mal-2026-16179
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (d22d8ef47e17a005ea3305f7d97a3cb4de14f0a3a07e8a1e461e13d25e5e7432)
On require/import, index.js unconditionally calls initialize(), which spawns a detached, unref'd node loader.js child with stdio ignored and writes a PID file. loader.js fetches JSON from https://api.npoint.io/24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f (a mutable third-party paste endpoint), base64-decodes the code field, and executes it via new Function('require','__dirname','__filename','module','exports', decodedCode)(...), granting the remote endpoint operator arbitrary code execution on the installer's host. The remote URL is stored in a constant misleadingly named API_KEY and surrounded by comments describing the loader as a sandboxed educational component, contradicting the actual fetch-decode-eval behavior.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "loader.js",
"sha256": "21bfaa51988b8dc7220f58d33e570d50ce43bc6103f872fda68db1eafe7729c6",
"tlsh": "7e5121a60afb3512027770e6bb0b596a96bbe113314ec994fa9cc3d44fc2421d6d72dc"
},
{
"path": "init.js",
"sha256": "414208fccb89273ad5dc8787c58cadd5139bcc1b0d35fbc2f6a6719e46a1b405",
"tlsh": "5c2142ab286a4b3981b2c4aa471fc51013a6d1777254f9a9f5ce87b56f0671cca238c8"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "process-tailwind-1.1.99.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "52b4fa9bc62dc4600b22486d68df29a95d27e7e1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-Mb1ZdUeOWQSnozK9OB42i1FQDqDc4MCD12DaEbxVbY5PfOZ7EWzpJ4XTPwbqt1kY5sY9cS40hwzLhdQ00qfZrw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "process-tailwind"
},
"versions": [
"1.1.99"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020063",
"import_time": "2026-09-15T16:19:15.669518243Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-15T15:55:20Z",
"sha256": "d22d8ef47e17a005ea3305f7d97a3cb4de14f0a3a07e8a1e461e13d25e5e7432",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.1.99"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (d22d8ef47e17a005ea3305f7d97a3cb4de14f0a3a07e8a1e461e13d25e5e7432)\nOn require/import, index.js unconditionally calls initialize(), which spawns a detached, unref\u0027d `node loader.js` child with stdio ignored and writes a PID file. loader.js fetches JSON from https://api.npoint.io/24c25d5f5fcbb0992a4f (a mutable third-party paste endpoint), base64-decodes the `code` field, and executes it via `new Function(\u0027require\u0027,\u0027__dirname\u0027,\u0027__filename\u0027,\u0027module\u0027,\u0027exports\u0027, decodedCode)(...)`, granting the remote endpoint operator arbitrary code execution on the installer\u0027s host. The remote URL is stored in a constant misleadingly named `API_KEY` and surrounded by comments describing the loader as a sandboxed educational component, contradicting the actual fetch-decode-eval behavior.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16179",
"modified": "2026-09-15T15:55:20Z",
"published": "2026-09-15T15:55:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/process-tailwind/v/1.1.99"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in process-tailwind (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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