mal-2026-10035
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
The npm package @wagni_bot/solana-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Solana SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e15edf4a83ab4894a29882072554e493c1673695d5e6aaa734672ba6da084112)
Package @wagni_bot/solana-sdk impersonates a legitimate Solana SDK but contains no SDK functionality — main points at postinstall.js, which is a credential-harvesting payload that runs automatically on npm install via preinstall/postinstall hooks. On execution the script recursively walks the installer's home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, and /tmp for wallet and secret files (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, MetaMask/Phantom extension storage in Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles,.env, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt), and reads SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_*), AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials), git credentials,.npmrc,.netrc, and Solana/Ethereum keystores. Collected file contents (up to 10KB each) are bundled with os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and cwd, then POSTed in cleartext to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name typosquats the Solana SDK ecosystem to lure developers into installing the harvester.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "3d8a59e627a451040c959870dace8fb417d1f9c55c6e2d2190637289212f8b3f",
"tlsh": "5c8155c4b1fa520958a341eefa5b220210717d573848e4a9fedc9f456f56240af53bfc"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "65b1b0321120ad8458ec9801342ac23930095173d05dac4b2f6498c3db374264",
"tlsh": "2ed05e204e505f33b8c81bed0937416aa9f3490b1118292c17df3894874e67b98bb72e"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "solana-sdk-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "a2da22179b6feee14f73568c3e9008f3ed94a853",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-IsekbLfEF9WDOmQii3NuSZDu8pne4VsOXWN1VKQsUc2Gy9Yif4MPjIVSoR6OD4a5s/Fi7ZXI9tw2CBSdopksjQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@wagni_bot/solana-sdk"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.2.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3003-wagni-solana-sdk"
],
"name": "codelake Research",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:1f150439a46f3fddda321fe45dc1ff99b8f874defb1088edb09873ee5487c766"
],
"urls": [
"https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-009048",
"import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:36.326758107Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:20:05Z",
"sha256": "a2007f27f9956a58b77a5e6bc010944f866ea375a9e76ef8d080979721e51eba",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-009019",
"import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:33.064753249Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:15:23Z",
"sha256": "e15edf4a83ab4894a29882072554e493c1673695d5e6aaa734672ba6da084112",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.2.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "The npm package `@wagni_bot/solana-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Solana** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.\n\nEach package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user\u0027s home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets \u2014 SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.\n\ncodelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token \u2014 a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e15edf4a83ab4894a29882072554e493c1673695d5e6aaa734672ba6da084112)\nPackage @wagni_bot/solana-sdk impersonates a legitimate Solana SDK but contains no SDK functionality \u2014 `main` points at postinstall.js, which is a credential-harvesting payload that runs automatically on `npm install` via preinstall/postinstall hooks. On execution the script recursively walks the installer\u0027s home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /root, and /tmp for wallet and secret files (id.json, wallet.json, keypair.json, MetaMask/Phantom extension storage in Chrome/Brave/Edge profiles,.env, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt), and reads SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_*), AWS credentials (~/.aws/credentials), git credentials,.npmrc,.netrc, and Solana/Ethereum keystores. Collected file contents (up to 10KB each) are bundled with os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, and cwd, then POSTed in cleartext to http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name typosquats the Solana SDK ecosystem to lure developers into installing the harvester.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-10035",
"modified": "2026-07-28T07:58:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/solana-sdk/v/1.0.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/solana-sdk/v/1.2.0"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3003-wagni-solana-sdk"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @wagni_bot/solana-sdk (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.