mal-2026-16204
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (53d49bf28eb233bca0591b32c11b411d1c10b8e8f978d1b76c6df2e6a00772f3)
The package @prime0/alanced-match is a 1-character-drop typosquat of balanced-match. Its postinstall.js runs automatically on npm install and POSTs a host fingerprint (hostname, username, platform, arch, cwd, node version, pid, non-internal IP addresses, uptime, package name) to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://69.48.229.140:8080/b. Its main entry index.js opens a require-time HTTP polling channel to the same host, retrieves JSON commands from /c every 30 seconds (with 10-minute re-beacons), executes them via child_process.exec, and posts stdout/stderr back to /r — providing full remote code execution on the installer's machine. A source comment self-identifies the code as a 'Minimal stealth agent' and 'typosquat'.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "a7fc4e3167420ca41e89f929a9721a63761e20c83b555338d91580d46e3dd3f1",
"tlsh": "ff4142eb91952124a17371f4ca5f64082bbad16202439e98bc2ce385af7493c072adfc"
},
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "f96920db8aa0d72723e7eab7dc5319f4395a201f8eba307b4f81974730c1d75c",
"tlsh": "571165e00191a6293222a1f1ca5f150917e9e4101201fe98f83cd285bff4e7c07f69ec"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "alanced-match-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "ca2231abea3bb4cad9786e92ccc5a8002df72719",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-g2qPbOPJmote+Y1VNxEYt28dxGPldP4MczXopsf4P4KnNOfLYHbl371tjPY0dkMnaC0VziO8mHcatiGPLTazgQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@prime0/alanced-match"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020072",
"import_time": "2026-09-16T06:31:14.372842728Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-16T06:27:22Z",
"sha256": "53d49bf28eb233bca0591b32c11b411d1c10b8e8f978d1b76c6df2e6a00772f3",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (53d49bf28eb233bca0591b32c11b411d1c10b8e8f978d1b76c6df2e6a00772f3)\nThe package @prime0/alanced-match is a 1-character-drop typosquat of balanced-match. Its postinstall.js runs automatically on npm install and POSTs a host fingerprint (hostname, username, platform, arch, cwd, node version, pid, non-internal IP addresses, uptime, package name) to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://69.48.229.140:8080/b. Its main entry index.js opens a require-time HTTP polling channel to the same host, retrieves JSON commands from /c every 30 seconds (with 10-minute re-beacons), executes them via child_process.exec, and posts stdout/stderr back to /r \u2014 providing full remote code execution on the installer\u0027s machine. A source comment self-identifies the code as a \u0027Minimal stealth agent\u0027 and \u0027typosquat\u0027.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16204",
"modified": "2026-09-16T06:27:22Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T06:27:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@prime0/alanced-match/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @prime0/alanced-match (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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