var-201108-0095
Vulnerability from variot
Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco TelePresence C Series Endpoints, E/EX Personal Video units, and MXP Series Codecs, when using software versions before TC 4.0.0 or F9.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted SIP packet to port 5060 or 5061, aka Bug ID CSCtq46500. The problem is Bug ID CSCtq46500 It is a problem.By a third party 5060 and 5061 Crafted against the port SIP Service disruption via packets ( crash ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco TelePresence Codecs are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can exploit this issue to cause the device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. This issue is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCtq46500.
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
Users can determine the software version of a Cisco TelePresence unit by entering the IP address of the codec in a web browser, authenticating (if the device is configured for authentication), and then selecting the system info menu option. The version number will follow the Software Version text in the System Info window.
Alternatively, users can determine the software version by issuing the "xStatus SystemUnit" command from a device's application programmer interface. The software version that is running on the codec is displayed following the SystemUnit Software Version text. The following example displays "xStatus SystemUnit" output from a system that is running software version TC4.0:
xStatus SystemUnit
*s SystemUnit ProductType: "Cisco TelePresence Codec"
*s SystemUnit ProductId: "Cisco TelePresence Codec C90"
*s SystemUnit ProductPlatform: "C90"
*s SystemUnit Uptime: 597095
*s SystemUnit Software Application: "Endpoint"
*s SystemUnit Software Version: "TC4.0"
*s SystemUnit Software Name: "s52000"
*s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: "2010-11-01"
*s SystemUnit Software MaxVideoCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit Software MaxAudioCalls: 4
*s SystemUnit Software ReleaseKey: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys NaturalPresenter: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys MultiSite: "true"
*s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys PremiumResolution: "true"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: "B1AD25A00003"
*s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: "0"
*s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497201"
*s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: "101401-3 [04]"
*s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard SerialNumber: "PH0497874"
*s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard Identifier: "101560-1 [02]"
*s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard SerialNumber: "N/A"
*s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard Identifier: ""
*s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: "U-Boot 2009.03-65"
*s SystemUnit State System: Initialized
*s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfActiveCalls: 3
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfActiveCalls: 1
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfSuspendedCalls: 0
*s SystemUnit State NumberOfInProgressCalls: 0
*s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized
*s SystemUnit ContactInfo: "helpdesk@company.com"
** end
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
Affected devices are part systems that provide Cisco TelePresence Endpoints for immersive environments, conference rooms, individual desktops, and home offices. This vulnerability is triggered by a crafted Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) packet that is sent to an affected device on port 5060 or 5061.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
- CSCtq46500 ("Specifically crafted SIP packet may crash the device")
CVSS Base Score - 7.8 Access Vector - Network Access Complexity - Low Authentication - None Confidentiality Impact - None Integrity Impact - None Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4 Exploitability - Functional Remediation Level - Official-Fix Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a system crash that may lead to a denial of service condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
There are no workarounds available that mitigate this vulnerability. However, there is an Applied Mitigations Bulletin available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110831-tandberg.shtml that describes how to filter SIP packets sent to the device.
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that addresses this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts +-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts +----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by David Klein of Sense of Security.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110831-tandberg.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
+------------------------------------------------------------+ | Revision 1.0 | 2011-Aug-31 | Initial public release. | +------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+-------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. +--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: Aug 11, 2011 Document ID: 113098
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Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ . 19-Sep-2011 Last Update. - Vendor Notification Date. 21-Feb-2011 Product. Cisco TelePresence Series Platform. C <= TC4.1.2, MXP <= F9.1 Severity Rating. Low - Medium Impact. Cookie/credential theft, impersonation, loss of confidentiality, client-side code execution, denial of service. Solution Status. Vendor patch References. 1. CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488) 2. CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496) 3. CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500)
Details. The C & MXP Series are the Endpoints used on desks or in boardrooms to provide users with a termination point for Video Conferencing.
- Post-authentication HTML Injection - CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints have a web interface (HTTP or HTTPS) for managing, configuring and reporting. It is possible to set the Call ID (with H.323 or SIP) to a HTML value. If a call is made to another endpoint and an authenticated user browses to the web interface on the endpoint receiving the call (e.g. to view call statistics), the HTML will render locally within the context of the logged in user. From this point it is possible to make changes to the system as the authenticated user. The flaw is due to the flexibility of the H.323 ID or SIP Display Name fields and failure to correctly validate user input.
Examples (MXP): Rebooting the system: The attacker may also choose to change passwords in the system, disable encryption or enable telnet:
- Post-authentication Memory Corruption - CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496): Cisco TelePresence systems (Endpoints and Infrastructure) use XPath for setting and getting configuration.
Example syntax is: http://ip/getxml?location=/Configuration/Video The request is sent to a locally listening shell (tshell). This is the case for all requests relating to performing an action on the system (e.g. config get or set). The shell then sends the input to the "main" application (/app/main, id=0), and the data is passed as a parameter.
It was discovered that the getXML handle does not properly perform length checking on the user supplied input before passing it to the tshell. Furthermore, there is no length checking performed in the tshell and no bounds checking performed in the main application where the parameter is consumed. As such, it is possible to send input that exceeds the size of the receiving buffer, subsequently causing an invalid address to be read. This causes a reboot on the Endpoints. The VCS will not reboot, the process will crash by SIGSEGV (or sigabrt) but it will restart the process itself which drops all calls.
Proof of Concept: GET /wsgi/getxml?location="+("A"5200)+("\x60"4)+("X"*4)+"HTTP/1.1\r\n Host: 192.168.6.99\r\n\r\n"
Received signal SIGSEGV (11) in thread 0x129e8480, TID 2670 Illegal memory access at: 0x5858585c Registers: GPR00: 00f2c908 129e5960 129ef920 00000005 00000040 0000000c 00000037 0f315580 GPR08: 00000005 129e5a70 129e5a80 58585858 0f3272d4 11589858 129e6896 0000000b GPR16: 129e6084 11164a1c 00000000 129e6894 00000037 1299ca18 00000005 00000002 GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac 129e5960 GPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac 129e5960 NIP: 0f39abc8 MSR: 0000d032 OGPR3: 00000002
As you can see, the crash string is passed as a parameter in GPR 8. The severity of this issue is compounded by the fact that the main application runs as root, this could potentially lead to arbitrary code execution.
- Pre-authentication SIP Denial of Service - CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500): Cisco TelePresence Endpoints utilise SIP for the call setup protocol. Sending a SIP INVITE with a 4x8 a"s in the MAC Address field and the receive field causes the system to reboot.
Proof of Concept: MXP: Exception 0x1100 : Data TLB load miss Active task FsmMain FSM process : SipTrnsp(0) FSM message : SipTrnsp_Send_Msg_Req from SipTrnsp(0) Data TLB miss (DMISS) : 0x00000000 (illegal addr. accessed)
Solution. Upgrade to TC4.2 for the C series to fix validation issues.
Discovered by.
About us. Sense of Security is a leading provider of information security and risk management solutions. Our team has expert skills in assessment and assurance, strategy and architecture, and deployment through to ongoing management. We are Australia's premier application penetration testing firm and trusted IT security advisor to many of the countries largest organisations.
Sense of Security Pty Ltd Level 8, 66 King St Sydney NSW 2000 AUSTRALIA
T: +61 (0)2 9290 4444 F: +61 (0)2 9290 4455 W: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au E: info@senseofsecurity.com.au Twitter: @ITsecurityAU
The latest version of this advisory can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/advisories/SOS-11-010.pdf
Other Sense of Security advisories can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/research/it-security-advisories.php
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"data": "Unspecified vulnerability in Cisco TelePresence C Series Endpoints, E/EX Personal Video units, and MXP Series Codecs, when using software versions before TC 4.0.0 or F9.1, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted SIP packet to port 5060 or 5061, aka Bug ID CSCtq46500. The problem is Bug ID CSCtq46500 It is a problem.By a third party 5060 and 5061 Crafted against the port SIP Service disruption via packets ( crash ) There is a possibility of being put into a state. Cisco TelePresence Codecs are prone to a denial-of-service vulnerability. \nAn attacker can exploit this issue to cause the device to crash, denying service to legitimate users. \nThis issue is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCtq46500. \n\nCisco has released free software updates that address this\nvulnerability. \n\nUsers can determine the software version of a Cisco TelePresence unit by\nentering the IP address of the codec in a web browser, authenticating\n(if the device is configured for authentication), and then selecting the\nsystem info menu option. The version number will follow the Software\nVersion text in the System Info window. \n\nAlternatively, users can determine the software version by issuing the\n\"xStatus SystemUnit\" command from a device\u0027s application programmer\ninterface. The software version that is running on the codec is\ndisplayed following the SystemUnit Software Version text. The following\nexample displays \"xStatus SystemUnit\" output from a system that is\nrunning software version TC4.0:\n\n xStatus SystemUnit\n *s SystemUnit ProductType: \"Cisco TelePresence Codec\"\n *s SystemUnit ProductId: \"Cisco TelePresence Codec C90\"\n *s SystemUnit ProductPlatform: \"C90\"\n *s SystemUnit Uptime: 597095\n *s SystemUnit Software Application: \"Endpoint\"\n *s SystemUnit Software Version: \"TC4.0\"\n *s SystemUnit Software Name: \"s52000\"\n *s SystemUnit Software ReleaseDate: \"2010-11-01\"\n *s SystemUnit Software MaxVideoCalls: 3\n *s SystemUnit Software MaxAudioCalls: 4\n *s SystemUnit Software ReleaseKey: \"true\"\n *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys NaturalPresenter: \"true\"\n *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys MultiSite: \"true\"\n *s SystemUnit Software OptionKeys PremiumResolution: \"true\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware Module SerialNumber: \"B1AD25A00003\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware Module Identifier: \"0\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard SerialNumber: \"PH0497201\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware MainBoard Identifier: \"101401-3 [04]\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard SerialNumber: \"PH0497874\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware VideoBoard Identifier: \"101560-1 [02]\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard SerialNumber: \"N/A\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware AudioBoard Identifier: \"\"\n *s SystemUnit Hardware BootSoftware: \"U-Boot 2009.03-65\"\n *s SystemUnit State System: Initialized\n *s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfCalls: 3\n *s SystemUnit State MaxNumberOfActiveCalls: 3\n *s SystemUnit State NumberOfActiveCalls: 1\n *s SystemUnit State NumberOfSuspendedCalls: 0\n *s SystemUnit State NumberOfInProgressCalls: 0\n *s SystemUnit State Subsystem Application: Initialized\n *s SystemUnit ContactInfo: \"helpdesk@company.com\"\n ** end\n\nProducts Confirmed Not Vulnerable\n+--------------------------------\n\nNo other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this\nvulnerability. \n\nDetails\n=======\n\nAffected devices are part systems that provide Cisco TelePresence\nEndpoints for immersive environments, conference rooms, individual\ndesktops, and home offices. This vulnerability is triggered by a crafted\nSession Initiation Protocol (SIP) packet that is sent to an affected\ndevice on port 5060 or 5061. \n\nVulnerability Scoring Details\n=============================\n\nCisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory\nbased on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS\nscoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS\nversion 2.0. \n\nCVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability\nseverity and helps determine urgency and priority of response. \n\nCisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then\ncompute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of\nthe vulnerability in individual networks. \n\nCisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding\nCVSS at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html\n\nCisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the\nenvironmental impact for individual networks at:\n\nhttp://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss\n\n* CSCtq46500 (\"Specifically crafted SIP packet may crash the device\")\n\nCVSS Base Score - 7.8\n Access Vector - Network\n Access Complexity - Low\n Authentication - None\n Confidentiality Impact - None\n Integrity Impact - None\n Availability Impact - Complete\n\nCVSS Temporal Score - 6.4\n Exploitability - Functional\n Remediation Level - Official-Fix\n Report Confidence - Confirmed\n\nImpact\n======\n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a\nsystem crash that may lead to a denial of service condition. \n\nSoftware Versions and Fixes\n===========================\n\nWhen considering software upgrades, also consult\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine\nexposure and a complete upgrade solution. \n\nIn all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the\ndevices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current\nhardware and software configurations will continue to be supported\nproperly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact\nthe Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted\nmaintenance provider for assistance. \n\nWorkarounds\n===========\n\nThere are no workarounds available that mitigate this vulnerability. \nHowever, there is an Applied Mitigations Bulletin available at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-amb-20110831-tandberg.shtml\nthat describes how to filter SIP packets sent to the device. \n\nObtaining Fixed Software\n========================\n\nCisco has released free software updates that addresses this\nvulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult\ntheir maintenance provider or check the software for feature set\ncompatibility and known issues specific to their environment. \n\nCustomers may only install and expect support for the feature sets\nthey have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or\notherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound\nby the terms of Cisco\u0027s software license terms found at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html,\nor as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. \n\nDo not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for\nsoftware upgrades. \n\nCustomers with Service Contracts\n+-------------------------------\n\nCustomers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through\ntheir regular update channels. For most customers, this means that\nupgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website at http://www.cisco.com. \n\nCustomers using Third Party Support Organizations\n+------------------------------------------------\n\nCustomers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through\nprior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,\nsuch as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers\nshould contact that support organization for guidance and assistance\nwith the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. \n\nThe effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific\ncustomer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic\nbehavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected\nproducts and releases, customers should consult with their service\nprovider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or\nfix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it\nis deployed. \n\nCustomers without Service Contracts\n+----------------------------------\n\nCustomers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco\nservice contract, and customers who purchase through third-party\nvendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through\ntheir point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco\nTechnical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. \n\n * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)\n * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)\n * e-mail: tac@cisco.com\n\nCustomers should have their product serial number available and be\nprepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to\na free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be\nrequested through the TAC. \n\nRefer to\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html\nfor additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone\nnumbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various\nlanguages. \n\nExploitation and Public Announcements\n=====================================\n\nThe Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious\nuse of the vulnerability described in this advisory. \n\nThis vulnerability was reported to Cisco by David Klein of Sense of\nSecurity. \n\nStatus of this Notice: FINAL\n============================\n\nTHIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN \"AS IS\" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY\nANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF\nMERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE\nINFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS\nAT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS\nDOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. \n\nA stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits\nthe distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,\nand may lack important information or contain factual errors. \n\nDistribution\n============\n\nThis advisory is posted on Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at:\n\nhttp://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110831-tandberg.shtml\n\nIn addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice\nis clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the\nfollowing e-mail and Usenet news recipients. \n\n * cust-security-announce@cisco.com\n * first-bulletins@lists.first.org\n * bugtraq@securityfocus.com\n * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org\n * cisco@spot.colorado.edu\n * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net\n * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk\n\nFuture updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco\u0027s\nworldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing\nlists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged\nto check the above URL for any updates. \n\nRevision History\n================\n\n+------------------------------------------------------------+\n| Revision 1.0 | 2011-Aug-31 | Initial public release. |\n+------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nCisco Security Procedures\n=========================\n\nComplete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco\nproducts, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and\nregistering to receive security information from Cisco, is available\non Cisco\u0027s worldwide website at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. \nThis includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security\nnotices. All Cisco security advisories are available at\nhttp://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. \n\n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\nCopyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. \n+--------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nUpdated: Aug 11, 2011 Document ID: 113098\n\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\nVersion: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux)\n\niF4EAREIAAYFAk5eWDwACgkQQXnnBKKRMNAFAQD7Bf8+G0VKbE37nc95p1vOhAvh\nDKCbu0g+YxMlo6+Iua8A/0qgCKk47eCVVO97ejvRkbAHxjOzVu9GBG4uTuQLoqK8\n=WGqM\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n_______________________________________________\nFull-Disclosure - We believe in it. \nCharter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html\nHosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/\n. 19-Sep-2011\nLast Update. -\nVendor Notification Date. 21-Feb-2011\nProduct. Cisco TelePresence Series\nPlatform. C \u003c= TC4.1.2, MXP \u003c= F9.1\nSeverity Rating. Low - Medium\nImpact. Cookie/credential theft,\n impersonation,\n loss of confidentiality,\n client-side code execution,\n denial of service. \nSolution Status. Vendor patch\nReferences. 1. CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488)\n 2. CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496)\n 3. CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500)\n\nDetails. The C \u0026 MXP Series are the\nEndpoints used on desks or in boardrooms to provide users with a\ntermination point for Video Conferencing. \n\n1. Post-authentication HTML Injection - CVE-2011-2544 (CSCtq46488):\nCisco TelePresence Endpoints have a web interface (HTTP or HTTPS) for\nmanaging, configuring and reporting. It is possible to set the Call ID\n(with H.323 or SIP) to a HTML value. If a call is made to another\nendpoint and an authenticated user browses to the web interface on the\nendpoint receiving the call (e.g. to view call statistics), the\nHTML will render locally within the context of the logged in user. From\nthis point it is possible to make changes to the system as the\nauthenticated user. The flaw is due to the flexibility of the H.323 ID\nor SIP Display Name fields and failure to correctly validate user input. \n\nExamples (MXP):\nRebooting the system: \u003cIMG SRC=\"/reboot\u0026Yes=please\"\u003e\nThe attacker may also choose to change passwords in the system, disable\nencryption or enable telnet:\n\u003cIMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=other.ssi\u0026telnet=On\u003e\n\u003cIMG SRC=/html_select_status?reload=security.ssi\u0026/Configuration/\nConference/Encryption/Mode=Off\u0026/Configuration/SystemUnit/Password=test\u003e\n\n2. Post-authentication Memory Corruption - CVE-2011-2543 (CSCtq46496):\nCisco TelePresence systems (Endpoints and Infrastructure) use XPath for\nsetting and getting configuration. \n\nExample syntax is:\nhttp://ip/getxml?location=/Configuration/Video\nThe request is sent to a locally listening shell (tshell). This is the\ncase for all requests relating to performing an action on the system (e.g. \nconfig get or set). The shell then sends the input to the \"main\"\napplication (/app/main, id=0), and the data is passed as a parameter. \n\nIt was discovered that the getXML handle does not properly perform\nlength checking on the user supplied input before passing it to the\ntshell. Furthermore, there is no length checking performed in the tshell\nand no bounds checking performed in the main application where the\nparameter is consumed. As such, it is possible to send input that\nexceeds the size of the receiving buffer, subsequently causing an\ninvalid address to be read. This causes a reboot on the Endpoints. The\nVCS will not reboot, the process will crash by SIGSEGV (or sigabrt) but\nit will restart the process itself which drops all calls. \n\nProof of Concept: GET\n/wsgi/getxml?location=\"+(\"A\"*5200)+(\"\\x60\"*4)+(\"X\"*4)+\"HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\nHost: 192.168.6.99\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n\nReceived signal SIGSEGV (11) in thread 0x129e8480, TID 2670\nIllegal memory access at: 0x5858585c\nRegisters:\nGPR00: 00f2c908 129e5960 129ef920 00000005 00000040 0000000c 00000037 \n0f315580\nGPR08: 00000005 129e5a70 129e5a80 58585858 0f3272d4 11589858 129e6896 \n0000000b\nGPR16: 129e6084 11164a1c 00000000 129e6894 00000037 1299ca18 00000005 \n00000002\nGPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac \n129e5960\nGPR24: 129e59a8 00000002 0f3ea3a4 129e5a64 00000037 00000005 0f410bac \n129e5960\nNIP: 0f39abc8 MSR: 0000d032 OGPR3: 00000002\n\nAs you can see, the crash string is passed as a parameter in GPR 8. \nThe severity of this issue is compounded by the fact that the main\napplication runs as root, this could potentially lead to arbitrary code\nexecution. \n\n3. Pre-authentication SIP Denial of Service - CVE-2011-2577 (CSCtq46500):\nCisco TelePresence Endpoints utilise SIP for the call setup protocol. \nSending a SIP INVITE with a 4x8 a\"s in the MAC Address field and the\nreceive field causes the system to reboot. \n\nProof of Concept: MXP:\nException 0x1100 : Data TLB load miss Active task\nFsmMain FSM process : SipTrnsp(0) FSM message : SipTrnsp_Send_Msg_Req\nfrom SipTrnsp(0) Data TLB miss (DMISS) : 0x00000000 (illegal addr. \naccessed)\n\nSolution. \nUpgrade to TC4.2 for the C series to fix validation issues. \n\nDiscovered by. \n\nAbout us. \nSense of Security is a leading provider of information\nsecurity and risk management solutions. Our team has expert\nskills in assessment and assurance, strategy and architecture,\nand deployment through to ongoing management. We are\nAustralia\u0027s premier application penetration testing firm and\ntrusted IT security advisor to many of the countries largest\norganisations. \n\nSense of Security Pty Ltd\nLevel 8, 66 King St\nSydney NSW 2000\nAUSTRALIA\n\nT: +61 (0)2 9290 4444\nF: +61 (0)2 9290 4455\nW: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au\nE: info@senseofsecurity.com.au\nTwitter: @ITsecurityAU\n\nThe latest version of this advisory can be found at:\nhttp://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/advisories/SOS-11-010.pdf\n\nOther Sense of Security advisories can be found at:\nhttp://www.senseofsecurity.com.au/research/it-security-advisories.php \n",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.