mal-2026-16215
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (1e843727c643c5d966acaa66461f7e392813a4284cd8181b4bb9b24ddfb8447a)
The package's main entrypoint (index.js) invokes an initializer at top level that spawns loader.js as a detached background Node process on every require/import. loader.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://api.npoint.io/24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f, base64-decodes the JSON code field, and passes the decoded string to new Function(require, __dirname, __filename, module, exports,...), executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges as the installing user. The endpoint URL is stored in a variable named API_KEY to disguise its nature, and the manifest/README advertise a runtime/system-info utility with a getRuntimeInfo() API that does not exist in the shipped code. The api.npoint.io document is attacker-mutable, unauthenticated, and unpinned, so whoever controls that bin controls what runs on any host importing this package.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "loader.js",
"sha256": "21bfaa51988b8dc7220f58d33e570d50ce43bc6103f872fda68db1eafe7729c6",
"tlsh": "7e5121a60afb3512027770e6bb0b596a96bbe113314ec994fa9cc3d44fc2421d6d72dc"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "659612116d1f68484c789fe7095bb0ad7c9d0bdb5c5b10fa67e761bc286c117e",
"tlsh": "82f0ac4b10836763855be3969652d0c00a7a8a0c3644ba02481f52bd0f940958356f53"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "091e2107daf39d80e08f34445a3f8faaee710c2b9601ce5e040855337e33bca1",
"tlsh": "b301f512caa1ac9311c9ae5abd9a464761b10e434605fd093797122c4fae16f60ff66c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "engin1-1.3.99.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "8864e8d1c466f490a5e3f1e2f49158c6b31d006b",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-jW/oKqEnJehcMW0Qq2VguD8qnkWaXKKIPEv9SePhnaSLjQEIiN/M1vUSluqASyQA927RrmHeeuB5HyJYCJ2eIQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "engin1"
},
"versions": [
"1.3.99"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020083",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T06:56:08.607863721Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:31:29Z",
"sha256": "1e843727c643c5d966acaa66461f7e392813a4284cd8181b4bb9b24ddfb8447a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.3.99"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1e843727c643c5d966acaa66461f7e392813a4284cd8181b4bb9b24ddfb8447a)\nThe package\u0027s main entrypoint (index.js) invokes an initializer at top level that spawns loader.js as a detached background Node process on every require/import. loader.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://api.npoint.io/24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f, base64-decodes the JSON `code` field, and passes the decoded string to `new Function(require, __dirname, __filename, module, exports,...)`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges as the installing user. The endpoint URL is stored in a variable named `API_KEY` to disguise its nature, and the manifest/README advertise a runtime/system-info utility with a `getRuntimeInfo()` API that does not exist in the shipped code. The api.npoint.io document is attacker-mutable, unauthenticated, and unpinned, so whoever controls that bin controls what runs on any host importing this package.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16215",
"modified": "2026-09-16T06:31:29Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T06:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/engin1/v/1.3.99"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in engin1 (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.