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rustsec-2023-0071
Vulnerability from osv_rustsec
Published
2023-11-22 12:00
Modified
2026-09-14 09:33
Summary
Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels
Details

Impact

Due to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.

Patches

No patch is yet available. The crypto-bigint migration (RustCrypto/RSA#394) did not close this. Tracking is RustCrypto/RSA#626 (padding still not constant-time). Implicit rejection work is in RustCrypto/RSA#680; default-path blinding is in RustCrypto/RSA#702.

Still affected as of 2026-09-12: rsa 0.9.10 (latest stable) and rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 (latest). patched = [] is intentional.

Workarounds

Avoid using the rsa crate in settings where attackers can observe timing, for example over the network. Local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.

References

This vulnerability was discovered as part of the "Marvin Attack", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "crypto-failure"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "rsa",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/rsa"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-49092",
    "GHSA-c38w-74pg-36hr",
    "GHSA-4grx-2x9w-596c"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nDue to a non-constant-time implementation, information about the private key is leaked through timing information which is observable over the network. An attacker may be able to use that information to recover the key.\n\n### Patches\nNo patch is yet available. The crypto-bigint migration ([RustCrypto/RSA#394](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/394)) did not close this. Tracking is [RustCrypto/RSA#626](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/626) (padding still not constant-time). Implicit rejection work is in [RustCrypto/RSA#680](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/680); default-path blinding is in [RustCrypto/RSA#702](https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/702).\n\nStill affected as of 2026-09-12: rsa 0.9.10 (latest stable) and rsa 0.10.0-rc.18 (latest). `patched = []` is intentional.\n\n### Workarounds\nAvoid using the `rsa` crate in settings where attackers can observe timing, for example over the network. Local use on a non-compromised computer is fine.\n\n### References\nThis vulnerability was discovered as part of the \"[Marvin Attack]\", which revealed several implementations of RSA including OpenSSL had not properly mitigated timing sidechannel attacks.\n\n[Marvin Attack]: https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
  "modified": "2026-09-14T09:33:38Z",
  "published": "2023-11-22T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/rsa"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2023-0071.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/626"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/issues/19#issuecomment-1822995643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/394"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/680"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/RustCrypto/RSA/pull/702"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Marvin Attack: potential key recovery through timing sidechannels"
}



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