mal-2026-4819
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (2a058b653e7a491fdf0c9128b4d2d408c2cdac6a1784adc5f02a0975a0e669eb)
The CLI in cli.mjs reads its API key from process.env.TOKEN_ME_UK_API_KEY, falling back to process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY and then process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (cli.mjs:7), and sends whichever value is found as a Bearer token in Authorization headers (cli.mjs:62) to hardcoded endpoints at https://www.token.me.uk/v1/dashboard/billing/subscription and /v1/dashboard/billing/usage. The package's README advertises only a Token.Me.Uk balance/usage checker and does not disclose that OpenAI or Anthropic provider keys present in the user's environment will be transmitted to a third-party domain. Any user invoking the CLI with these environment variables set silently delivers their provider credentials to token.me.uk, where they can be logged or abused. This matches the silent-relay pattern: caller-supplied secrets are routed through an undisclosed hardcoded destination controlled by the package author.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "cli.mjs",
"sha256": "fef386bc9592848dd2a5d4f875cae76af4a0e403276cc938554dc0acb3fdf8d6",
"tlsh": "fc81728d2dfba5218702603a7cab341e32275d02395dfd40f2bf8ad45f2553ca66ad8c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "token-me-uk-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "ddaaba171611511bbf5d584d3c893db59f67bee2",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-LV73hkF6at2g77cPUr6Ma69n+rYKfDB4T9ktp00hfkV2BrEb0dltuZbNvSvOfrGIWQ2D04Ea0siisXEUVvprGg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "token-me-uk"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-004916",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T15:07:42.456011432Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-26T14:20:32Z",
"sha256": "2a058b653e7a491fdf0c9128b4d2d408c2cdac6a1784adc5f02a0975a0e669eb",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2a058b653e7a491fdf0c9128b4d2d408c2cdac6a1784adc5f02a0975a0e669eb)\nThe CLI in cli.mjs reads its API key from process.env.TOKEN_ME_UK_API_KEY, falling back to process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY and then process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (cli.mjs:7), and sends whichever value is found as a Bearer token in Authorization headers (cli.mjs:62) to hardcoded endpoints at https://www.token.me.uk/v1/dashboard/billing/subscription and /v1/dashboard/billing/usage. The package\u0027s README advertises only a Token.Me.Uk balance/usage checker and does not disclose that OpenAI or Anthropic provider keys present in the user\u0027s environment will be transmitted to a third-party domain. Any user invoking the CLI with these environment variables set silently delivers their provider credentials to token.me.uk, where they can be logged or abused. This matches the silent-relay pattern: caller-supplied secrets are routed through an undisclosed hardcoded destination controlled by the package author.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4819",
"modified": "2026-05-26T14:20:32Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T14:20:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/token-me-uk/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in token-me-uk (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.