mal-2026-10031
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
The npm package @wagni_bot/orca-sdk is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a Orca (Solana DEX) SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.
Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.
codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (6fcc40768d3a7cdf73ca8664e00519e42639493a81144d6310af862b91816273)
@wagni_bot/orca-sdk@1.0.0 ships a single file, postinstall.js, which is registered as the package main and as both the preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts. On npm install, this script executes automatically and (1) collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), process.cwd()) and beacons a 'postinstall_executed' heartbeat, (2) reads installer-owned secrets from well-known paths — ~/.ssh keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, and the npm authToken from ~/.npmrc — and (3) recursively walks the user's home directory (up to 3 levels, skipping node_modules/Library/AppData/snap/cache) looking for crypto-wallet artifacts (id.json, wallet.json, keystore.json, mnemonic.txt, seed/recovery files, MetaMask/Phantom JSON, wallet.dat, etc.) and any.env /.env.local /.env.production file. All collected content is POSTed over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name imitates the widely used Orca (Solana DEX) SDK, and the wallet target list is oriented at Solana developers whose ~/.config/solana/id.json is directly harvested. No legitimate SDK functionality is present; the package's sole purpose is credential and wallet theft at install time.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "3d8a59e627a451040c959870dace8fb417d1f9c55c6e2d2190637289212f8b3f",
"tlsh": "5c8155c4b1fa520958a341eefa5b220210717d573848e4a9fedc9f456f56240af53bfc"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "db6f58546232e4b05d019c2304e9963fcb221735917b76c929a17039e5fc5605",
"tlsh": "d2d05e204e505b7379c81bec0837816baaf3490b1018292817db2894834e27b947b62e"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "orca-sdk-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "c1bfc56a3d705bba64ac06016999c60c4aa900d1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-t6OZSRQmdtABAdvnOeORKB0e2urS3GgUvJfnsgdnoUj7UVkk67lipRJ+JEjjGt4YPJ2b+trTgCdEtUfk2hKAEw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@wagni_bot/orca-sdk"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0",
"1.2.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3005-wagni-orca-sdk"
],
"name": "codelake Research",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"iocs": {
"hashes": [
"sha256:6631dc762cc91d6ae04c9a7b6273c468739a0aacc5c0fa630fb9cded2c140868"
],
"urls": [
"https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage"
]
},
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-009049",
"import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:36.403424202Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:20:13Z",
"sha256": "6fcc40768d3a7cdf73ca8664e00519e42639493a81144d6310af862b91816273",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-009036",
"import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:34.805294968Z",
"modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:18:06Z",
"sha256": "ad9c40e5686bf1f20afccb03e6faf4d8125fbab7c1e41215826c6f09ac369ed2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.2.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "The npm package `@wagni_bot/orca-sdk` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **Orca (Solana DEX)** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.\n\nEach package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user\u0027s home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets \u2014 SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.\n\ncodelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token \u2014 a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (6fcc40768d3a7cdf73ca8664e00519e42639493a81144d6310af862b91816273)\n@wagni_bot/orca-sdk@1.0.0 ships a single file, postinstall.js, which is registered as the package main and as both the preinstall and postinstall lifecycle scripts. On `npm install`, this script executes automatically and (1) collects host identity (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), process.cwd()) and beacons a \u0027postinstall_executed\u0027 heartbeat, (2) reads installer-owned secrets from well-known paths \u2014 ~/.ssh keys, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.git-credentials, and the npm authToken from ~/.npmrc \u2014 and (3) recursively walks the user\u0027s home directory (up to 3 levels, skipping node_modules/Library/AppData/snap/cache) looking for crypto-wallet artifacts (id.json, wallet.json, keystore.json, mnemonic.txt, seed/recovery files, MetaMask/Phantom JSON, wallet.dat, etc.) and any.env /.env.local /.env.production file. All collected content is POSTed over plain HTTP to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package name imitates the widely used Orca (Solana DEX) SDK, and the wallet target list is oriented at Solana developers whose ~/.config/solana/id.json is directly harvested. No legitimate SDK functionality is present; the package\u0027s sole purpose is credential and wallet theft at install time.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-10031",
"modified": "2026-07-28T07:58:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-09T00:00:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/orca-sdk/v/1.0.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/orca-sdk/v/1.2.0"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3005-wagni-orca-sdk"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @wagni_bot/orca-sdk (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.