mal-2026-16222
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (45eb01f2eb09b73c0660d97e76d37ab8f7d62773cab9cdbdea65039a37dbb534)
package.json declares preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts that run curl against http://tko.amgsec.com/depconf/traktis-core/ on every npm install, carrying the output of whoami, hostname, and PWD as query parameters together with a base64-encoded dump of CI-related environment variables (GITHUB_, CI_PROJECT, JENKINS_URL, BUILD_URL, GITLAB_, RUNNER_*, HOSTNAME, USER, HOME). index.js is a one-line placeholder with no functionality, so the manifest is the entire payload. The scoped name combined with version 99.99.2 is the shape used to win dependency resolution against an internal package of the same name, causing internal build systems to install this artifact and beacon their identity and CI/repo metadata to a hardcoded non-publisher endpoint over plaintext HTTP.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "424da3d8af2d03fe5127134895ddc49037c577029d84665cc525236c83bb8b38",
"tlsh": "c201cb34ee69a933bec5a0b419e8d30db182b8ce41b0386477438c146a9c61534ae56d"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "c4f212c13101ef585d303d83ad985fad6be41203e8ae39e2e3d5560c9a4cc04c",
"tlsh": "57900204d1845392540889051d014621621d54a1977102912103054637125a0973e980"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "core-99.99.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "7ec71dd42835cd0458954e016f2f5f2b80e651a1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-VFoGfiD5MmzN0KWxH1XlHBYb3QHDaIT5MnYyRjllnjuC6Hq2bca4FpUTSF9nQaB0tUMCwAWVubHaPllZ+J0WJA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@traktis/core"
},
"versions": [
"99.99.2"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020109",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T14:19:38.509451228Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T14:00:09Z",
"sha256": "45eb01f2eb09b73c0660d97e76d37ab8f7d62773cab9cdbdea65039a37dbb534",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"99.99.2"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (45eb01f2eb09b73c0660d97e76d37ab8f7d62773cab9cdbdea65039a37dbb534)\npackage.json declares preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts that run curl against http://tko.amgsec.com/depconf/traktis-core/ on every `npm install`, carrying the output of whoami, hostname, and PWD as query parameters together with a base64-encoded dump of CI-related environment variables (GITHUB_*, CI_PROJECT, JENKINS_URL, BUILD_URL, GITLAB_*, RUNNER_*, HOSTNAME, USER, HOME). index.js is a one-line placeholder with no functionality, so the manifest is the entire payload. The scoped name combined with version 99.99.2 is the shape used to win dependency resolution against an internal package of the same name, causing internal build systems to install this artifact and beacon their identity and CI/repo metadata to a hardcoded non-publisher endpoint over plaintext HTTP.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16222",
"modified": "2026-09-16T14:00:09Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T14:00:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@traktis/core/v/99.99.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @traktis/core (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.