mal-2026-16238
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (5f04ef6b35ce447e6825a520a88eda4fe27ebfe6214648906db673e7d57ea86b)
Package advertises itself as a Strapi plugin but ships no plugin functionality; the entire payload is postinstall.js, which is also declared as the package main. On install, postinstall.js checks os.hostname() against 'ubuntu-fc-uvm' and then invokes child_process.exec on an inline python3 one-liner that opens a TCP socket to the hardcoded remote host 14.225.210.85:80, dups the socket onto stdin/stdout/stderr, and calls pty.spawn('sh'), yielding an interactive reverse shell on the installer's machine. A retry loop attempts up to five reconnects. The hostname gate is a targeting/anti-analysis check, not a safety limit. The package name and Strapi-plugin framing are a cover story; no legitimate plugin code is present.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "4d4d4c8b33a87d03be45370616b16c71a8b91a8cb12899fac511a5db72cc6993",
"tlsh": "ba4131ad06bf273a63334ca8521b8097e51701023512d578799c8b53bfd5d99c531bf9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "strapi-plugin-portcc-meeb-3.6.8.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "90f1b9b173577dd3bd2a4ed9f1870b6659d013d5",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-1rd5y8D3PmVFpCWsPT+NPZo8c526zeK6CdTqjtG0k1bcA7ilzmmN9Z7hTrFEvUTuHgaVL8gkqrZd16hKPmdi/g=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "strapi-plugin-portcc-meeb"
},
"versions": [
"3.6.8"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020094",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T14:19:37.542684546Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T13:57:39Z",
"sha256": "5f04ef6b35ce447e6825a520a88eda4fe27ebfe6214648906db673e7d57ea86b",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.6.8"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5f04ef6b35ce447e6825a520a88eda4fe27ebfe6214648906db673e7d57ea86b)\nPackage advertises itself as a Strapi plugin but ships no plugin functionality; the entire payload is postinstall.js, which is also declared as the package `main`. On install, postinstall.js checks os.hostname() against \u0027ubuntu-fc-uvm\u0027 and then invokes child_process.exec on an inline python3 one-liner that opens a TCP socket to the hardcoded remote host 14.225.210.85:80, dups the socket onto stdin/stdout/stderr, and calls pty.spawn(\u0027sh\u0027), yielding an interactive reverse shell on the installer\u0027s machine. A retry loop attempts up to five reconnects. The hostname gate is a targeting/anti-analysis check, not a safety limit. The package name and Strapi-plugin framing are a cover story; no legitimate plugin code is present.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16238",
"modified": "2026-09-16T13:57:39Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T13:57:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/strapi-plugin-portcc-meeb/v/3.6.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in strapi-plugin-portcc-meeb (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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