mal-2026-3288
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-05-02 08:00
Modified
2026-05-02 08:00
Summary
Malicious code in common-tg-service (npm)
Details

Malicious npm package published by user shetty123 as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with ams-ssk, which provides the operator's server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure.

common-tg-service performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (Ajtdmwajt1@) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (imap.gmail.com) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker's session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from npoint.io so operators can change behavior without re-publishing.

Blocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at helper-thge.onrender.com. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (-1001801844217 and -1001972065816). Operator infrastructure includes paidgirl.site, cms.paidgirl.site, report-upi.netlify.app, and promoteClients2.glitch.me.

Credits
SafeDep safedep.io

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "common-tg-service"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://safedep.io"
      ],
      "name": "SafeDep",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": null
  },
  "details": "Malicious npm package published by user `shetty123` as part of a Telegram account hijacking framework targeting Indian Telegram users. All 502 published versions (1.0.1 through 1.3.207) are malicious. Pairs with `ams-ssk`, which provides the operator\u0027s server-side AMS/CMS infrastructure.\n\n`common-tg-service` performs full Telegram account takeover at runtime when the service is initialized (no install-time hooks, which lets it bypass scanners that gate on preinstall/postinstall lifecycle scripts). Behavior includes: implanting a hardcoded 2FA password (`Ajtdmwajt1@`) and recovery email on hijacked accounts; polling an operator-controlled Gmail inbox over IMAP (`imap.gmail.com`) to auto-submit 2FA confirmation codes; revoking all device authorizations except the attacker\u0027s session; harvesting OTP codes by monitoring Telegram chat 777000 and forwarding them to the operator; running SRP ownership checks against managed accounts and flagging rotated 2FA as unrecoverable; and fetching remote JSON configuration from `npoint.io` so operators can change behavior without re-publishing.\n\nBlocked outbound requests are laundered through a relay at `helper-thge.onrender.com`. Stolen accounts and updates are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled Telegram channels (`-1001801844217` and `-1001972065816`). Operator infrastructure includes `paidgirl.site`, `cms.paidgirl.site`, `report-upi.netlify.app`, and `promoteClients2.glitch.me`.",
  "id": "MAL-2026-3288",
  "modified": "2026-05-02T08:00:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-02T08:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://safedep.io/malicious-common-tg-service-npm-telegram-hijacking-framework/"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in common-tg-service (npm)"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…