GHSA-XR7V-J379-34V9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-28 21:41 – Updated: 2026-01-28 21:41
VLAI?
Summary
NocoDB has Blind SSRF via Unvalidated HEAD Request in uploadViaURL Functionality
Details

Summary

A blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the uploadViaURL functionality due to an unprotected HEAD request. While the subsequent file retrieval logic correctly enforces SSRF protections, the initial metadata request executes without validation.

This allows limited outbound requests to arbitrary URLs before SSRF controls are applied.


Vulnerability Details

The uploadViaURL() function issues an axios.head() request to retrieve metadata (content type, content length, and final URL after redirects). This request is performed without SSRF filtering.

Although the actual file download is protected by request filtering, the initial HEAD request occurs prior to these checks and can be triggered with an attacker-controlled URL.

Vulnerable Code

if (!url.startsWith('data:')) {
  response = await axios.head(url, { maxRedirects: 5 });
  mimeType = response.headers['content-type']?.split(';')[0];
  size = response.headers['content-length'];
  finalUrl = response.request.res.responseUrl;
}

Impact

The impact of this issue is limited due to the following constraints:

  • Only HEAD requests are affected (no response body is returned)
  • No direct exfiltration of response data occurs
  • The subsequent file-fetching logic enforces SSRF protections

However, the vulnerability may still allow:

  • Blind SSRF via outbound HEAD requests
  • Limited internal service probing (reachability and response behavior)
  • Interaction with sensitive internal endpoints that respond to HEAD requests

This issue does not provide arbitrary data access or full internal network compromise on its own.


Severity

Moderate

The vulnerability is limited in scope and impact:

  • Only HEAD requests are affected
  • No response body or sensitive data is directly returned
  • The actual file download logic enforces SSRF protections

While the issue permits blind outbound requests to attacker-controlled URLs, it does not enable direct data exfiltration or full internal network compromise on its own.


Proof of Concept

curl -X POST 'http://localhost:8080/api/v2/storage/upload-by-url' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'xc-auth: <token>' \
  -d '[{
    "url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
    "fileName": "test.txt"
  }]'

This request causes the server to issue an unfiltered HEAD request before SSRF protections are applied.


Acknowledgements

This issue was first identified and responsibly disclosed by Faizan Raza of Kolega.dev as part of a security assessment using Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan, including validation and fix recommendations.

NocoDB also acknowledges Neel B for independently reporting the same issue prior to publication.

NocoDB thanks Kolega.dev for their contribution to improving the security posture of the project.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nocodb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.301.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-28T21:41:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-28T21:16:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA **blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** vulnerability exists in the `uploadViaURL` functionality due to an unprotected `HEAD` request. While the subsequent file retrieval logic correctly enforces SSRF protections, the initial metadata request executes without validation.\n\nThis allows limited outbound requests to arbitrary URLs before SSRF controls are applied.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe `uploadViaURL()` function issues an `axios.head()` request to retrieve metadata (content type, content length, and final URL after redirects). This request is performed **without SSRF filtering**.\n\nAlthough the actual file download is protected by request filtering, the initial `HEAD` request occurs prior to these checks and can be triggered with an attacker-controlled URL.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n```ts\nif (!url.startsWith(\u0027data:\u0027)) {\n  response = await axios.head(url, { maxRedirects: 5 });\n  mimeType = response.headers[\u0027content-type\u0027]?.split(\u0027;\u0027)[0];\n  size = response.headers[\u0027content-length\u0027];\n  finalUrl = response.request.res.responseUrl;\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this issue is **limited** due to the following constraints:\n\n* Only `HEAD` requests are affected (no response body is returned)\n* No direct exfiltration of response data occurs\n* The subsequent file-fetching logic enforces SSRF protections\n\nHowever, the vulnerability may still allow:\n\n* **Blind SSRF** via outbound `HEAD` requests\n* **Limited internal service probing** (reachability and response behavior)\n* **Interaction with sensitive internal endpoints** that respond to `HEAD` requests\n\nThis issue does **not** provide arbitrary data access or full internal network compromise on its own.\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**Moderate**\n\nThe vulnerability is limited in scope and impact:\n\n* Only `HEAD` requests are affected\n* No response body or sensitive data is directly returned\n* The actual file download logic enforces SSRF protections\n\nWhile the issue permits blind outbound requests to attacker-controlled URLs, it does not enable direct data exfiltration or full internal network compromise on its own.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027http://localhost:8080/api/v2/storage/upload-by-url\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027xc-auth: \u003ctoken\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027[{\n    \"url\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\",\n    \"fileName\": \"test.txt\"\n  }]\u0027\n```\n\nThis request causes the server to issue an unfiltered `HEAD` request before SSRF protections are applied.\n\n---\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nThis issue was first identified and responsibly disclosed by Faizan Raza of Kolega.dev as part of a security assessment using Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan, including validation and fix recommendations.\n\nNocoDB also acknowledges Neel B for independently reporting the same issue prior to publication.\n\nNocoDB thanks Kolega.dev for their contribution to improving the security posture of the project.",
  "id": "GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9",
  "modified": "2026-01-28T21:41:18Z",
  "published": "2026-01-28T21:41:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24767"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NocoDB has Blind SSRF via Unvalidated HEAD Request in uploadViaURL Functionality"
}


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