mal-2026-16173
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
This package is part of a malicious npm campaign published by the biz44 account. Importing the package automatically launches a detached JavaScript loader that retrieves and executes additional code from npoint.io. The retrieved payload communicates with an attacker-controlled server and implements clipboard collection, keyboard and mouse event collection, filesystem scanning, and theft of Chrome extension storage.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (8e7016cebc45328009f3b55af011e7d5d4db068ea04d85602cac0aeafbe3637e)
On import, index.js calls initialize() which spawns a detached, stdio-suppressed node loader.js child process. loader.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://api.npoint.io/24c12c4b66a29747764f, base64-decodes the code field of the response, and executes it via new Function(require, __dirname, __filename, module, exports, decodedCode) — arbitrary code from a third-party mutable JSON hosting bin runs with full Node privileges on the installer's machine. loader.js additionally monkey-patches Module.prototype.require so any subsequent require('child_process').spawn/execSync call is rewritten to force windowsHide:true and route execSync through a hidden cmd.exe /c spawnSync, ensuring commands issued by the remotely fetched payload run invisibly on Windows. The detached-and-unref'd child, suppressed stdio, and stealth child_process wrapper are consistent with a persistent covert loader whose actual behavior is controlled by whoever owns the npoint bin.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "loader.js",
"sha256": "0bca5c92870c78656fe1d30d69a05af2486c6c36672b5172c249af4106c096b7",
"tlsh": "e45121a609fb211302b770e6bb0b596a96bba113314ecd94fa9cc3d44fc2421d6d72dc"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "11e427eb46163ba1735199f2294e57259403a0a784bc3ba11f410c38ae48d303",
"tlsh": "a6f0ac4b10832723855bf3969652d0c00a7a8a1c3a44ba02481f52bd0f840958356f53"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "id79-client-1.1.79.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "2c92450c77b6bf49234861f1e130d05beeab5514",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-LQpI75RBUsDJWJPLScAZ8uPoYbzpOBvutpa/9wT7VjAbURMUVTRzRiuLQqfX1wOBQpKt6j68O7Vc8zRRerrzEg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "id79-client"
},
"versions": [
"1.1.79"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"name": "ESTsecurity",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://pkgwarden.com"
],
"name": "pkgwarden",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"files": [
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "0bca5c92870c78656fe1d30d69a05af2486c6c36672b5172c249af4106c096b7"
},
"note": "fetches api.npoint.io and executes the base64 code field via new Function",
"paths": [
"loader.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
},
{
"digests": {
"sha256": "5e779c0c5c92005241a49d88604d106d53d102a3d6b942c4140410d247a9220c"
},
"note": "spawns a detached node loader.js on import",
"paths": [
"init.js"
],
"source": "PACKAGE_ARCHIVE"
}
],
"ips": [
"103.170.217.184"
],
"urls": [
"https://api.npoint.io/24c12c4b66a29747764f",
"https://api.npoint.io/37c0a0c68bf7a94ed731",
"http://103.170.217.184:8787"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020069",
"import_time": "2026-09-15T16:19:16.181777312Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-15T15:56:09Z",
"sha256": "8e7016cebc45328009f3b55af011e7d5d4db068ea04d85602cac0aeafbe3637e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.1.79"
]
}
]
},
"details": "This package is part of a malicious npm campaign published by the `biz44` account. Importing the package automatically launches a detached JavaScript loader that retrieves and executes additional code from npoint.io. The retrieved payload communicates with an attacker-controlled server and implements clipboard collection, keyboard and mouse event collection, filesystem scanning, and theft of Chrome extension storage.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (8e7016cebc45328009f3b55af011e7d5d4db068ea04d85602cac0aeafbe3637e)\nOn import, index.js calls initialize() which spawns a detached, stdio-suppressed `node loader.js` child process. loader.js issues an HTTPS GET to https://api.npoint.io/24c12c4b66a29747764f, base64-decodes the `code` field of the response, and executes it via `new Function(require, __dirname, __filename, module, exports, decodedCode)` \u2014 arbitrary code from a third-party mutable JSON hosting bin runs with full Node privileges on the installer\u0027s machine. loader.js additionally monkey-patches `Module.prototype.require` so any subsequent `require(\u0027child_process\u0027).spawn`/`execSync` call is rewritten to force `windowsHide:true` and route execSync through a hidden `cmd.exe /c` spawnSync, ensuring commands issued by the remotely fetched payload run invisibly on Windows. The detached-and-unref\u0027d child, suppressed stdio, and stealth child_process wrapper are consistent with a persistent covert loader whose actual behavior is controlled by whoever owns the npoint bin.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16173",
"modified": "2026-09-15T16:21:12.226827555Z",
"published": "2026-09-12T13:35:09Z",
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in id79-client (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Related by attack behaviour
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