mal-2026-10025
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-07-09 00:00
Modified
2026-07-28 07:58
Summary
Malicious code in @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet (npm)
Details

The npm package @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a an Ethereum wallet library SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope @wagni_bot on 2026-07-09.

Each package declares a postinstall lifecycle hook (postinstall: node postinstall.js) that executes automatically on npm install, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (os.hostname(), os.userInfo(), os.platform()), walks the user's home directory (readdirSync/readFileSync) and reads high-value secrets — SSH private keys (~/.ssh/id_rsa), cryptocurrency wallet files, and .env files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API sendMessage endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.

codelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token — a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).


-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (181ac4262af395234755b7e5755de0eff6cf084cab58c95e4660d3b2a66c385b)

@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet@1.2.0 ships a single file postinstall.js that is wired to run automatically via both preinstall and postinstall npm lifecycle hooks (and is also set as package main). On install it recursively walks the user's home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /tmp, and /root looking for cryptocurrency wallet artifacts and credential files, including wallet.json, keystore.json, id.json, metamask.json, phantom.json, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt, private.key,.env files, credentials.json,.npmrc,.netrc,.git-credentials, ~/.ssh private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, and browser extension Local Storage directories for MetaMask and Phantom. It also scans.txt/.md files for BIP-39, seed, mnemonic, and password keywords in English and Spanish. Each matched file's contents (truncated to 10000 bytes) plus hostname, username, and cwd are POSTed to the hardcoded endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package has an empty description and no legitimate functionality beyond this harvester, and its name imitates generic wallet-utility packages to lure developers.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          },
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "postinstall.js",
              "sha256": "6c9c16897e74d441ac24472d86e97fac219c2fc56f14408ef406b2883df03654",
              "tlsh": "6712d9c576be111d1427d2bbfa2b0202356eae8a260dd995fcce09002f583945bd7bfc"
            },
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "a7b7e443d2f321c3e4e7b50ffc4ee771e0ba4f0b7b71b2a4fcf5a62e24d486ae",
              "tlsh": "efd05e204e505b7378c81bed082741abaaf3491b51082a2827df2894430e27b987b21f"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "ethereum-wallet-1.2.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "279e450660572e6b6917d98a5517332b52a54e81",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-J5AD+akCb9VZV4WuR75T/nC+8wLIrO5fTLsyUtk1OUTjSGUB6qMx3R+J7lrfp7RmjwW+lPQ4XLbZ0PrC0wUb5g=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.2.0",
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    },
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3020-wagni-ethereum-wallet"
      ],
      "name": "codelake Research",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "iocs": {
      "hashes": [
        "sha256:5feab4badcc22976d83f714c4641fe123d8a7f791935a4d26c4bf56b713216be"
      ],
      "urls": [
        "https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage"
      ]
    },
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009014",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:32.749511301Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:14:36Z",
        "sha256": "181ac4262af395234755b7e5755de0eff6cf084cab58c95e4660d3b2a66c385b",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.2.0"
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-009029",
        "import_time": "2026-07-09T16:20:33.761024429Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-07-09T15:16:59Z",
        "sha256": "2cfda5bb18b5f8877a8baaee233d198d8da5498c8a1b1e90e87623a49a7bcc51",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "The npm package `@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet` is a supply-chain credential stealer disguised as a **an Ethereum wallet library** SDK. It is one member of a coordinated campaign of 25 crypto/web3 typosquat packages published under the single npm scope `@wagni_bot` on 2026-07-09.\n\nEach package declares a `postinstall` lifecycle hook (`postinstall: node postinstall.js`) that executes automatically on `npm install`, before the package is ever imported. The script fingerprints the host and user (`os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo()`, `os.platform()`), walks the user\u0027s home directory (`readdirSync`/`readFileSync`) and reads high-value secrets \u2014 SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cryptocurrency wallet files, and `.env` files (API keys, tokens, seed phrases). It then JSON-encodes the collected data and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot via the Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` endpoint (https://api.telegram.org/bot8804087989:AAHUia-5DCloXsg9M9QhffTsHO5J_6FAxQM/sendMessage). All error paths are swallowed so the install appears normal.\n\ncodelake Research proved the packages belong to one campaign deterministically: the payload file is byte-identical across all 25 packages at each published version (version-lockstep), and every package exfiltrates to the same Telegram bot token \u2014 a single automated actor. Detected and classified independently from the live npm feed on 2026-07-09; at the time of reporting the packages were still live on npm and none of the 25 were present in OSV or GHSA (a first-catch).\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (181ac4262af395234755b7e5755de0eff6cf084cab58c95e4660d3b2a66c385b)\n@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet@1.2.0 ships a single file postinstall.js that is wired to run automatically via both preinstall and postinstall npm lifecycle hooks (and is also set as package main). On install it recursively walks the user\u0027s home directory, Desktop, Documents, Downloads, /tmp, and /root looking for cryptocurrency wallet artifacts and credential files, including wallet.json, keystore.json, id.json, metamask.json, phantom.json, seed.txt, mnemonic.txt, private.key,.env files, credentials.json,.npmrc,.netrc,.git-credentials, ~/.ssh private keys, ~/.aws/credentials, and browser extension Local Storage directories for MetaMask and Phantom. It also scans.txt/.md files for BIP-39, seed, mnemonic, and password keywords in English and Spanish. Each matched file\u0027s contents (truncated to 10000 bytes) plus hostname, username, and cwd are POSTed to the hardcoded endpoint http://107.161.90.180:7777. The package has an empty description and no legitimate functionality beyond this harvester, and its name imitates generic wallet-utility packages to lure developers.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-10025",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T07:58:22Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T00:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet/v/1.2.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet/v/1.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://research.codelake.dev/advisories/clr-2026-3020-wagni-ethereum-wallet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in @wagni_bot/ethereum-wallet (npm)"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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