GSD-2023-52592
Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2024-03-03 06:01Details
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libbpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_object__collect_prog_relos
An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206
4206 in libbpf.c
(gdb) bt
#0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206
#1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706
#2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437
#3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497
#4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16
#5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one ()
#6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope ()
#7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir ()
#8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} ()
#9 0x00000000005f2601 in main ()
(gdb)
scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c):
if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) {
The scn_data is derived from the code above:
scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx);
scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn);
relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name);
sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn);
if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL
return -EINVAL;
In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file,
it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer
Aliases
{
"gsd": {
"metadata": {
"exploitCode": "unknown",
"remediation": "unknown",
"reportConfidence": "confirmed",
"type": "vulnerability"
},
"osvSchema": {
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52592"
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibbpf: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bpf_object__collect_prog_relos\n\nAn issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing:\n\n\tProgram received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.\n\t0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206\n\t4206 in libbpf.c\n\t(gdb) bt\n\t#0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206\n\t#1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706\n\t#2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437\n\t#3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497\n\t#4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16\n\t#5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one ()\n\t#6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope ()\n\t#7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir ()\n\t#8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} ()\n\t#9 0x00000000005f2601 in main ()\n\t(gdb)\n\nscn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c):\n\n\tif (rel-\u003er_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel-\u003er_offset \u003e= scn_data-\u003ed_size) {\n\nThe scn_data is derived from the code above:\n\n\tscn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx);\n\tscn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn);\n\n\trelo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr-\u003esh_name);\n\tsec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn);\n\tif (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don\u0027t check whether scn_data is NULL\n\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n\nIn certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file,\nit is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer",
"id": "GSD-2023-52592",
"modified": "2024-03-03T06:01:51.551344Z",
"schema_version": "1.4.0"
}
},
"namespaces": {
"cve.org": {
"CVE_data_meta": {
"ASSIGNER": "cve@kernel.org",
"ID": "CVE-2023-52592",
"STATE": "REJECT"
},
"data_format": "MITRE",
"data_type": "CVE",
"data_version": "4.0",
"description": {
"description_data": [
{
"lang": "eng",
"value": "** REJECT ** This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority."
}
]
}
},
"nvd.nist.gov": {
"cve": {
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-52592",
"lastModified": "2024-03-07T21:15:07.620",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2024-03-06T07:15:08.733",
"references": [],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Rejected"
}
}
}
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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