rustsec-2026-0242
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
All published versions of dcrypt-api before 2.0.0 exposed safe
ErrorRegistry operations that could trigger undefined behavior when the
default std feature was enabled.
Stored Box<E> values were erased to raw pointers and later deallocated as
Box<()>. The get_error<E> operation also performed an unchecked cast to a
caller-selected type. Finally, concurrent replacement or clearing could free a
value while another thread cloned it. Ordinary safe Rust could therefore cause
mismatched deallocation, type confusion, and use-after-free. Crates that
re-exported this API are affected transitively.
Version 2.0.0 replaces the raw pointers with owned Box<dyn Any + Send> values
behind a mutex, performs checked downcasts, and uses a mutation generation so
concurrent stores and clears win safely. There is no reliable workaround while
calling the affected registry API. Upgrade to 2.0.0 or later and avoid
process-global error state where possible.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"categories": [
"memory-corruption",
"thread-safety"
],
"cvss": null,
"informational": null
},
"ecosystem_specific": {
"affected_functions": null,
"affects": {
"arch": [],
"functions": [],
"os": []
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "dcrypt-api",
"purl": "pkg:cargo/dcrypt-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": []
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-7hc7-h3f2-r4j6"
],
"database_specific": {
"license": "CC0-1.0"
},
"details": "All published versions of `dcrypt-api` before 2.0.0 exposed safe\n`ErrorRegistry` operations that could trigger undefined behavior when the\ndefault `std` feature was enabled.\n\nStored `Box\u003cE\u003e` values were erased to raw pointers and later deallocated as\n`Box\u003c()\u003e`. The `get_error\u003cE\u003e` operation also performed an unchecked cast to a\ncaller-selected type. Finally, concurrent replacement or clearing could free a\nvalue while another thread cloned it. Ordinary safe Rust could therefore cause\nmismatched deallocation, type confusion, and use-after-free. Crates that\nre-exported this API are affected transitively.\n\nVersion 2.0.0 replaces the raw pointers with owned `Box\u003cdyn Any + Send\u003e` values\nbehind a mutex, performs checked downcasts, and uses a mutation generation so\nconcurrent stores and clears win safely. There is no reliable workaround while\ncalling the affected registry API. Upgrade to 2.0.0 or later and avoid\nprocess-global error state where possible.",
"id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0242",
"modified": "2026-08-09T12:34:06Z",
"published": "2026-08-09T12:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://crates.io/crates/dcrypt-api"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0242.html"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/ioi-foundation/dcrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-7hc7-h3f2-r4j6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ioi-foundation/dcrypt/commit/c99cc86f0ee353010cd202cbcd2c310371b0bbb8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ioi-foundation/dcrypt/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
}
],
"related": [],
"severity": [],
"summary": "Safe ErrorRegistry APIs can cause undefined behavior"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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