mal-2026-10037
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-07-09 00:00
Modified
2026-07-28 07:58
Summary
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit (npm)
Details

The npm package @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a web3.js SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).


-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (0a07053ee42572578f0fbeab5c9c8551fd2937f1126bc9c71c37546dfdf19edd)

The package installs a postinstall.js payload wired to both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks (and to main), so it runs automatically on npm install. On execution it walks the user's home directory and OS-specific paths and reads files matching wallet, keystore, seed, mnemonic, and credential patterns — including.env, ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, Solana id.json/keypair.json, Ethereum keystores, and browser wallet extension storage for MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), Phantom, and similar extensions. It also scans.txt/.md/.rtf/.csv files across Desktop, Documents, and Downloads (including localized directory names), matches contents against an embedded BIP-39 wordlist to detect seed-phrase backups, and POSTs matching file contents plus host/user identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.homedir()) over plain HTTP to a hardcoded remote endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package.json description is empty and the package ships no legitimate functionality; the web3-themed scoped name is a lure targeting crypto developers.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          },
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "postinstall.js",
              "sha256": "6c9c16897e74d441ac24472d86e97fac219c2fc56f14408ef406b2883df03654",
              "tlsh": "6712d9c576be111d1427d2bbfa2b0202356eae8a260dd995fcce09002f583945bd7bfc"
            },
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "d88d3942aa56e24c3603568ea6c1f6498e09eaa43f9c88d94bb514ac164e0135",
              "tlsh": "53d05e204d515b3378c81bec0827416baef3490f1008292817db2994434e67b947b62f"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "web3-toolkit-1.2.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "0a1a57ea524fac883c113157f3b4e95dd9849145",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-s8lSeq79K/bmTdruXzFihN/E3vXmKaxz1N7HeifXalx45DSwOBD6PbIq3zDgbJwnwJ3JGTYwIabQm3bOCsTRYQ=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.2.0",
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3023-wagni-web3-toolkit"
      ],
      "name": "codelake Research",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "hashes": [
        "sha256:244fd0c108a95e17a07ad46d9f41c9f5b97bc1a01e943079acb8866ead73b0f8"
      ],
      "urls": [
        "https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage"
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009013",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:32.665526837Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:14:27Z",
        "sha256": "0a07053ee42572578f0fbeab5c9c8551fd2937f1126bc9c71c37546dfdf19edd",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.2.0"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009027",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:33.667248098Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:16:36Z",
        "sha256": "888085b6329d0b35602e7d50bedb0175cdb43dc35b2581b80a7ca5fccc7b7dee",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "The npm package `@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **web3.js** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.\n\nEach package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user\u0027s home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets \u2014 SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.\n\ncodelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token \u2014 a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0a07053ee42572578f0fbeab5c9c8551fd2937f1126bc9c71c37546dfdf19edd)\nThe package installs a postinstall.js payload wired to both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks (and to main), so it runs automatically on `npm install`. On execution it walks the user\u0027s home directory and OS-specific paths and reads files matching wallet, keystore, seed, mnemonic, and credential patterns \u2014 including.env, ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.netrc, Solana id.json/keypair.json, Ethereum keystores, and browser wallet extension storage for MetaMask (nkbihfbeogaeaoehlefnkodbefgpgknn), Phantom, and similar extensions. It also scans.txt/.md/.rtf/.csv files across Desktop, Documents, and Downloads (including localized directory names), matches contents against an embedded BIP-39 wordlist to detect seed-phrase backups, and POSTs matching file contents plus host/user identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.homedir()) over plain HTTP to a hardcoded remote endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package.json description is empty and the package ships no legitimate functionality; the web3-themed scoped name is a lure targeting crypto developers.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-10037",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T07:58:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T00:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit/v/1.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/web3-toolkit/v/1.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3023-wagni-web3-toolkit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in @wagni_bot/web3-toolkit (npm)"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…