mal-2026-16213
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (3eadb25768efba4ff9dc9170a838f90f6572993195d37e526543fa956e65faa2)
index.js is the package main and unconditionally starts a backup loop at module top level. On require, BackupManager zips process.cwd() (excluding node_modules,.git, archives) via archiver and uploads the archive with Telegraf's sendDocument to a hardcoded Telegram bot token ('8837512876:AAHX...') and chat_id '7549282259' shipped in src/config.js. The loop repeats every 60 minutes, continuously exfiltrating the installer's project tree (including any.env files, credentials, and source code) to the attacker's Telegram chat. The package is named 'discord-players' with description 'idk' but ships a 'tg-backup' CLI; the README documents a user-configured TG_BOT_TOKEN via a setup wizard that writes.env, and bin/setup.js does write a.env, but config.js ignores process.env entirely and always uses the hardcoded token and chat_id — the env-configuration story is a cover for hardcoded exfiltration to the author's chat.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "src/config.js",
"sha256": "64d39d682b49f10705276cdab1fe99eaba4509e1a841ae3aa325b5793afdf508",
"tlsh": "1b01287a98f751a6112545d7e6af502b194c80133d22f835b78c89c04fdf25c4072efe"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "008b637cf681cd16bd0faec93c7e6731a8bce92babbab7731e82f36ac31ddeed",
"tlsh": "31f0f624cd71adb318c85b720d7b42463121a8575c2cfc1c3382125c8f8e12f34f966d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "discord-players-3.4.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "774d53251125f7aa55fd20d4ed4221e64d95840b",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-ZEk5UxuAFtv1HhkPnzH4wpCHdIwAGXfwowbfSRRpFRhnmhHSG8Ghry5wolsfodhM+/lAP77mx5V+iitS6QjkFg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "discord-players"
},
"versions": [
"3.4.2"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020090",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T06:56:09.26285083Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:37:12Z",
"sha256": "3eadb25768efba4ff9dc9170a838f90f6572993195d37e526543fa956e65faa2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.4.2"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3eadb25768efba4ff9dc9170a838f90f6572993195d37e526543fa956e65faa2)\nindex.js is the package main and unconditionally starts a backup loop at module top level. On require, BackupManager zips process.cwd() (excluding node_modules,.git, archives) via archiver and uploads the archive with Telegraf\u0027s sendDocument to a hardcoded Telegram bot token (\u00278837512876:AAHX...\u0027) and chat_id \u00277549282259\u0027 shipped in src/config.js. The loop repeats every 60 minutes, continuously exfiltrating the installer\u0027s project tree (including any.env files, credentials, and source code) to the attacker\u0027s Telegram chat. The package is named \u0027discord-players\u0027 with description \u0027idk\u0027 but ships a \u0027tg-backup\u0027 CLI; the README documents a user-configured TG_BOT_TOKEN via a setup wizard that writes.env, and bin/setup.js does write a.env, but config.js ignores process.env entirely and always uses the hardcoded token and chat_id \u2014 the env-configuration story is a cover for hardcoded exfiltration to the author\u0027s chat.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16213",
"modified": "2026-09-16T06:37:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T06:37:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/discord-players/v/3.4.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in discord-players (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.