OXDC-ADV-2024-0003

Vulnerability from csaf_ox - Published: 2024-09-09 22:00 - Updated: 2024-09-10 00:00
Summary
OX Dovecot Pro Security Advisory OXDC-ADV-2024-0003
Severity
High

Very large headers can cause resource exhaustion when parsing message. The message-parser normally reads reasonably sized chunks of the message. However, when it feeds them to message-header-parser, it starts building up "full_value" buffer out of the smaller chunks. The full_value buffer has no size limit, so large headers can cause large memory usage. It doesn't matter whether it's a single long header line, or a single header split into multiple lines. This bug exists in all Dovecot versions.

CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Affected products
Product Identifier Version Remediation
OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.21
Open-Xchange GmbH / OX Dovecot Pro core
cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:2.3.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:* 2.3.21
Vendor Fix
Product Identifier Version Remediation
OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.21.1
Open-Xchange GmbH / OX Dovecot Pro core
cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:2.3.21.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:* 2.3.21.1
OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.0
Open-Xchange GmbH / OX Dovecot Pro core
cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:* 3.0.0
Threats
Impact Incoming mails typically have some size limits set by MTA, so even largest possible header size may still fit into Dovecot's vsz_limit. So attackers probably can't DoS a victim user this way. A user could APPEND larger mails though, allowing them to DoS themselves (although maybe cause some memory issues for the backend in general).
Exploit Status No publicly available exploits are known.

{
  "document": {
    "aggregate_severity": {
      "text": "HIGH"
    },
    "category": "csaf_security_advisory",
    "csaf_version": "2.0",
    "distribution": {
      "tlp": {
        "label": "GREEN",
        "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
      }
    },
    "lang": "en-US",
    "publisher": {
      "category": "vendor",
      "name": "Open-Xchange GmbH",
      "namespace": "https://open-xchange.com/"
    },
    "references": [
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "Canonical CSAF document",
        "url": "https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/csaf/2024/oxdc-adv-2024-0003.json"
      },
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "Markdown representation",
        "url": "https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/md/2024/oxdc-adv-2024-0003.md"
      },
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "HTML representation",
        "url": "https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/html/2024/oxdc-adv-2024-0003.html"
      },
      {
        "category": "self",
        "summary": "Plain-text representation",
        "url": "https://documentation.open-xchange.com/dovecot/security/advisories/txt/2024/oxdc-adv-2024-0003.txt"
      }
    ],
    "title": "OX Dovecot Pro Security Advisory OXDC-ADV-2024-0003",
    "tracking": {
      "current_release_date": "2024-09-10T00:00:00+00:00",
      "generator": {
        "date": "2024-09-10T14:45:00+00:00",
        "engine": {
          "name": "OX CSAF",
          "version": "1.0.0"
        }
      },
      "id": "OXDC-ADV-2024-0003",
      "initial_release_date": "2024-09-10T00:00:00+02:00",
      "revision_history": [
        {
          "date": "2024-09-10T00:00:00+02:00",
          "number": "1",
          "summary": "Initial release"
        },
        {
          "date": "2024-09-10T00:00:00+00:00",
          "number": "2",
          "summary": "Public release"
        }
      ],
      "status": "final",
      "version": "2"
    }
  },
  "product_tree": {
    "branches": [
      {
        "branches": [
          {
            "branches": [
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "2.3.21",
                "product": {
                  "name": "OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.21",
                  "product_id": "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21",
                  "product_identification_helper": {
                    "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:2.3.21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                  }
                }
              },
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "2.3.21.1",
                "product": {
                  "name": "OX Dovecot Pro core 2.3.21.1",
                  "product_id": "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21.1",
                  "product_identification_helper": {
                    "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:2.3.21.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                  }
                }
              },
              {
                "category": "product_version",
                "name": "3.0.0",
                "product": {
                  "name": "OX Dovecot Pro core 3.0.0",
                  "product_id": "OXDC-CORE_3.0.0",
                  "product_identification_helper": {
                    "cpe": "cpe:2.3:a:open-xchange:dovecot:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
                  }
                }
              }
            ],
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "OX Dovecot Pro core"
          }
        ],
        "category": "vendor",
        "name": "Open-Xchange GmbH"
      }
    ]
  },
  "vulnerabilities": [
    {
      "cve": "CVE-2024-23185",
      "cwe": {
        "id": "CWE-770",
        "name": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling"
      },
      "discovery_date": "2024-01-31T11:55:28+01:00",
      "ids": [
        {
          "system_name": "JIRA OX Bug",
          "text": "DOV-6601"
        }
      ],
      "notes": [
        {
          "category": "description",
          "text": "Very large headers can cause resource exhaustion when parsing message. The message-parser normally reads reasonably sized chunks of the message. However, when it feeds them to message-header-parser, it starts building up \"full_value\" buffer out of the smaller chunks. The full_value buffer has no size limit, so large headers can cause large memory usage. It doesn\u0027t matter whether it\u0027s a single long header line, or a single header split into multiple lines. This bug exists in all Dovecot versions."
        }
      ],
      "product_status": {
        "first_fixed": [
          "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21.1",
          "OXDC-CORE_3.0.0"
        ],
        "last_affected": [
          "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21"
        ]
      },
      "remediations": [
        {
          "category": "vendor_fix",
          "date": "2024-08-21T08:59:54+02:00",
          "details": "One can implement restrictions on headers on MTA component preceding Dovecot.",
          "product_ids": [
            "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "scores": [
        {
          "cvss_v3": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "products": [
            "OXDC-CORE_2.3.21"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "threats": [
        {
          "category": "impact",
          "details": "Incoming mails typically have some size limits set by MTA, so even largest possible header size may still fit into Dovecot\u0027s vsz_limit. So attackers probably can\u0027t DoS a victim user this way. A user could APPEND larger mails though, allowing them to DoS themselves (although maybe cause some memory issues for the backend in general)."
        },
        {
          "category": "exploit_status",
          "details": "No publicly available exploits are known."
        }
      ],
      "title": "Message headers have no size limit when parsing"
    }
  ]
}



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