mal-2026-4814
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-05-26 13:08
Modified
2026-05-26 22:57
Summary
Malicious code in vectordb-engine (PyPI)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0)

During pip install, a custom build_ext step in src/vectordb_engine_build.py runs an obfuscated payload that performs targeted reconnaissance and exfiltration. Before doing anything else, it SHA-256-hashes the lowercased machine hostname against an obfuscated salt and compares the digest against three hardcoded allowed-hash constants; if the hostname does not match, the process calls exit() — the canonical shape of a targeted supply-chain implant that lies dormant on non-victim machines. On matching hosts, the script collects hostname, FQDN, OS, architecture, Python version, and OS username, concatenates them with | separators, XOR-encrypts the blob with a hardcoded key, hex-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET to https://vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net/kernels/?v=<encoded-fingerprint>. A separate function reads environment variables whose names are concealed behind a base85+XOR+zlib decoder (_ORQFVrfoaIJyX4SjOvpEI) and folds the values into the same exfil pipeline, consistent with scraping CI/cloud secrets without leaving readable identifiers in the source. urllib3.disable_warnings() is invoked to suppress TLS warnings. The package metadata uses placeholder publisher identity (VectorDB Contributors, support@vectordb-engine.io) and constructs a cover-story URL https://releases.vectordb-engine.io/kernels that is built into a string but never actually requested — it exists only as a decoy alongside the real Azure blob exfil endpoint. Each of (hostname-allowlist gating with exit() fallback, obfuscated env-var-name scraper feeding a network exfil, host-fingerprint XOR-encoded into a query string against attacker-controlled storage, decoy-domain cover story with placeholder publisher metadata) is independently sufficient evidence of a targeted attack; their joint presence leaves no benign interpretation.

Source: kam193 (b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4)

During installation, in the build step, the code performs machine fingerprinting and only in a highly targeted environment, downloads a likely-malicious shared library. The code seems to actually be incomplete.


Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-05-vectordb-engine

Reasons (based on the campaign):

  • Downloads and executes a remote executable.

  • targetted-attack

  • obfuscation

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
Credits

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "src/vectordb_engine_build.py",
              "sha256": "0a2aa6695bdd2be1a18c38cf3d938bb52d795f13739f736d9ba8f3dc7d9e6c70",
              "tlsh": "80c2b226dc5a682121b3d55e8ca6f063fb690743970e58257abc0314af321a5d3f1ebf"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "vectordb_engine-1.0.0.tar.gz",
              "hashes": {
                "blake2b_256": "45516a6f9c2e7a3c5293e36bc659637b6bdaa9e38efe79a131b8f5178e52754d",
                "md5": "e6ec863ab98ad77d0c222b51932e32ea",
                "sha256": "883518dae64216fca4ecdcf8c16100aff193a54eea3b17bc8dbb6f38f8caeb5e"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vectordb-engine"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "actran@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://github.com/kam193",
        "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
      ],
      "name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
      "type": "REPORTER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "domains": [
        "vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net"
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-004910",
        "import_time": "2026-05-26T13:32:46.958207847Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-05-26T13:08:58Z",
        "sha256": "42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "pypi/2026-05-vectordb-engine/vectordb-engine",
        "import_time": "2026-05-26T22:55:24.736846288Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-05-26T21:59:35.102583Z",
        "sha256": "b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4",
        "source": "kam193",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (42695503b90ec4adc30c038c3321d637f05038f841bcc5f463a16b891fe4e3e0)\nDuring `pip install`, a custom `build_ext` step in `src/vectordb_engine_build.py` runs an obfuscated payload that performs targeted reconnaissance and exfiltration. Before doing anything else, it SHA-256-hashes the lowercased machine hostname against an obfuscated salt and compares the digest against three hardcoded allowed-hash constants; if the hostname does not match, the process calls `exit()` \u2014 the canonical shape of a targeted supply-chain implant that lies dormant on non-victim machines. On matching hosts, the script collects hostname, FQDN, OS, architecture, Python version, and OS username, concatenates them with `|` separators, XOR-encrypts the blob with a hardcoded key, hex-encodes the result, and issues an HTTPS GET to `https://vectordbengine.blob.core.windows.net/kernels/?v=\u003cencoded-fingerprint\u003e`. A separate function reads environment variables whose names are concealed behind a base85+XOR+zlib decoder (`_ORQFVrfoaIJyX4SjOvpEI`) and folds the values into the same exfil pipeline, consistent with scraping CI/cloud secrets without leaving readable identifiers in the source. `urllib3.disable_warnings()` is invoked to suppress TLS warnings. The package metadata uses placeholder publisher identity (`VectorDB Contributors`, `support@vectordb-engine.io`) and constructs a cover-story URL `https://releases.vectordb-engine.io/kernels` that is built into a string but never actually requested \u2014 it exists only as a decoy alongside the real Azure blob exfil endpoint. Each of (hostname-allowlist gating with `exit()` fallback, obfuscated env-var-name scraper feeding a network exfil, host-fingerprint XOR-encoded into a query string against attacker-controlled storage, decoy-domain cover story with placeholder publisher metadata) is independently sufficient evidence of a targeted attack; their joint presence leaves no benign interpretation.\n\n## Source: kam193 (b1908db5bd2b5d1d4a5ab9238d71d6da0147994c2bb812e1ffb7e0e90626e2b4)\nDuring installation, in the build step, the code performs machine fingerprinting and only in a highly targeted environment, downloads a likely-malicious shared library. The code seems to actually be incomplete.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-05-vectordb-engine\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - Downloads and executes a remote executable.\n\n\n - targetted-attack\n\n\n - obfuscation\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-4814",
  "modified": "2026-05-26T22:57:06Z",
  "published": "2026-05-26T13:08:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/vectordb-engine/1.0.0/"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/vectordb-engine"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in vectordb-engine (PyPI)"
}


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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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