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GHSA-XCFP-7R4F-6367

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 09:31
VLAI
Details

The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-17576"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T07:16:49Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox =\u003e $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the \u0027iwp_get_comments_\u0027 prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb-\u003eget_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin\u0027s WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.",
  "id": "GHSA-xcfp-7r4f-6367",
  "modified": "2026-09-18T09:31:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T09:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L57"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L80"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php#L131"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php#L1651"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3655042%40iwp-client\u0026new=3655042%40iwp-client"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05c50442-570b-45cf-816a-c7a5b712ba21?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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