mal-2026-13481
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-08-06 23:55
Modified
2026-08-07 01:01
Summary
Malicious code in cdf-tag-commander-helper (npm)
Details
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (945179057c5bd93b985c3c532baa35379ce9dd9603e26d17e63201beb25868ae)
The preinstall lifecycle script in cdf-tag-commander-helper@3.6.2 runs automatically on npm install. It executes whoami and hostname, retrieves the machine's public IP via ifconfig.me, and issues a plain-HTTP GET to a hardcoded Interactsh-style out-of-band callback subdomain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun), passing the three values as query parameters. The README states that the package makes no network requests, which contradicts the shipped code. The behavior is a reconnaissance beacon consistent with dependency-confusion targeting: on install, an attacker learns which internal build hosts and user accounts have resolved this package name.
CWE
Credits
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "scripts/preinstall.js",
"sha256": "4275061552723f1d31253e74f931ebac93d9f83b772b3c68a53374c1b4c9dd68",
"tlsh": "6d01f9f7636553f04fc2cd96854eb58b5317a12a7502bca87cbd0a563b49c0c13f22d5"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "cdf-tag-commander-helper-3.6.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "ba23f21f8de10419940693d76fa1cce8e9013952",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-fa7pbmsjOFsJetUAPGON51kyJoxoRr8BZ6HBjKP5t95oCIgEV98RBhtHHIGfMWZP1ZyENN4iY1loAfsZceRGRg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "cdf-tag-commander-helper"
},
"versions": [
"3.6.2",
"3.1.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-016851",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T00:59:21.810273287Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-06T23:55:57Z",
"sha256": "945179057c5bd93b985c3c532baa35379ce9dd9603e26d17e63201beb25868ae",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.6.2"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-016850",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T00:59:21.727968778Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-06T23:55:50Z",
"sha256": "ccd31e8393ef0a473c2e445bbd2132361c509f8679338b7a98fd4d9097b17db3",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.1.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (945179057c5bd93b985c3c532baa35379ce9dd9603e26d17e63201beb25868ae)\nThe preinstall lifecycle script in cdf-tag-commander-helper@3.6.2 runs automatically on `npm install`. It executes `whoami` and `hostname`, retrieves the machine\u0027s public IP via ifconfig.me, and issues a plain-HTTP GET to a hardcoded Interactsh-style out-of-band callback subdomain (kwphewvexhjbtfduscqybx6q7c862eh0g.oast.fun), passing the three values as query parameters. The README states that the package makes no network requests, which contradicts the shipped code. The behavior is a reconnaissance beacon consistent with dependency-confusion targeting: on install, an attacker learns which internal build hosts and user accounts have resolved this package name.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13481",
"modified": "2026-08-07T01:01:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T23:55:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/cdf-tag-commander-helper/v/3.6.2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/cdf-tag-commander-helper/v/3.1.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in cdf-tag-commander-helper (npm)"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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