GHSA-XCFP-7R4F-6367
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-18 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 09:31The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17576"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-18T07:16:49Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox =\u003e $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the \u0027iwp_get_comments_\u0027 prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb-\u003eget_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin\u0027s WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.",
"id": "GHSA-xcfp-7r4f-6367",
"modified": "2026-09-18T09:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-09-18T09:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17576"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/addons/comments/comments.class.php#L80"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php#L131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/iwp-client/tags/1.13.6/init.php#L1651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3655042%40iwp-client\u0026new=3655042%40iwp-client"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/05c50442-570b-45cf-816a-c7a5b712ba21?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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