\n```js\nzlib.inflate(body, (err, data) =\u003e { ... });\n```\n\nNo options object (in particular, no `maxOutputLength`) is passed. Node\u0027s zlib convenience methods default `maxOutputLength` to `buffer.kMaxLength`, which on this platform is `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` \u2014 i.e. effectively unbounded until the process runs out of memory. The 3-byte \"length of payload before compression\" field in the compressed-packet header is read (`packet.readInt24()`) but is only used to branch on `!== 0`; it is never used to cap or validate the actual inflate output size, and the real decompressed size is determined purely by the attacker-supplied deflate stream.\n\nBecause DEFLATE can reach compression ratios over 1000:1 for crafted repetitive input, an attacker who controls (or MITMs, on a non-TLS connection) the MySQL server endpoint can send a single small compressed packet that expands to gigabytes in the client\u0027s memory \u2014 a classic decompression-bomb / \"zip bomb\" applied to MySQL\u0027s client-compression protocol.\n\n### Attack Scenario\n1. Application connects with `mysql2`/`mysql2/promise` using `compress: true` (a documented option for reducing bandwidth, commonly used for cloud/WAN DB connections).\n2. The connection target is attacker-controlled or attacker-compromised, or an attacker MITMs a non-TLS connection.\n3. Right after authentication succeeds, the malicious endpoint sends one crafted compressed packet whose deflate stream is small on the wire (hundreds of KB) but decompresses to several GB.\n4. `zlib.inflate()` starts allocating memory for the full decompressed output with no ceiling.\n5. The Node.js process\u0027s RSS grows uncontrolled until OOM-kill or crash \u2014 no query needs to be issued by the client; the malicious packet alone is enough.\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service of the client application (process crash / OOM) \u2014 not the database itself. No authentication bypass or data exposure. Requires `compress: true` plus a malicious/compromised server or MITM position.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n```js\nfunction handleCompressedPacket(packet) {\n  const connection = this;\n  const deflatedLength = packet.readInt24();\n  const body = packet.readBuffer();\n\n  if (deflatedLength !== 0) {\n    connection.inflateQueue.push((task) =\u003e {\n      zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) =\u003e {\n        if (err) {\n          connection._handleNetworkError(err);\n          return;\n        }\n        connection._bumpCompressedSequenceId(packet.numPackets);\n        connection._inflatedPacketsParser.execute(data);\n        task.done();\n      });\n    });\n  } else {\n    ...\n  }\n}\n```\n\n### Recommended Fix\n```js\nconst MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE = 1 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // e.g. 1 GiB, ideally configurable\n\nzlib.inflate(body, { maxOutputLength: MAX_INFLATED_PACKET_SIZE }, (err, data) =\u003e {\n  if (err) {\n    connection._handleNetworkError(err);\n    return;\n  }\n  ...\n});\n```\n`maxOutputLength` makes `zlib.inflate` abort with `ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE` as soon as the decompressed size would exceed the cap, routing into the exact same (already-existing) `err` \u2192 `connection._handleNetworkError(err)` path, so no new error-handling logic is required.\n\n### Verification\nDynamically confirmed on v3.23.0 (HEAD) using a minimal rogue \"MySQL server\" built on node-mysql2\u0027s own server-mode helpers (`mysql.createServer`, `Packets.Handshake`, `connection.writeOk()`). The rogue server completes a real handshake advertising `CLIENT_COMPRESS`, then writes one raw compressed frame (509,604 bytes on the wire \u2014 a zlib deflate of 500 MB of zero bytes, ratio 1028.8:1) directly to the socket. A normal `mysql.createConnection({ ..., compress: true })` victim client \u2014 which never issues any query \u2014 had its RSS grow from 74.3 MB to 1115.0 MB after receiving that single packet, before erroring out with `PROTOCOL_UNEXPECTED_PACKET` once the client tried to parse the inflated zero-filled buffer as MySQL packets. The memory allocation happens unconditionally before any content validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-rgwj-5xj2-c3m3",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T15:28:46Z",
  "published": "2026-08-31T22:36:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/security/advisories/GHSA-rgwj-5xj2-c3m3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/commit/7c48343c95ecc80d30d6ebfa67875947b7d848d2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sidorares/node-mysql2/releases/tag/v3.23.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MySQL2: Unbounded zlib inflate in compressed MySQL protocol handler allows decompression-bomb DoS"
}

GHSA-RMQV-7V3J-MR7P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 14:04
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Scrapy decompression bomb vulnerability
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7j7m-v7m3-jqm7. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

The scrapy/scrapy project is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks due to the use of lxml.etree.fromstring for parsing untrusted XML data without proper validation. This vulnerability allows attackers to perform denial of service attacks, access local files, generate network connections, or circumvent firewalls by submitting specially crafted XML data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "scrapy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-16T12:42:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7j7m-v7m3-jqm7. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nThe scrapy/scrapy project is vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks due to the use of lxml.etree.fromstring for parsing untrusted XML data without proper validation. This vulnerability allows attackers to perform denial of service attacks, access local files, generate network connections, or circumvent firewalls by submitting specially crafted XML data. ",
  "id": "GHSA-rmqv-7v3j-mr7p",
  "modified": "2024-04-16T14:04:36Z",
  "published": "2024-04-16T00:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3572"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy/commit/809bfac4890f75fc73607318a04d2ccba71b3d9f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/scrapy/scrapy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/c4a0fac9-0c5a-4718-9ee4-2d06d58adabb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Scrapy decompression bomb vulnerability",
  "withdrawn": "2024-04-16T14:04:36Z"
}

GHSA-RR89-W3H9-M66J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 17:52 – Updated: 2026-07-17 16:52
VLAI
Summary
ExifReader is vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded decompression of image metadata
Details

Impact

Versions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. ExifReader.load(file) or ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory.

The affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including:

  • PNG zTXt, compressed iTXt, and iCCP chunks (deflate)
  • JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks

A typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000× expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB).

Both the npm package and the dist/ bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected.

Patches

Fixed in 4.39.0. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is 128 MiB per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via console.warn) and the remaining tags are returned as usual.

The cap is configurable via the new maxDecompressedSize field on the decompress option, in bytes:

const tags = await ExifReader.load(file, {
    async: true,
    decompress: {
        maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB
    }
});

The same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom brotli/deflate functions.

Workarounds

  • If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader.

Resources

  • Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375
  • README — "Limiting decompressed metadata size": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "exifreader"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.20.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-8814"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T17:52:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T07:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nVersions of ExifReader from 4.20.0 through 4.38.1 do not bound the size of decompressed metadata blocks. When a caller invokes the asynchronous API (e.g. `ExifReader.load(file)` or `ExifReader.load(buffer, {async: true})`) on an attacker-supplied image, a small compressed chunk in the file can expand to hundreds of megabytes of memory, consuming heap and CPU until the process slows down or runs out of memory.\n\nThe affected paths share a single decompression utility, so the issue is reachable through any compressed metadata block the library handles asynchronously, including:\n\n- PNG `zTXt`, compressed `iTXt`, and `iCCP` chunks (deflate)\n- JPEG XL Brotli-compressed Exif and XMP blocks\n\nA typical proof of concept produced roughly 1000\u00d7 expansion (for example, ~32 KB of compressed input expanded to ~32 MB of output, ~130 KB to ~128 MB).\n\nBoth the npm package and the `dist/` bundle published from this repository (consumed by Bower and other users of the prebuilt artifact) are affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **4.39.0**. The decompression utility now reads the decompressed stream incrementally and aborts as soon as the running total would exceed a configurable limit. The default cap is **128 MiB** per metadata block, which is well above any realistic legitimate value. When a block exceeds the cap, that block is skipped (a warning is emitted via `console.warn`) and the remaining tags are returned as usual.\n\nThe cap is configurable via the new `maxDecompressedSize` field on the `decompress` option, in bytes:\n\n```javascript\nconst tags = await ExifReader.load(file, {\n    async: true,\n    decompress: {\n        maxDecompressedSize: 16 * 1024 * 1024 // 16 MiB\n    }\n});\n```\n\nThe same cap applies to results returned by user-supplied custom `brotli`/`deflate` functions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- If upgrading is not possible, avoid invoking the asynchronous API on untrusted inputs. The synchronous code path skips compressed metadata blocks entirely and is not affected. Alternatively, pre-validate input files by source or size before passing them to ExifReader.\n\n### Resources\n\n- Patch: https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375\n- README \u2014 \"Limiting decompressed metadata size\": https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/blob/main/README.md#limiting-decompressed-metadata-size",
  "id": "GHSA-rr89-w3h9-m66j",
  "modified": "2026-07-17T16:52:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T17:52:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/security/advisories/GHSA-rr89-w3h9-m66j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader/commit/5f116128adc19f674902f8bf582bfe7dd0a36375"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattiasw/ExifReader"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-EXIFREADER-16689340"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ExifReader is vulnerable to denial of service via unbounded decompression of image metadata"
}

GHSA-V3F6-M9J2-437P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:14
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-69304 – ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8cp2-47hg-mfgh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

Improper handling of highly compressed data (data amplification) in ASP.NET Core allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IISIntegration"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0-preview.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.0.0-rc.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.30"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IISIntegration"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.31"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.0.19"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IISIntegration"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.0.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IISIntegration"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T21:14:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-08T18:18:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8cp2-47hg-mfgh. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nImproper handling of highly compressed data (data amplification) in ASP.NET Core allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-v3f6-m9j2-437p",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:14:33Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:32:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69304"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69304"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.AspNetCore.Server.IISIntegration"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Microsoft Security Advisory CVE-2026-69304 \u2013 ASP.NET Core Denial of Service Vulnerability",
  "withdrawn": "2026-09-08T21:14:33Z"
}

GHSA-V464-R2R9-WWW7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-21 17:25
VLAI
Summary
Ollama Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Crafted GZIP
Details

An Out-Of-Memory (OOM) vulnerability exists in the ollama server version 0.3.14. This vulnerability can be triggered when a malicious API server responds with a gzip bomb HTTP response, leading to the ollama server crashing. The vulnerability is present in the makeRequestWithRetry and getAuthorizationToken functions, which use io.ReadAll to read the response body. This can result in excessive memory usage and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ollama/ollama"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.3.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12886"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-21T17:25:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An Out-Of-Memory (OOM) vulnerability exists in the `ollama` server version 0.3.14. This vulnerability can be triggered when a malicious API server responds with a gzip bomb HTTP response, leading to the `ollama` server crashing. The vulnerability is present in the `makeRequestWithRetry` and `getAuthorizationToken` functions, which use `io.ReadAll` to read the response body. This can result in excessive memory usage and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.",
  "id": "GHSA-v464-r2r9-www7",
  "modified": "2025-03-21T17:25:07Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12886"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ollama/ollama"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/f115fe52-58af-4844-ad29-b1c25f7245df"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ollama Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Crafted GZIP"
}

GHSA-V626-428R-43P8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-15 12:32
VLAI
Details

Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry's ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()['size']) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61449"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T12:18:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Grav 2.0.1 contains a decompression-bomb size-cap bypass in ZipArchiver and GPM\\Installer. The size bound introduced in 2.0.1 sums the uncompressed size declared in each entry\u0027s ZIP central-directory header (ZipArchive::statIndex()[\u0027size\u0027]) and rejects archives exceeding system.gpm.archive.max_uncompressed_size before extraction. Because this declared size is attacker-forgeable and is not cross-checked against the actual inflated stream, a crafted archive declaring tiny per-entry sizes passes the cap while extractTo() writes the real, much larger content, filling disk or exhausting inodes. The archive must be supplied by a package source or admin upload (admin/operator trust). Fixed in 2.0.2. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-928x-9mpw-8h56.",
  "id": "GHSA-v626-428r-43p8",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T12:32:04Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T12:32:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-8h9x-89f2-m7x3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61449"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-decompression-bomb-via-forged-zip-size"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V647-H8JJ-FW5R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-16 09:31 – Updated: 2024-12-16 19:27
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost Data Amplification vulnerability
Details

Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.1.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.11.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.5.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-16T19:27:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-16T08:15:05Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 10.1.x \u003c= 10.1.2, 10.0.x \u003c= 10.0.2, 9.11.x \u003c= 9.11.4, 9.5.x \u003c= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to\u00a0cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.",
  "id": "GHSA-v647-h8jj-fw5r",
  "modified": "2024-12-16T19:27:16Z",
  "published": "2024-12-16T09:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54682"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost Data Amplification vulnerability"
}

GHSA-V72X-2H86-7F8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:53 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:53
VLAI
Summary
MessagePack-CSharp: LZ4 decompression allocates from unbounded declared output lengths
Details

Summary

When MessagePack-CSharp decompresses Lz4Block or Lz4BlockArray payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable.

A small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins.

Impact

Applications are affected when they deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack payloads with MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block or MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray enabled.

In the Lz4Block case, an attacker-controlled integer is used to request the destination span. In the Lz4BlockArray case, per-block uncompressed lengths and their aggregate can be attacker-controlled. Without a cap, the declared output size can be disproportionate to the input size, producing out-of-memory exceptions, process termination on constrained hosts, or severe memory pressure.

This advisory is about unbounded allocation from declared decompressed sizes. It is separate from the LZ4 source-buffer over-read issue, which concerns unsafe decoder reads beyond the compressed input buffer.

Affected components

  • Package: MessagePack
  • Feature: LZ4 compressed MessagePack payloads
  • APIs: MessagePackSerializer with WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block) or WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray)
  • Internal routine: MessagePackSerializer.TryDecompress
  • Finding ID: MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004

Patches

Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.

Upgrade guidance:

  1. Upgrade MessagePack to the patched version for your release line.
  2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.

The fix should reject negative and excessive uncompressed lengths before allocation. It should also cap aggregate decompressed size for block arrays and expose or honor an appropriate maximum decompressed length policy.

Workarounds

Patching is recommended.

Until a patched version is available, do not enable MessagePack-CSharp's built-in LZ4 compression modes for untrusted inputs. If compression is required, enforce strict compressed and decompressed size limits outside MessagePack-CSharp before deserialization.

Resources

  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004: LZ4 decompression allocation from unbounded uncompressed length
  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-011: duplicate decompression-bomb finding
  • CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data
  • CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.301"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48510"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen MessagePack-CSharp decompresses `Lz4Block` or `Lz4BlockArray` payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable.\n\nA small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack payloads with `MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block` or `MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray` enabled.\n\nIn the `Lz4Block` case, an attacker-controlled integer is used to request the destination span. In the `Lz4BlockArray` case, per-block uncompressed lengths and their aggregate can be attacker-controlled. Without a cap, the declared output size can be disproportionate to the input size, producing out-of-memory exceptions, process termination on constrained hosts, or severe memory pressure.\n\nThis advisory is about unbounded allocation from declared decompressed sizes. It is separate from the LZ4 source-buffer over-read issue, which concerns unsafe decoder reads beyond the compressed input buffer.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- Feature: LZ4 compressed MessagePack payloads\n- APIs: `MessagePackSerializer` with `WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block)` or `WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray)`\n- Internal routine: `MessagePackSerializer.TryDecompress`\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should reject negative and excessive uncompressed lengths before allocation. It should also cap aggregate decompressed size for block arrays and expose or honor an appropriate maximum decompressed length policy.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, do not enable MessagePack-CSharp\u0027s built-in LZ4 compression modes for untrusted inputs. If compression is required, enforce strict compressed and decompressed size limits outside MessagePack-CSharp before deserialization.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004`: LZ4 decompression allocation from unbounded uncompressed length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-011`: duplicate decompression-bomb finding\n- CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
  "id": "GHSA-v72x-2h86-7f8m",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-v72x-2h86-7f8m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48510"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: LZ4 decompression allocates from unbounded declared output lengths"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.