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rustsec-2026-0272
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2026-08-27 12:00
Modified
2026-08-31 09:44
Summary
Panic-safety unsoundness in `Stack::pop`, `Fifo::pop_front` and `Value::replace_stable` (use-after-free / double-free)
Details

Three removal and replacement paths destroy an initialized value before committing the metadata change that removes it. Destruction runs T::drop(), which is user code and may panic. If it does, the commit is skipped and the container still claims ownership of the already-destroyed value, so its own destructor drops that value a second time.

Stack::pop drops the top value before reducing next_ofs. Stack's destructor pops in a loop, so an unchanged next_ofs re-drops the same value.

Fifo::pop_front (via pop_front_inner) drops the front value before advancing read_pos. An unchanged read_pos still points at the destroyed value.

Value::replace_stable drops the existing value before writing the replacement. If the destructor panics the replacement is never written, but the backing storage still holds the old value's metadata.

This is separate from RUSTSEC-2021-0033, which covered a clone panic on insertion in push_cloned and was fixed in 0.6.1.

Impact

A heap-owning value is freed twice, corrupting the allocator. Reachable from safe Rust with any element type whose Drop can panic — no unsafe on the caller's side.

  • CWE-415 (Double Free)
  • CWE-416 (Use-After-Free)

Confirmed under AddressSanitizer, which reports attempting double-free on all three paths.

Fix

Fixed in 0.8.2.

References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": "unsound"
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "stack_dst::Fifo::pop_front",
            "stack_dst::Stack::pop",
            "stack_dst::Value::replace_stable"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "stack_dst",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/stack_dst"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Three removal and replacement paths destroy an initialized value before\ncommitting the metadata change that removes it. Destruction runs `T::drop()`,\nwhich is user code and may panic. If it does, the commit is skipped and the\ncontainer still claims ownership of the already-destroyed value, so its own\ndestructor drops that value a second time.\n\n`Stack::pop` drops the top value before reducing `next_ofs`. `Stack`\u0027s\ndestructor pops in a loop, so an unchanged `next_ofs` re-drops the same value.\n\n`Fifo::pop_front` (via `pop_front_inner`) drops the front value before advancing\n`read_pos`. An unchanged `read_pos` still points at the destroyed value.\n\n`Value::replace_stable` drops the existing value before writing the replacement.\nIf the destructor panics the replacement is never written, but the backing\nstorage still holds the old value\u0027s metadata.\n\nThis is separate from RUSTSEC-2021-0033, which covered a clone panic on\ninsertion in `push_cloned` and was fixed in 0.6.1.\n\n## Impact\n\nA heap-owning value is freed twice, corrupting the allocator. Reachable from\nsafe Rust with any element type whose `Drop` can panic \u2014 no `unsafe` on the\ncaller\u0027s side.\n\n* CWE-415 (Double Free)\n* CWE-416 (Use-After-Free)\n\nConfirmed under AddressSanitizer, which reports `attempting double-free` on all\nthree paths.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in 0.8.2.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0272",
  "modified": "2026-08-31T09:44:04Z",
  "published": "2026-08-27T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/stack_dst"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0272.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/thepowersgang/stack_dst-rs/issues/16"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Panic-safety unsoundness in `Stack::pop`, `Fifo::pop_front` and `Value::replace_stable` (use-after-free / double-free)"
}



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