rustsec-2026-0267
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
BitVecCore::clear drops every occupied element with drop_in_place and only
afterwards clears the occupancy bits and resets len. If an element's Drop
panics, those metadata updates are skipped, so the slot of the already-dropped
element stays marked as occupied. BitVecCore::drop calls clear() again,
visits the same slot, and drops the element a second time — a double-free /
use-after-free reachable from safe Rust.
Reachable via the public StableVec::clear and ExternStableVec::clear, which
delegate to BitVecCore::clear.
Impact
- CWE-415 (Double Free): the same allocation is freed twice.
- CWE-416 (Use-After-Free): a freed allocation is accessed during a repeated
Drop.
Reachable entirely from safe Rust via catch_unwind with element types whose
Drop can panic. Confirmed under AddressSanitizer on 0.4.2.
Fix
Fixed in stable-vec 0.4.3 by removing each element via remove_at, which
clears the occupancy bit before taking the value out.
Release 0.4.3 also fixes several other panic-safety issues found by the maintainer; see GHSA-mr2v-63pc-gmr4 and the 0.4.3 changelog for the full list.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-corruption"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": "unsound"
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [
"stable_vec::BitVecCore::clear"
],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "stable-vec",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/stable-vec"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.3"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-mr2v-63pc-gmr4"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "`BitVecCore::clear` drops every occupied element with `drop_in_place` and only\nafterwards clears the occupancy bits and resets `len`. If an element\u0027s `Drop`\npanics, those metadata updates are skipped, so the slot of the already-dropped\nelement stays marked as occupied. `BitVecCore::drop` calls `clear()` again,\nvisits the same slot, and drops the element a second time \u2014 a double-free /\nuse-after-free reachable from safe Rust.\n\nReachable via the public `StableVec::clear` and `ExternStableVec::clear`, which\ndelegate to `BitVecCore::clear`.\n\n## Impact\n\n* CWE-415 (Double Free): the same allocation is freed twice.\n* CWE-416 (Use-After-Free): a freed allocation is accessed during a repeated `Drop`.\n\nReachable entirely from safe Rust via `catch_unwind` with element types whose\n`Drop` can panic. Confirmed under AddressSanitizer on 0.4.2.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in `stable-vec` 0.4.3 by removing each element via `remove_at`, which\nclears the occupancy bit before taking the value out.\n\nRelease 0.4.3 also fixes several other panic-safety issues found by the\nmaintainer; see [GHSA-mr2v-63pc-gmr4](https://github.com/LukasKalbertodt/stable-vec/security/advisories/GHSA-mr2v-63pc-gmr4)\nand the 0.4.3 changelog for the full list.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0267",
"modified": "2026-08-25T02:41:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/stable-vec"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0267.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LukasKalbertodt/stable-vec/pull/51"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Panic-safety unsoundness in `BitVecCore::clear` (double-free / use-after-free)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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