mal-2026-10034
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-07-09 00:00
Modified
2026-07-28 07:58
Summary
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk (npm)
Details

The npm package @wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Pump.fun SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).


-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (c3c060b019bf424240d1dbb396577a6b8a1e6079de951e5732f5027e767bab20)

On npm install, postinstall.js recursively walks the user's home directory harvesting cryptocurrency wallet material (Solana id.json, Ethereum keystores, wallet.dat, seed/mnemonic files) and developer credentials (~/.ssh private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.npmrc auth tokens,.env files). The collected file contents together with os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username are JSON-encoded and POSTed over plain HTTP to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package ships no functional SDK code; the postinstall script is the entire payload, while the package name mimics the legitimate Solana pump.fun SDK naming to lure developers. Installing this package on any developer or CI machine causes immediate loss of SSH keys, cloud credentials, npm publish tokens, git credentials, and any crypto wallet keys present in the home directory.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          },
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "postinstall.js",
              "sha256": "6c9c16897e74d441ac24472d86e97fac219c2fc56f14408ef406b2883df03654",
              "tlsh": "6712d9c576be111d1427d2bbfa2b0202356eae8a260dd995fcce09002f583945bd7bfc"
            },
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "0c17c07b8b9b4169fe462bc08939e7088144a21523384cf96e4b99cc9430dfd9",
              "tlsh": "eed05e204e505b3378c91bec0827416aa9f3591b1118692857df2894470e27b947b62f"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "pumpfun-sdk-1.2.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "881b66fabbea39a8708d8e8aeb88cb7a9974fc38",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-FNG/JM9ry83i7neh77VaVoiASIaAyH/fuflCErqpuxtNPuH105i0OQj+jK9yNfxv7Ssb6bnF+uxSS61rvbPyrQ=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.2.0",
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3007-wagni-pumpfun-sdk"
      ],
      "name": "codelake Research",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "hashes": [
        "sha256:176b3290679930a929448fc6e1daec081908e146c99977b4c439af3edeee31b4"
      ],
      "urls": [
        "https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage"
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009038",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:35.070495173Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:18:25Z",
        "sha256": "4de202cbfc85ad5e2bd273362095b18d2d1b79337c4cb8a4adedbcc850853168",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.2.0"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009047",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:36.272454627Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:19:56Z",
        "sha256": "c3c060b019bf424240d1dbb396577a6b8a1e6079de951e5732f5027e767bab20",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "The npm package `@wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Pump.fun** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.\n\nEach package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user\u0027s home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets \u2014 SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.\n\ncodelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token \u2014 a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c3c060b019bf424240d1dbb396577a6b8a1e6079de951e5732f5027e767bab20)\nOn npm install, postinstall.js recursively walks the user\u0027s home directory harvesting cryptocurrency wallet material (Solana id.json, Ethereum keystores, wallet.dat, seed/mnemonic files) and developer credentials (~/.ssh private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.npmrc auth tokens,.env files). The collected file contents together with os.hostname() and os.userInfo().username are JSON-encoded and POSTed over plain HTTP to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package ships no functional SDK code; the postinstall script is the entire payload, while the package name mimics the legitimate Solana pump.fun SDK naming to lure developers. Installing this package on any developer or CI machine causes immediate loss of SSH keys, cloud credentials, npm publish tokens, git credentials, and any crypto wallet keys present in the home directory.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-10034",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T07:58:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T00:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk/v/1.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk/v/1.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3007-wagni-pumpfun-sdk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in @wagni_bot/pumpfun-sdk (npm)"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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