mal-2026-4814
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0)
During pip install, a custom build_ext step in src/vectordb_engine_build.py runs an obfuscated payload that performs targeted reconnaissance and exfiltration. Before doing anything else, it SHA-256-hashes the lowercased machine hostname against an obfuscated salt and compares the digest against three hardcoded allowed-hash constants; if the hostname does not match, the process calls exit() — the canonical shape of a targeted supply-chain implant that lies dormant on non-victim machines. On matching hosts, the script collects hostname, FQDN, OS, architecture, Python version, and OS username, concatenates them with | separators, XOR-encrypts the blob with a hardcoded key, hex-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET to https://vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net/kernels/?v=<encoded-fingerprint>. A separate function reads environment variables whose names are concealed behind a base85+XOR+zlib decoder (_ORQFVrfoaIJyX4SjOvpEI) and folds the values into the same exfil pipeline, consistent with scraping CI/cloud secrets without leaving readable identifiers in the source. urllib3.disable_warnings() is invoked to suppress TLS warnings. The package metadata uses placeholder publisher identity (VectorDB Contributors, support@vectordb-engine.io) and constructs a cover-story URL https://releases.vectordb-engine.io/kernels that is built into a string but never actually requested — it exists only as a decoy alongside the real Azure blob exfil endpoint. Each of (hostname-allowlist gating with exit() fallback, obfuscated env-var-name scraper feeding a network exfil, host-fingerprint XOR-encoded into a query string against attacker-controlled storage, decoy-domain cover story with placeholder publisher metadata) is independently sufficient evidence of a targeted attack; their joint presence leaves no benign interpretation.
Source: kam193 (b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4)
During installation, in the build step, the code performs machine fingerprinting and only in a highly targeted environment, downloads a likely-malicious shared library. The code seems to actually be incomplete.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-05-vectordb-engine
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
Downloads and executes a remote executable.
-
targetted-attack
-
obfuscation
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "src/vectordb_engine_build.py",
"sha256": "0a2aa6695bdd2be1a18c38cf3d938bb52d795f13739f736d9ba8f3dc7d9e6c70",
"tlsh": "80c2b226dc5a682121b3d55e8ca6f063fb690743970e58257abc0314af321a5d3f1ebf"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "vectordb_engine-1.0.0.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "45516a6f9c2e7a3c5293e36bc659637b6bdaa9e38efe79a131b8f5178e52754d",
"md5": "e6ec863ab98ad77d0c222b51932e32ea",
"sha256": "883518dae64216fca4ecdcf8c16100aff193a54eea3b17bc8dbb6f38f8caeb5e"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vectordb-engine"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-004910",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T13:32:46.958207847Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-26T13:08:58Z",
"sha256": "42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "pypi/2026-05-vectordb-engine/vectordb-engine",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T22:55:24.736846288Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-26T21:59:35.102583Z",
"sha256": "b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0)\nDuring `pip install`, a custom `build_ext` step in `src/vectordb_engine_build.py` runs an obfuscated payload that performs targeted reconnaissance and exfiltration. Before doing anything else, it SHA-256-hashes the lowercased machine hostname against an obfuscated salt and compares the digest against three hardcoded allowed-hash constants; if the hostname does not match, the process calls `exit()` \u2014 the canonical shape of a targeted supply-chain implant that lies dormant on non-victim machines. On matching hosts, the script collects hostname, FQDN, OS, architecture, Python version, and OS username, concatenates them with `|` separators, XOR-encrypts the blob with a hardcoded key, hex-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET to `https://vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net/kernels/?v=\u003cencoded-fingerprint\u003e`. A separate function reads environment variables whose names are concealed behind a base85+XOR+zlib decoder (`_ORQFVrfoaIJyX4SjOvpEI`) and folds the values into the same exfil pipeline, consistent with scraping CI/cloud secrets without leaving readable identifiers in the source. `urllib3.disable_warnings()` is invoked to suppress TLS warnings. The package metadata uses placeholder publisher identity (`VectorDB Contributors`, `support@vectordb-engine.io`) and constructs a cover-story URL `https://releases.vectordb-engine.io/kernels` that is built into a string but never actually requested \u2014 it exists only as a decoy alongside the real Azure blob exfil endpoint. Each of (hostname-allowlist gating with `exit()` fallback, obfuscated env-var-name scraper feeding a network exfil, host-fingerprint XOR-encoded into a query string against attacker-controlled storage, decoy-domain cover story with placeholder publisher metadata) is independently sufficient evidence of a targeted attack; their joint presence leaves no benign interpretation.\n\n## Source: kam193 (b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4)\nDuring installation, in the build step, the code performs machine fingerprinting and only in a highly targeted environment, downloads a likely-malicious shared library. The code seems to actually be incomplete.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-05-vectordb-engine\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - Downloads and executes a remote executable.\n\n\n - targetted-attack\n\n\n - obfuscation\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4814",
"modified": "2026-05-26T22:57:06Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:08:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/vectordb-engine/1.0.0/"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/vectordb-engine"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in vectordb-engine (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.