mal-2026-16211
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (70fb3b7b76f32b1c101b04c15933b403658f199267e9c3c34ebea9aba917949a)
On require/import, index.js invokes initialize() which spawns loader.js as a detached, hidden background child process (detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: 'ignore', unref'd) and records a.pid file to avoid re-spawning. loader.js performs an HTTPS GET against https://api.npoint.io/641d37178a880b1e8b8f (a user-editable JSON hosting service), base64-decodes the code field of the response, and executes the decoded payload via new Function("require",..., decodedCode)(require, __dirname, __filename,...), granting the fetched code full access to Node's require, filesystem, and process APIs on the installer's machine. loader.js additionally monkey-patches Module.prototype.require to force windowsHide on all child_process spawn calls and reroute execSync through a hidden cmd.exe /c, concealing further child-process activity. The remote payload is mutable and attacker-controllable via the npoint.io endpoint.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "loader.js",
"sha256": "98602aca3efb91d6f77d4f3d0283681f1a954821885259b70127a66eb34fa7e4",
"tlsh": "d35143a609fb35120277b0e6b70b596a96bba113314ec994fa9cc3d44fc2421d3d32dc"
},
{
"path": "init.js",
"sha256": "dfd17877122c08d4206e82fb3b58793f4063f4005cfdd7805b325be2293d5822",
"tlsh": "f32142ab286a4b3981b2c4aa471fc51013a7d1777254f9a9f4ce87b56f0661cca238c8"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "swnwall-1.2.10.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "1f94ae5929d19fdb0a885660afac4d77c2b6e030",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-5WeY7G2ZwyZQBaLBcEBHlcUomUlOd5ss6SazXbjbSA2Fiap4LLjEtwyjsYAkakAAZRdQqaGqVtHeI2LlrPCiiQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "swnwall"
},
"versions": [
"1.2.10"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020075",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T06:31:14.606334497Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:28:43Z",
"sha256": "70fb3b7b76f32b1c101b04c15933b403658f199267e9c3c34ebea9aba917949a",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.2.10"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (70fb3b7b76f32b1c101b04c15933b403658f199267e9c3c34ebea9aba917949a)\nOn require/import, index.js invokes initialize() which spawns loader.js as a detached, hidden background child process (detached: true, windowsHide: true, stdio: \u0027ignore\u0027, unref\u0027d) and records a.pid file to avoid re-spawning. loader.js performs an HTTPS GET against https://api.npoint.io/641d37178a880b1e8b8f (a user-editable JSON hosting service), base64-decodes the `code` field of the response, and executes the decoded payload via `new Function(\"require\",..., decodedCode)(require, __dirname, __filename,...)`, granting the fetched code full access to Node\u0027s require, filesystem, and process APIs on the installer\u0027s machine. loader.js additionally monkey-patches Module.prototype.require to force windowsHide on all child_process spawn calls and reroute execSync through a hidden `cmd.exe /c`, concealing further child-process activity. The remote payload is mutable and attacker-controllable via the npoint.io endpoint.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16211",
"modified": "2026-09-16T06:28:43Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T06:28:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/swnwall/v/1.2.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in swnwall (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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